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Committee Chair, Dr. Kelly Dixon, Ph.D. 
 
  This dissertation is dedicated to an applied archaeological approach as stated in the mission declaration 
of UMDA’s Ph.D. program in Cultural Heritage and Applied Anthropology: “An overlapping concern of 
the Ph.D. program is applied anthropology, the use of the anthropological perspective to solve real-
world problems, including cultural heritage, medical anthropology, and a host of international 
development issues. At the heart of our program is a strong commitment to employ anthropological 
theory to engage contemporary relevant issues with focused research for communities. While some that 
[sic] are awarded a Ph.D. in Anthropology from [sic] University of Montana will look toward teaching 
careers, a goal of the program is to produce applied anthropologists who will serve in government 
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), tribal and ethnic associations, and businesses”. 
 
  The following dissertation mirrors the above the University of Montana’s Department of Anthropology 
mission statement and does so in an applied archaeological framework. It is also an analytical product of 
focused research involving data and information collection as well as real-world experience on 
archaeological undertakings conducted during counterinsurgency operations. This dissertation provides 
solutions to solving real-world problems (the looting and destruction of cultural property) while 
engaging contemporary relevant issues (armed conflict) whose ultimate purpose is to save human life 
on the contemporary battlefield. 
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                                                Preface 
 
The applied nature of the analysis1 contained herein is inspired by the University of 
Montana Department of Anthropology’s Ph.D. program in Cultural Heritage and Applied 
Anthropology2. This program’s objective is to produce applied anthropologists to serve 
outside of academia versus those who use the Ph.D. to teach anthropology at a college 
or university (UMDA 2016: 1). In accordance with the program’s objective, the following 
dissertation is an applied archaeological effort which is designed for application during 
counterinsurgency3 operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism.   
This dissertation and its content may seem unfamiliar to an archaeological audience in 
that it is of a military nature. This is necessary as it is designed to familiarize 
archaeologists with the women and men of the American Armed Forces. It is also 
designed for American military personnel who wish to work with archaeologists and 
 
11 “Analysis can be as simple as writing up some notes on why we’re convinced that what we’ve found is 
a five or six-year-old bovine corpse, or it can be a very complex undertaking that involves a wide range of 
specialists, lots of special technical studies, and often, many years of work” (King 2005: 76). For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the analyst (author) will use the latter part of King’s definition. 
 
2 Although anthropology and archaeology are considered separate disciplines throughout most of the 
world, American archaeology is one of the four subfields of anthropology; therefore, American 
archaeology is dedicated to furthering “the aims of anthropology” (Binford 1962: 224; See Wiley and 
Philips 1958). Whenever the term archaeology is used in this dissertation, the analyst is referring to the 
Americanist form of the discipline, which means any examples herein associated with the term 
“anthropology” are germane to archaeological research and application. 
 
3 Counterinsurgency consists of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions 
used to defeat an insurgency (FM 1-02 2004:1-47). 
 
2 
 
familiarize themselves with archaeological history, ethics, theories and methods and 
how it can be applied to military training exercises and operations. The format of this 
dissertation is similar in style to formats of doctrinal publications, manuals and 
handbooks of the American military (i.e. Petraeus et al. 2007). Therefore, this 
dissertation is designed and written in said format. 
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Section 1 
Introduction 
 
 Most governments have their hands full combating terrorism, with few  
resources left to spare for tracking down stolen artifacts. Most international 
organizations are content to issue proclamations, preferring to hit the conference 
center rather than the streets. Many cultural organizations and foundations are 
equally content to issue a call for papers rather than a call to action (Bogdanos 
2008: 121).  
1-1. This dissertation is a call to action and is dedicated to an applied archaeological 
approach as stated in the mission statement of the University of Montana Department of 
Anthropology doctoral program in Cultural Heritage and Applied Anthropology:   
An overlapping concern of the Ph.D. program is applied anthropology, the use 
of the anthropological perspective to solve real-world problems, including 
cultural heritage, medical anthropology, and a host of international development 
issues. At the heart of our program is a strong commitment to employ 
anthropological theory to engage contemporary relevant issues with focused 
research for communities. While some that [sic] are awarded a Ph.D. in 
Anthropology from [sic] University of Montana will look toward teaching careers, 
a goal of the program is to produce applied anthropologists who will serve in 
government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), tribal and ethnic 
associations, and businesses (UMDA 2016: 1). 
1-2. The design and intent of this dissertation mirrors the above University of Montana 
Department of Anthropology doctoral program mission statement and does so in an  
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applied archaeological context. It is also an analytical product of focused research 
involving data and information collection as well as real-world experience on 
archaeological undertakings conducted during counterinsurgency operations. The 
analyst has created this product by providing solutions to solving real-world problems 
(the looting and destruction of cultural property) while engaging contemporary relevant 
issues (armed conflict). While the penultimate objective of this undertaking is to 
safeguard and preserve cultural property4 during warfare, the ultimate objective is to 
save human life. 
Applied Archaeological Research: Accomplishments of the Analyst 
1-3. As an archaeologist-intern at the U.S. State Department’s Cultural Heritage Center, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the analyst conducted information and data 
collection which was crucial to the successful completion of the Congressionally 
mandated Babylon Site Damage Assessment Report. The report illustrated the history 
and damage to the site—including damage by U.S. and Coalition Armed Forces during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. This undertaking was based on the analyst’s observations 
during combat operations as a Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance5 platoon 
 
4 The analyst wishes to emphasize the intent of safeguarding and preserving cultural property does not 
include the removal of said cultural property from the people and/or nations to whom it belongs.  
5 Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance is a military intelligence asset. The mission of Force 
Reconnaissance is to conduct amphibious reconnaissance, surveillance, and raids in support of Marine 
Corps forces. Force reconnaissance uses specialized insertion such as military free-fall and combatant 
diving, patrolling, reporting, and extraction techniques to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance tasks 
and maintains the capability to perform special operations capable tasks (MCWP 2-25 2015: 1-6; 2-3). 
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commander and time spent during the initial stages of the military occupation of 
Babylon. The report is on file at the State Department in Washington D.C. 
(file:///E:/Recovery/Desktop/School&Work/PH.d%20Guide1/Portfolio/babylondamagerep
ort.pdf ) 
1-4. Next the analyst served as a forensic archaeologist and as the security/safety 
officer with the Army Corps of Engineers’6 Mass Graves Investigation Team in Iraq. The 
Mass Graves Investigation Team was subordinate to the Justice Department’s Regime 
Crimes Liaison Office whose main duty was to provide forensic evidence in the trial of 
Saddam Hussein, Chemical Ali and other Ba’athist Regime members for war crimes 
against the people of Iraq. As the security officer, the analyst was responsible to advise 
and liaison with the security team in all aspects of security and protection for the Mass 
Graves Investigation Team’s personnel, archaeological expeditionary camp, excavation 
sites, and during archaeological reconnaissance missions. As an archaeologist, the 
analyst was tasked with conducting forensic archaeological survey, mapping, and 
excavation. The analyst also served as the deputy logistics officer. This applied 
archaeological experience provided the skillsets necessary for conducting 
archaeological operations (i.e. cultural property protection and preservation operations) 
in hostile, wartime environments.  
1-5. As the Cultural Property Liaison Officer for the Utah Army National Guard and Utah 
Air National Guard, the analyst served as the Utah National Guard liaison officer to the 
Utah Cultural Property Team in support of cultural property identification, assessment 
 
6 The analyst was hired by a private contractor and assigned to the Army Corps of Engineers.  
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and protection in the event of state and/or federal emergencies. This effort provided the 
development, design, and submission of the Mobile Archaeological-Arts Assessment 
Team (MAAT) guidelines for integrating Utah National Guard assets to assist the Utah 
Cultural Property Team during above mentioned emergencies. These guidelines can 
also be applied to cultural heritage preservation and protection in areas of armed 
conflict as well.  
1-6. As the Cultural Heritage and Preservation Advisor at the Institute for Military 
Support to Governance, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School, the analyst was 
called to serve an Active Duty Operational Support tour to advise and recommend 
policies to the institute’s Director in order to implement and sustain the U.S. Army’s new 
Cultural Heritage and Preservation Officer specialty. As a result of this active duty tour, 
the analyst provided vital inertia to develop the Cultural Heritage and Preservation 
specialty within the new 38G7 Military Government Officer Area of Concentration by (1) 
laying the intellectual and relational foundation to restore the heritage of the 
"Monuments Men" (and Women) in the U.S. Army and (2) transform a concept to an 
actual U.S. military capability8. As a result of this effort, the analyst was designated a 
Cultural Heritage and Preservation Officer (Monuments Man) in the Reserve 
 
7 “38” is the Army numeric designator for the Civil Affairs Military Occupational Specialty. Civil 
Affairs is the military occupational specialty responsible for enhancing the relationship between 
military forces and civil authorities (FM 1-02 2004: 1-30). “G” is the alpha designation for 
“Government”. 
 
8 While the Cultural Heritage and Preservation Officer specialty is currently organic to the U.S. 
Army, the intent is to expand this specialty to the Coast Guard, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force.  
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Component of the U.S. Army9. This accomplishment was made possible by integrating 
the analyst’s previous mentioned efforts in stateside academic settings and during 
periods of armed conflict as an archaeologist. 
1-7. Most recently, the analyst served as the Headquarters Marine Corps Cultural 
Resource Manager and Archaeologist. While overseeing and managing cultural 
property on Marine Corps Installations world-wide, the analyst’s assistance was 
requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to work with the Special Assistant 
for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs to assist in the development of a Cultural Heritage 
Protection response force10 for the American Armed Forces. This research is ongoing.  
1-8. The analyst is currently a Marine Corps11 infantry and Reconnaissance officer in 
the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. His new objective as a Marine is to create an 
additional military occupational specialty of Cultural Heritage and Preservation Officer in 
the Marine Corps. The analyst also has the additional duty in serving as a cultural 
heritage and preservation advisor for his upcoming deployment to Afghanistan in early 
2020.  
 
 
9 While this specialty was developed as a U.S. Army capability, the goal of the analyst is to 
expand this specialty to the Coast Guard, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  
 
10 On 21 October 2019, the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Army announced a 21st-
Century Version of the Monuments Men to Protect Cultural Heritage in War-Torn Regions 
(Cascone 2019: 1).  
 
11 The analyst recently left the Army Reserve and was reappointed back into the Marine Corps 
as an Infantry and Reconnaissance Officer. 
 
8 
 
1-9. The analyst has taught and presented numerous periods of instruction to 
anthropological (undergraduate and graduate) and military audiences—this included 
both stateside and overseas (Iraq) periods of instruction on cultural heritage awareness. 
The analyst has also been published as a chapter co-author in an archaeological 
textbook entitled: Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property 
during Conflict. The chapter’s title is Cultural Heritage in Time of Conflict: A Tool for 
Counterinsurgency.  
Background 
1-10. The genesis for this applied archaeological undertaking is the analyst’s 
experience as a Force Reconnaissance Marine during the opening days of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in 2003. During the invasion phase, the analyst witnessed the I Marine 
Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group occupy the ancient site of Babylon. Babylon 
had already been occupied for decades by the Ba’athist dictator Saddam Hussein, his 
henchmen, and the Iraqi armed forces. Following the Marine Corps occupation, the 
analyst observed a water purification system installed, a military headquarters added, 
and sandbags filled with potsherd-laced sand. Upon notifying a senior officer of the 
above-mentioned issues, the analyst was colorfully reminded he was in Iraq not as an 
archaeologist, but as an officer of United States Marines. He was then told to “get back 
to work”. It was at that time the analyst thought to himself, why couldn’t he be both an 
officer and archaeologist? Here the analyst decided his life mission was to protect 
cultural property during periods of armed conflict as an archaeologist while serving 
alongside the American Armed Forces. One of the analyst’s inspiration for this life 
mission is the following:    
9 
 
Anthropology was made for man; not man for anthropology. In peacetime, we 
labor to increase anthropological knowledge, to construct a systematic picture of 
how human culture works, to provide the scientific basis for building an 
everbetter world. In wartime we have three courses—to retire into ivory towers, 
protect our scientific reputations, and wait, on the chance that peace will come 
without our help and leave us free again to go back to our patient labors; or we 
can do something non-anthropological, satisfy our patriotic consciences by 
becoming air-raid wardens, working in an area where no colleague will review 
our works. Or, we can say quite simply, with such knowledge and insights as we 
have, we will now do what we can, as anthropologists, to win the war (Mead 
1942:13-14). 
1-11. Since the events at Babylon, the analyst’s research, experience, education, and 
training has directed his efforts to focus on the looting of archaeological sites in areas of 
armed conflict. More specifically, the analyst is concerned with the looting of 
archaeological sites in American Military areas of responsibility and the subsequent illicit 
sale of cultural property which is used as a funding mechanism for international terrorist 
organizations.  
1-12. The development of this effort is rooted in scholarship, focused research and 
analysis. It is important to emphasize the effort is based on the real-life military 
undertakings (including combat experiences) of the analyst as both a United States  
Marine and as an archaeologist in the context of applied military archaeology and  
cultural property protection. The illicit sale of antiquities for the purposes of funding 
terrorist organizations happens in the real-world and requires real-world solutions. 
10 
 
Therefore, this effort should be examined from both academic perspectives as well as 
realistic and scholarly applied archaeological practice and standards that are effective in 
the engagement of real-world issues. In short, this effort is written by a warfighter12, for 
warfighters in addition to anthropologists and archaeologists wanting to serve alongside 
and as part of the American Armed Forces.   
1-13. This dissertation product is inspired by the doctoral program mission statement of 
the University of Montana’s Department of Anthropology and will be designed and 
published as a military style handbook based on the analyst’s efforts thus far. The 
handbook will be a “living document”—meaning it will be updated and amended as the 
analyst (and others) gain experience and application of protecting and preserving 
cultural property during military operations. With the formation of a new era of military 
“Monuments Men and Women”, the purpose of the handbook is to galvanize and inspire 
the archaeological and military communities to work together in order to protect and 
preserve cultural property during counterinsurgency operations. 
Bridging the Academic-Military Divide 
1-14. In a discipline that has minimal presence beyond the campuses of established 
universities (Green 2006: 119), the goal the University of Montana’s Department of 
Anthropology to produce applied anthropologists to serve outside of academia is a 
worthy cause— especially in the context of government entities such as the American 
Armed Forces. It is therefore important to offer alternative perspectives in the kind of 
 
12 The term “Warfighter” is a common American military reference to any member of the United States 
Armed Forces, especially those who serve and or support those who serve in the context of combat. 
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work anthropologists can do in military contexts (Rush 2013: 9). These contexts include 
armed conflict and war. This dissertation will focus on the application of anthropology 
and archaeology to one of the most significant issues of the 21st century—global armed 
conflict.  
1-15. Wars are often controversial, and the asymmetric nature of the Global War on 
Terrorism is no different— especially when cultural heritage is involved. The looting of 
archaeological sites is one of the most alarming and destructive types of cultural 
property destruction (Bowman 2008: 1). During periods of armed conflict, the looting of 
cultural property has not only resulted in irreparable damage to museums and the 
archaeological record (Zottin 2008: 236), but it has also generated support in the form of 
cash and/or weapons to fund insurgent and terrorist organizations around the world 
(Charney et al. 2012: 1, Meyers and Kulish 2016: 1).  
1-16. Despite this data, there has not been consistent professional oversight dedicated 
to protecting cultural heritage during American military counterinsurgency operations. 
This is because some archaeologists refuse to coordinate with the military on ethical 
grounds (Wegener 2008: 165). In contrast to those who wish to decline to cooperate 
with the military, there are those ethically informed and open-minded individuals within 
the anthropology and archaeology communities who want the opportunity to employ 
their archaeological skillsets13 to assist in military operations. This dissertation will 
examine the following subjects in order to accomplish this effort:  
 
13 Archaeological skill sets include but are not limited to survey (Collins and Molyneaux 2003: 205-237; 
King 2005:65); excavation (McIntosh 1999: 74-75; King 2005:71); and curation (preservation) (King 2005: 
81) of cultural, biological, archaeological, and traditional cultural properties. 
12 
 
(1) Examine how military ethics can serve as a plausible alternative to the ethical 
codes of anthropological professional organizations when conducting applied 
archaeology in the Global War on Terrorism. 
(2) Examine applied archaeology in the context of past and contemporary military 
conflicts and their effects in protecting and preserving cultural property.    
(3) Establish the concept of operational archaeology. 
 
(4) Examine archaeological theories in the context of applying archaeological 
skillsets during military operations.   
(5) Examine the applied methodologies that can be employed during military 
operations.  
1-17. As previously stated, the heart of the University of Montana’s Department of 
Anthropology doctoral program is a strong commitment to apply anthropological theory 
and research that engages contemporary, real-world and relevant issues (UMDA 2016: 
1). Contemporary warfare is a real-world human condition where relevant engagements 
of anthropology and archaeology can make positive impacts in saving human life as 
well as safeguarding cultural property. This dissertation (and future military handbook) 
will provide inspiration and motivation for the archaeologist wishing to serve with the 
American military in the quest to save cultural property during armed conflict and most 
importantly, save human lives.  
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Section 2 
Applied Archaeology and Military Ethics:  
A Plausible Alternative 
 
 
A spectre haunts anthropology– the spectre of ethics (Stoczkowski 2008: 345).  
2-1. This section is the most robust as it directly addresses the debate regarding 
anthropologists and archaeologists14 working with the American military in the Global 
War on Terrorism. The debate emanates from individuals within the anthropology 
community who hold the position that it is unethical for anthropologists and 
archaeologists to serve with the American military—unfortunately, this position is based 
on negative stereotypes of the American Armed Forces, its mission, its culture, and the 
women and men who serve in its ranks. Moreover “some anthropologists speak 
negatively of the [American] military from their position outside of the community both to 
disavow and decline opportunities to develop a relationship with the military; preserving 
distance is critical to these individuals, to whom proximity to the military may even be 
distasteful because they disagree vehemently with military missions or employment” 
(Harrell 2003: 9). While disagreement with national defense policy is a matter of opinion 
 
14 Although anthropology and archaeology are considered separate disciplines throughout most of the 
world, American archaeology is one of the four subfields of anthropology; therefore, American 
archaeology is dedicated to furthering “the aims of anthropology “(Binford 1962:224; See Wiley and 
Philips 1958). Whenever the term archaeology is used in this paper, I am referring to the Americanist form 
of the discipline, which means any examples herein associated with the term “anthropology” are germane 
to archaeological research and application.   
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(informed or otherwise), the aforementioned stereotypes are based on ignorance, 
misinformation, and in some cases outright bigotry towards those who serve in 
uniform— this section will engage these inaccuracies head-on. That being said, the goal 
of this section is not to generate confrontation, but instead foster understanding and 
appreciation for the American military, its personnel, and their families and embrace 
those with whom we have disagreements. This understanding and appreciation will 
promote a sincere environment of dialogue for all concerned parties and will lead to long 
term partnerships and associations for solving real-world problems from anthropological 
perspectives and approaches in military contexts.  
2-2. This section will examine the role and history of ethics as it relates to the 
controversial milieu of applied archaeology and its application during military operations. 
This section will also explore the appropriateness of applying anthropological (and 
archaeological) skillsets to assist military and intelligence organizations in achieving 
security and stability—which includes preserving cultural property on the asymmetric15 
battlefield (to be discussed later in the dissertation). In applying these skillsets, “ethical 
thinkers need to think deep and answer difficult questions about what sort of people we 
should be, what kinds of acts we should perform or avoid, and how we should treat our 
fellow human beings” (Scarre and Scarre 2006:1). Before this in-depth examination of 
military ethics and archaeology, it is important to have a familiarization with American 
military culture in order to better understand the ethical standards the American 
 
15 Asymmetric warfare are dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, and values between other 
armed forces (formally organized or not) and U.S. Forces (FM 1-02 2004:1-15).   
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warfighter follows in his or her everyday undertakings, on and off the battlefield. It is 
important to note that the analyst is not attempting to suggest directly nor imply that 
American military culture is perfect. Quite the contrary, American military culture, like 
every culture, is a product of its people, and people as we all know, are not perfect.  
The American Military and Anthropology  
It is curious that in the discipline of military sociology there should be no 
commonly accepted anthropology of war, no comprehensive explanation of why 
men fight and how we reached this stage in our evolutionary development where 
we came to be equipped with the means to destroy the entire species. The works 
that exist on the origins of war have been written mostly by cultural 
anthropologists, biologists, and others with little in the way of military background 
or experience (Gabriel 1990: XV). 
2-3. After all, war is the legacy the ancient world bestowed to the contemporary world 
(Gabriel 2007: 21) and “by adopting a cultural approach to the study of war and combat, 
we better appreciate the variety and change that have typified military institutions, 
thought, and practice over the ages” (Lynn 2008: 12). The American military is a rich 
and relatively unexplored anthropological subject (Harrell 2003: 9) and anthropology 
remains the only social science with no branch devoted to the study of warfare or the 
military (Simons 2012: 1). Anthropologists must recognize the need to engage a 
powerful entity like the American military and propose ways in which its strengths in 
understanding social institutions and cultural beliefs can be applied to important issues 
in a contemporary and globalized world (Frese 2003: 149). This engagement may at 
times need to be addressed in both anthropological and/or military contexts.  
16 
 
2-4. If twenty-first century anthropology is going to be truly relevant in the engagement 
of real-world issues such as armed conflict, it must reach out to and engage the 
American military. Furthermore, anthropology, as a discipline and community must 
facilitate its own anthropological sphere of influence within the American military’s 
thinking, doctrine, and approaches to current and future overseas military combat and 
humanitarian operations. A great way to do so is to learn about the culture of the 
women and men who serve in the American Armed Forces. Before delving into 
archaeological (and military) ethics, this section will first examine the anthropology 
community’s overall rejection of American military culture and propose approaches for 
archaeologists to foster a more solid understanding of said culture. It will do so by 
emphasizing the anthropological axiom that a culture should always be examined on “its 
own terms” (Honigmann 1963: 9). This axiom includes American military culture.  
2-5. “If American military personnel attended an American Anthropological Association 
meeting and heard the negative attitudes about the military, many of which were 
misinformed, American military personnel would wince at the idea of working with 
anthropologists. This is not because American military leadership and personnel shirk 
away from criticism, but because they would not appreciate the lack of information upon 
which many negative and irrational opinions by anthropologists appear to be based” 
(Harrell 2003: 7). Moreover, anthropology may well be the most politically-correct of the 
social sciences and it is not easy to be an anthropologist who partners with and/or 
studies the American military (Simons 2012: 1). Far too often, many anthropologists 
believe working with the military or even worse, working for the military is tantamount to 
associating with war mongers (Harrell 2003: 7). Some anthropologists have gone so far 
17 
 
as to make bigoted statements about the American military whereby they fail to 
understand American military culture (see Gonzalez 2010, 2007; Lutz 2005; Lutz 2001) 
and have even suggested that American anthropologists who work for the American 
Armed forces are mercenaries for hire (Gonzalez 2007: 14, 19). Many anthropologists 
(as well as many in academia) believe this because they are politically opposed to the 
American military and its mission (Harrell 2003: 7: Van Creveld 2008: xii)— especially 
since the events of September 11, 2001. Even anthropologists who choose to study the 
people and institutions that form the American military and defense communities have 
been regarded with suspicion by other anthropologists (Rubenstein 2003:16). This is 
puzzling since many anthropologists, especially in academia, are unfamiliar with what 
the military does, especially when in the field (Simons 2012: 1). Such predispositions 
against anthropologists studying American military institutions (Rubenstein 2003: 16) 
more than likely illustrate why there has been no comprehensive anthropological study 
of warfare and how it relates to the military (Gabriel 1990: xv) and society.    
2-6. Anthropology has long championed cultural relativity including the principle that 
non-Western cultures or societies should not be understood in comparison to Western 
cultural perspectives and standards (Lassiter 2009: 18). In maintaining this principle, 
American military culture and its institutions should not be understood in comparison to 
an “elite university sector”16 of academic perspectives and standards— especially when 
these sectors are void of a military cultural influence. Many scholars (including 
archaeologists) with no experience in the military or understanding of the military 
profession of arms often criticize the American military despite their lack of experience 
 
16 The term “elite university sector” is used by Green in her chapter (Green 2006: 119).  
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and understanding (Bogdanos 2005a: 200-201). This unfortunately includes many in the 
anthropology community who have chosen to not abide by the anthropological principle 
of examining a culture “on its own terms” (Honigmann 1963: 9). The American military 
represents a distinct cultural group with unique features of communication, manners, 
norms of behavior, and belief systems (Reger et al. 2008: 21). Anthropologists have 
failed to treat American military culture as a serious ethnographic subject and as a 
result, anthropologists have failed themselves as anthropologists (Rubenstein 2003: 
16). 
2-7. The events of September 11, 2001 made the American Armed Forces stop and 
realize the importance in understanding the culture and language of the enemy 
(Fujimura 2003: 145), as well as the populations they are charged to protect. “The 
military is changing in a dramatic way and it is reevaluating itself not just to make war 
but to fix some profound deficiencies" (Bender 2007: 1). Since September 11, 2001 the 
American military has reached out to anthropology for assistance, but it has instead 
received resistance from many within the anthropological community. This is because 
many anthropologists are not fond of the American military and there have been very 
few who have spent time studying American military organizations—let alone the 
organizations that actually engage in combat (Simons 2012: 1). This approach is 
counter to the concept of cultural relativity as there is no comprehensive or holistic 
examination of American military culture.   
2-8. In order to understand other cultures unlike our own, it is imperative to examine 
these cultures from their own world-view—and to ensure this takes place the 
anthropologist must live with and experience other cultures firsthand (Lassiter 2009: 
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18). For American military culture this could be accomplished by anthropologists 
spending as much time as possible with American warfighters in order to understand 
and appreciate their environment and other “cultural contexts” (Honigmann 1963: 9). 
These cultural contexts (especially those fighting in the Global War on Terrorism) are 
best mastered by spending time with American warfighters—which means moving 
among them and sharing their lives as much as possible17 (Honigmann 1963: 9).  
2-9. In order to bridge the divide between the anthropology community and American 
military, it is necessary to dispel inaccurate depictions of the American military as an 
institution and a culture, and more importantly, the women and men who serve in 
uniform. This must take place in order to ensure anthropologists reading this section 
can appreciate American military culture without preconceived notions based on false 
characterizations, which unfortunately have been exacerbated by anthropologists 
beginning with Franz Boas’ depiction of “soldiers as murderers” (Boas 1919: 1) during 
World War I to the portrayal of American warfighters in the Global War on Terrorism 
being described “Nazi-like” (Harrell 2003: 14) to the extreme of an anthropology 
professor encouraging the enemy to inflict mass casualties and death to American 
warfighters serving in Iraq and Afghanistan (CNN 2003: 1; Donaldson-Evans 2003:1). 
This depiction and treatment of the American military and its culture by individuals from 
the anthropology community contradicts the strength of anthropology in that it espouses 
 
17 Honigmann’s comments are not directed toward American military culture specifically, but rather, the 
“other” cultures that exist outside the western paradigmatic sphere. The analyst is simply applying 
Honiggmann’s concepts so anthropologists can better understand the importance in treating American 
military culture like any “other” culture.  
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an appreciation of a myriad of perspectives and worldviews (Rapport and Overing 2007: 
119), particularly how they differ from culture to culture (Taylor 1976: 256).  
Addressing the Academy’s Inaccurate Stereotypes of the American Military 
2-10. The American Armed Forces has created an effective and cohesive fighting force 
from amongst a diverse heterogeneous civilian population (Evans 2003: 2). Despite this 
“the military, like other cultures, has been stereotyped” (Fennel 2008: 1) as an inferior 
organization when it comes to equality and justice (Hsia 2010: 1). Negative 
preconceptions have assisted in facilitating the stereotype in that military culture is 
considered inferior to that of other groups (Van Creveld 2008: xiii). There is no logical 
basis for this stereotype, especially since the Global War on Terrorism began. Here the 
attitudes and actions of contemporary American warfighters have changed due to the 
necessity for military readiness at all times:  
American military culture has moved sharply from a Cavalier to a Roundhead 
conception of social mores. The hard-drinking, chain-smoking, womanizing 
“Alpha male” has, to a considerable degree–especially in the officer corps–been 
replaced by the teetotaling, nonsmoking, family-man paragon of virtue. (Indeed, a 
drunk-driving arrest and conviction will ruin an officer’s career.) The absence of 
drinking and smoking relates to the need for constant readiness to go to war and 
the associated need for physical health and endurance, which mirrors similar 
trends among the more educated classes in American society (Goldich 2011: 
66). 
Therefore, cultural competence that has been traditionally applied to the treatment of 
ethnic and racial minorities is just as essential in the treatment and depiction of 
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American warfighters and military culture (Reger et al. 2008: 21).   
2-11. Since the Global War on Terrorism began many in academia (including 
anthropologists) have been quick to point out that the American military is uneducated, 
racist, sexist, homophobic, and conspicuously lacking in wealthy White Americans 
whose fathers allegedly started and/or escalated the Global War on Terrorism in order 
to profit from it (Lowther 2010: 75). This depiction of the American military is not based 
on facts, but a failure to understand the American Armed Forces and its culture. The 
American military has aptly demonstrated the ability to maintain its great traditions yet 
innovate and lead the rest of American society in social movements (civil rights in 
particular) twenty years ahead of American mainstream society (Harrell 2003: 2). The 
American military’s unique culture promotes a diverse and cohesive force via the 
concept of uniformity (Harrell 2003: 2) and comradeship; and unlike American civilian 
society, the American military has maintained a peaceful and harmonious working 
relationship amongst its diverse and cultured membership since the late 1970s 
(Lawrence and Kane 1998: 315). In working to transform civilians into warfighters, the 
American Armed Forces “strives to forge a shared sense of purpose and inculcate 
service members with collective values, norms and culture in the pursuit of common 
goals” (Evans 2003: 3). 
2-12. Those who have been so quick to suggest that today's wartime recruits represent 
lesser quality and/or come from lower socio-economic classes are incorrect; rather, a 
much clearer set of evidence indicates lower income recruits are proportionally 
underrepresented in recent years (Kane 2006: 1). Since the events of September 11, 
2001, the percentage of recruits from high-income households has increased while the 
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percentage from low income households has declined (Lowther 2010: 76). Overall the 
American military is better educated than the rest of civilian society in that 98 percent of 
American warfighters hold at least a high school diploma while the American civilian 
national average is 75 percent (Lowther 2010: 76). 
2-13. Regarding skin color and service to the country, American military bases and 
ships are much more integrated than the self-imposed segregation found in many 
colleges and universities (Moskos 1991: 16). In fact, Black18 Americans whose parents 
served in the military and grew up on American military bases experienced bigotry for 
the first time when they lived and worked in civilian communities as adults (Hall 2011: 6; 
Wertsch 2011: 1059). That said outsiders of American military culture have failed to 
recognize how American warfighters view themselves when it comes to their ethnicity. 
When American warfighters are asked about their ethnicity, it is not uncommon to hear 
the response “We are all green” (Soldiers and Marines) or “We are all blue” (Sailors, 
Airmen, and Coastguardsmen) (Fennel 2008: 1). Once in the military, many American 
warfighters stated they are part of a culture that values honor and morality (Lewis 2007: 
380). In other words, it’s not a matter of skin color, ethnicity, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic class; rather it’s all about the person on your left or right flank and how 
well they can shoot, move, and communicate.   
What really keeps you going is the guy next to you. The one counting on you to 
do your job, just as you are counting on him to do his. You have his “6” (his six 
o’clock, his back) and he has yours. It is a refusal to let your buddies down. In 
 
18 Department of Defense uses terms African-American and Black interchangeably for official 
demographic data.   
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writing in his experiences as a Marine in Okinawa, William Manchester observed 
that any man in combat who lacks comrades who will die for him, and for whom 
he is willing to die is not a man at all. He is truly damned—and the guy’s race, 
skin color, religion, gender, or sexual orientation are not even close to being 
relevant…we (that is, those who have rifles in our hands) do not care (Bogdanos 
2005a: 78).   
To echo this sentiment, Republican United States Senator Barry Goldwater said it best: 
“You don’t have to be straight to be in the military; you just have to be able to shoot 
straight” (Hsia 2010: 1). It is important to note the American military demanded 
Congress repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” via Congressional testimony from American 
military leadership, including Republican Secretary of Defense Robert Gates19. To 
facilitate the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, American military leadership also conducted 
opinion surveys and discussion groups (DoD 2010: 49) and the vast majority of 
American warfighters are satisfied with the repeal—especially during intense combat 
situations where most warfighters were not concerned with the sexual orientation of a 
brother or sister comrade-in-arms (DoD 2010: 66). Unfortunately, not all Americans 
have the right to serve without restrictions. While there are Transgender Americans who 
serve in today’s American military, there are limits to their military service that some 
would argue keep many patriotic Americans who happen to be Transgender from 
serving outright. As stated earlier, the purpose of this section is not to paint a rosy 
picture of American military culture (or policy for that matter). The American military, like 
 
19 Secretary Gates was appointed by President G.W. Bush and retained by President Obama. 
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other cultures, has preconceptions of population groups just like any other. In this vein, 
it is the analyst’s hope that American military leadership, in its policy on limiting 
Transgender American military service, does not inadvertently bar a future transgender 
personification of Alan Turing20 from serving— as that could have dire consequences in 
a current or future military conflict. The analyst, however, is optimistic that eventually, 
the correct decision will be made.  
2-14. Women have served in the American military in every war. While we know that 
more and more women are entering the military, the culture of the American military has 
historically been a very “male” culture (Hall 2011: 15). In order to clarify, it is important 
to understand however that the military is not a “male” or masculine culture in and of 
itself. This is an outsider's perspective. While it is true there are mostly men in the 
military, and the vast majority of them are masculine, masculinity is not a necessity for 
mental and physical toughness and competence in battle. The military does not actively 
or passively encourage or discourage feminine or masculine qualities in its warfighters. 
It does however demand mental and physical endurance combined with competent 
technical and tactical proficiency.   
 
 
20 Alan Turing, a gay man, was the lead Code Breaker for British Intelligence during World War II. Turing 
personally broke the German Enigma (the German military's typewriter-like cipher machine) code that 
was used by the U-boats preying on the North Atlantic merchant convoys. If the U-boat code had not 
been broken, and World War II had continued for another two to three years, a further 14 to 21 million 
people might have been killed (Copeland 2012: 1). After the war, Turing was arrested for being 
homosexual, was sentenced and chemically castrated, he died at age 41 (Pease 2012: 1). “Turing stands 
alongside Churchill, Eisenhower, and a short glory-list of other wartime principals as a leading figure in 
the Allied victory over Hitler. There should be a statue of him in London among Britain's other leading war 
heroes” (Copeland 2012: 1).  
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2-15. One lesson the Global War on Terrorism has taught is there are no front lines in 
asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency. The end of the Cold War and the need for 
large and mechanized conventional forces has become anachronistic and profoundly 
changed American military culture (Goldich 2011:  63)—especially the attitudes that 
only men should command and serve in combat units. The Global War on Terrorism 
has made it abundantly clear that women in combat are becoming a necessary reality 
and because there are no front lines, women have proven (as in every other war) that 
they are just as capable and competent as men to fight and lead in combat. In an effort 
to determine how to expand the role of women in battle, the Marine Corps began the 
process of soliciting female volunteers to attend the Infantry Officer Course which 
previously had been only open to males (Hlad 2012: 1) and the U.S. Army began to 
plan for female Soldiers to attend Army Ranger School, an intense 60 day combat 
training regimen that would put them on equal footing with male counterparts (Kuo 
2012: 1). As of this writing, the Army now has female Army Rangers (Meyers 2015: 1) 
and the Marine Corps had its first female graduate of the Infantry Officer Course 
(Schogol 2017: 1) and has female infantry Marines (Schogol 2017) as well. The 
American military is also one of the few employers in the country who guarantees and 
enforces equal work for equal pay regardless of gender (or sexual orientation) (DFAS 
2013: 1).    
2-16. The United States military is one of the most colorblind institutions in the entire 
world, and most American warfighters today do not think of one another in terms of skin 
color, gender, or the religion they follow (Hsia 2010: 1) but more of an extended family 
of brothers and sisters or siblings-in-arms. This harnesses a bonding and level of 
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respect that only those who have been in combat can relate to—and one which 
unfortunately most anthropologists cannot. The analyst hopes to change this reality.  
The Culture of the American Military: A Brief Introduction 
2-17. There are a number of anthropological schools of thought and definitions when it 
comes to defining culture and there are various explanations in how culture is produced 
and reproduced (Lewis 2007: 3; Lewis 2011: 67).    
Culture is what makes us human, and what makes us think of ourselves as 
different kinds of humans— members of families, communities, nations, and 
organizations. It includes ideas and beliefs in our heads and the way they’re 
expressed in speech, songs, stories, dances, and ways of organizing ourselves 
to live together, find or produce food, make war, build and maintain our 
communities (King 2005: 20).   
The American military, like other military organizations around the world, is held 
together by a culture of war (Van Creveld 2008: 359). Anthropologists need to 
understand that the culture of war cannot be fully understood unless one experiences it 
firsthand, but it is possible to be aware of its existence and how it is a part of American 
military culture.  
2-18. “Within any cultural group there is always a wide range of beliefs. However, a 
specific cultural group is defined, in part, by a shared set of beliefs that affect the 
thinking and behavior of many members of the group" (Reger et al 2008: 27). The same 
applies to American military culture as it constitutes a separate and distinctly different 
culture from American civilian culture (Wertsch 2011: 24). This culture is comprised of 
the most significant internal attitudes and mindset in the identity of the American Armed 
27 
 
Forces (Goldich 2011: 59) and like other cultures consists of the shared attitudes, 
values, practices, and goals as well as being deeply rooted in long-held beliefs and 
customs (FM 22-100 1999: 3-14). American military culture is learned via socialization 
training (boot camp, officer candidate school or the Military Service Academies); it is 
broadly shared by its members (i.e. saluting); it is adaptive to changing conditions 
(integration of minorities and acceptance of women and homosexuals into its ranks); 
and it is symbolic in nature (rank, vernacular in military contexts) (Dunivin 1994: 533). 
From the first day of a warfighter’s induction into the American military, each one is 
responsible for building a bond of cohesion strongly within the framework of the 
hierarchy of rank, chain of command, required duties within his or her unit, and the 
proud tradition of customs and courtesies (U.S. Army 2009: 162).   
2-19. American military culture is fundamentally historical in nature where each 
warfighter reveres the history of their branch of service (Army, Navy, Marines, Coast 
Guard, and Air Force) —especially their combat history. They preserve the American 
military’s cultural memory through ceremonies and through customs (FM 7-21.13 2003: 
2-2). Each branch of the Armed Forces has a myriad of well-established customs still in 
use today (U.S. Army 2009: 129), some of which have been handed down from early in 
the Nation’s past while others are of comparatively recent in origin (FM 7-21.13 2003: 4-
1).   
Often it is these customs and traditions, strange to the civilian                           
eye but solemn to the soldier, that keep the man in the uniform      
going in the unexciting times of peace. In war they keep him                   
fighting at the front. The fiery regimental spirit fondly polished                 
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over decades and centuries possesses him in the face of the            
enemy. [The soldier] fights for the regiment, his battalion, his         
company, his platoon, his section, his comrade (FM 7-21.13 2003: 4-1).   
This worldview may seem strange as most Americans who are not in the military get 
their war experiences from television, news, and movies (Gabriel 1987: 14). It could 
also be the result of interpreting the customs of the American military in terms of one’s 
own cultural background (Taylor 1976: 317)—or a combination thereof. In the 
anthropologist’s attempt to understand American military culture in the context of the 
Global War on Terrorism, it is important to recognize the cultural divide between the tiny 
minority of the American populace who serve in uniform and the vast majority who do 
not (Gegax and Thomas 2005: 1). It is this divide which facilitates the isolation of the 
American military from the rest of society (including academia) (Gegax and Thomas 
2005: 1) and contributes to the development and evolution of American military culture. 
One of the reasons this cultural divide exists is because the Global War on Terrorism is 
not a national effort. In the years since the end of the Vietnam War, the American 
military has included only 0.5% of American households (Lewis 2007: 377) and less 
than one percent of the American people have served in uniform since September 11, 
2001 (Gegax and Thomas 2005: 1; Lewis 2007: 377). This isolation contributes to a 
distinct American military culture and has even contributed to American military culture 
having a vernacular of its own (Fennel 2008: 1). This vernacular is often spoken in 
acronyms and other idiosyncratic terms (Hall 2011: 9), which many civilians have a 
difficult time understanding. The challenge of understanding idioms and slang in an 
unfamiliar culture can be a challenge to any anthropologist (Hall 2011: 9) and American 
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military culture is no different; if anything, the challenge of the American military 
vernacular is rendered even more difficult if one is attempting to understand American 
military culture in the context of a combat environment. Thus, for someone to 
understand the American military in every context, it is important to have interactions 
with American military personnel before, during, and after a unit deploys overseas.  
2-20. The American military offers an incredible richness in culture which includes 
history, formality, and tradition (Harrell 2003: 2). Cultural continuity (Honigmann 1963: 
321-322) is ensured as these attributes are passed down from one generation of 
American warfighters to the next (MCA 2009: 29). The American Armed Forces is a 
highly diverse organization and although cultural, religious and ethnic diversity are 
prevalent within the military, the American military is a culture in its own right (Fenell 
2008: 1) in that it is a professional fighting force with its own unique system and set of 
values, ethics, and beliefs (Lewis 2007: 377).   
2-21. Even within American military culture, there is organizational culture. The concept 
of organizational culture is also important because it enables anthropologists to 
examine differences between each branch of the armed services and between units 
within the same uniformed service. “Each branch of the U.S. Military has its own 
definition of culture, sometimes more than one, and each serves critically, well or 
otherwise, how that branch approaches the problem of culture in its training, doctrine, 
and operational application” (Lewis 2011: 68). For example, U.S. Army culture (land 
based) is different from that of U.S. Navy culture (maritime based) (FM 22-100 1999: 3-
14), and all military services have differences based upon their histories and 
experiences. These insights can help explain to anthropologists interested in learning 
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about American military culture how each branch of the American military addresses 
vital issues such as warfighting, leadership, and technology, as well as explain why 
various units may perform differently in roughly the same circumstances (English 2004: 
6). Within organizational cultures there are climates. Climate relates to the specific 
environment of small unit organizations within the larger American military cultural 
framework (U.S. Army 2008: 58) and comes from warfighters’ shared perceptions and 
attitudes on what they believe about the day-to-day activities of their unit (FM 22-100 
1999: 3-12). Organizational cultures of the American Armed Forces are particularly 
strong because these establishments have a closed career principle whereby 
warfighters spend their careers almost exclusively in these organizations (i.e. 
infantrymen in infantry units, supply personnel in supply units etc.) (Cassidy 2008: 39).   
2-22. [American military culture like any] culture is continuous in both time and space 
(Honigmann 1963: 321-322) and the American military understands this. They ensure 
[American military] cultural continuity (Honigmann 1963: 321-322) by recruiting and 
training new members centered on their core mission and requirements that spans 
many generations of American military personnel (Cassidy 2008: 39). Like other 
cultures, American military culture is transmitted temporally through social learning 
where each generation of warfighters learns from the previous generation of warfighters 
(Swartz and Jordan 1976: 56). The daily life of the American warfighter connects him or 
her to the past (and future) via the warfighter’s uniform, the military music that begins 
and ends the warfighter’s day, the way the warfighter salutes, the warfighter’s rank and 
organization’s history, and the American military values system (i.e. ethics) (FM 22-100 
1999: 3-14). These personnel encompass and shape the attributes which form 
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American military culture. Attributes include but are not limited to: Customs and 
Courtesies; Ceremony and Ritual; Hierarchy and Rank; Military Art; Military Music; and 
even Military Funerary Rites.  
Customs and Courtesies 
2-23. American military customs are “those time-honored practices and outward signs of 
military courtesy that create a formal atmosphere of respect and honor” and courtesies 
are “the respect and honor shown to military traditions, practices, symbols and 
individuals” (U.S. Army 2009: 129). Specifically, military courtesies are the outward 
signs of respect toward the nation, flag, comradeship, military heroes, and fallen 
warfighters (U.S. Army 2009: 129). One of the most important manners in which 
warfighters show respect is through the courtesy of the military hand salute (MCA 2009: 
29).   
2-24. The hand salute is a formal military gesture of respect in which a junior warfighter 
acknowledges a senior officer by bringing the hand to the brim of the cap or slightly 
above the right eye. Warfighters salute in greeting, leaving, reporting and other military 
situations to publicly show respect for officers who are senior to them in rank (U.S. Army 
2009: 131). The origin of the military salute is not certain. It is believed to have begun as 
a gesture to demonstrate that an approaching warrior was not holding a weapon (U.S. 
Army 2009: 131). The warrior did so by shifting his weapon from his right hand to the 
left and then raising his right hand to indicate there was no intention to attack (Palm 
2009: 29; Estes 1996: 344). During the Middle Ages armored knights raised their helmet 
visors with their right hand when meeting with a comrade (Estes 1996: 345; FM 7-21.13 
2003: 4-3). This practice gradually became a way of showing respect and by 1820, the 
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motion was modified to touching the hat. Since then it has become the hand salute used 
today (FM 7-21.13 2003: 4-3). 
 
Picture 1: Marines salute one another during change of command ceremony 
2-25. In today’s professional American military, saluting is a military courtesy observed 
by men and women who follow the profession of arms (Estes 1996: 344). In the 
American military all officers rate a salute from lower ranking warfighters (officer or 
enlisted). The hand salute is widely misunderstood by many in civilian society who 
consider it to be a gesture of servility and thus signifies inferiority and subservience 
between junior and senior military personnel (Estes 1996: 345; FM 7-21.13 2003: 4-3). 
Saluting however is a two-way exchange between junior warfighters and officers who 
are senior to them in rank. The salute is initiated by a warfighter toward an officer senior 
in rank. The officer is then required to acknowledge the warfighter by returning a salute. 
The salute may also be initiated while walking or marching, but never while running (FM 
22-5 1986: 3-6). There is also a time not to salute, such as guarding enemy prisoners of 
war, training, or under battlefield conditions (Palm 2009: 30). Other personnel who 
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warfighters salute are civilians such as the Commander-in-Chief (President of the 
United States), Secretary of Defense, and Congressional Medal of Honor recipients 
(regardless of the rank). When the Star-Spangled Banner is played and whenever the 
American flag is raised or lowered, it is proper to salute in the direction of the position of 
the flag or from where the music originates (Palm 2009: 31).   
Ceremony and Ritual 
2-26. All cultures have incorporated ritual and ceremony into their way of life, and the 
American military is no different. A ritual is the recurring performance of a standardized 
set of acts which maintain the status quo and/or to achieve specified end states (Hoebel 
1966: 478) and a ceremony is a complex set of rituals (Hoebel 1966: 478). American 
military ceremonies are representative of American military culture’s pride, discipline, 
and teamwork and are important in developing and maintaining unit pride, esprit de 
corps, and preserving tradition (FM 7-21.13 2004: C-1). American military rituals 
comprise of all types including preparations for battle such as group prayer before a 
combat mission (Van Creveld 2008: 88) and the procession of flag-draped caskets 
when American warfighters bring home their war dead (Whitlock 2010: 1). Examples of 
formal American military ceremonies include Dining Outs and Military Balls (events 
where American warfighters wear dress uniforms and bring guests, usually a spouse or 
significant other) and Dining Ins (formal events for American warfighters only).   
2-27. One example of a formal ceremony is the Marine Corps Birthday Ball. The Marine 
Corps Birthday Ball is a formal ceremony where both officer and enlisted Marines wear 
formal dress uniforms (Estes 1996: 444-445). One of the highlights of the Marine Corps 
Birthday Ball is the cake cutting ritual where the most senior-in-rank Marine present 
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(usually the commanding officer) cuts the birthday cake with a Marine Corps sword and 
then presents a slice to the oldest and youngest Marine present while the band plays 
Auld Lang Syne (Estes 1996: 478). The significance of this ritual is the symbolization of 
the connection of one generation of Marines to the next and the passing of honor, 
courage, commitment, and tradition in the context of cultural continuity (Honigmann 
1963: 321-322). Other formal military ceremonies include the military promotion 
ceremony. Promotion ceremonies are an important tradition that enables American 
warfighters to reinforce their core values as well as an opportunity to thank senior and 
junior leadership who mentored, trained, educated and motivated the warfighter 
advancing to the next higher rank (Gale 2007: 1).  
 
Picture 2: Marine Corps Cake Cutting Ritual at a Marine Corps Ball Ceremony 
American Military Culture Hierarchy and Rank  
2-28. The history of military hierarchy and rank has existed for thousands of years (U.S. 
Army 2009: 121). For example Sargon of Akkad had an army that numbered over 5,000 
men that was organized into nine battalions and was commanded by a colonel or 
gir.nita (Gabriel 2007: 232-233). The Roman legions also had colonels who were in 
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charge of a columna— or column of warriors (U.S. Army 2009: 121). Like any other 
culture, the American military requires social organization in order to function efficiently. 
Ability, responsibility and authority all come together in the form of military rank and 
hierarchy (Palm 2009: A-6).   
The military remains hierarchical and, ultimately, authoritarian (although there is 
much more give and take, especially in combat units and environments, than 
most civilians might believe). It emphasizes organizational and collective 
effectiveness, discipline, and commitment rather than individual rights, 
prerogatives, and liberties (Goldich 2011: 62). 
American military hierarchy starts with the individual warfighter and eventually ascends 
above military ranks and answers ultimately to the appointed and/or elected American 
civilian leadership. This includes the Secretary of Defense and the President of the 
United States (FM 6-22 2006: 2-1). At the top of the military hierarchy are the 
commissioned officers who hold their grade and office under a commission issued by 
Presidential authority (FM 6-22 2006: 3-1). Below the commissioned officers are 
enlisted personnel who do not have a commission but form the backbone of the 
American military and run its day-to-day activities. Military ranks identify who is in 
charge, indicating different levels of leadership and responsibility to guide and assist in 
decision making and problem solving (U.S. Army 2009: 121). Military ranks also provide 
members of the Armed Forces a legal means to accept responsibility and be equipped 
with the necessary authority to carry and issue lawful orders (Palm 2009: A-6) and also 
play a fundamental role in communication between enlisted, noncommissioned officers, 
warrant officers, and commissioned officers (Regal et al 2008: 25).   
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2-29. The American military is maintained by a rigid authoritarian structure (Hall 2011: 
8) and within this rigid structure, the United States has made great strides to affirm the 
importance of and equalize the differences in available services between ranks (Hall 
2011: 10). This is because while the American military rank structure and system is 
authoritarian, it is by no means totalitarian. The spread of equality has led more 
American warfighters to expect to be commanded not by their social superiors but 
rather led by their social equals (Van Creveld 2008: 101), where billet and responsibility 
determines who gives orders and who follows orders. This attitude is prevalent in that 
Western armies often fight with and for a sense of legal liberty and are frequently 
products of civic militarism or constitutional governments overseen by those outside 
religion and the military itself (Hanson 2001: 21).   
2-30. The most profound change in American military culture, however, has taken place 
since the end of the Cold War where “the paradigm of long periods of peace 
interspersed with apocalyptic mobilizations for war, involving the accession of huge 
numbers of draftees into the force, has been replaced by one of fairly continuous 
operational deployments” (i.e. the Global War on Terrorism) (Goldich 2011: 63). Since 
the Global War on Terrorism began, hierarchy in the American military has undergone a 
transformation, as the military has shifted its focus from conventional warfare to 
counterinsurgency operations. Rank matters far less than talent in asymmetric warfare 
(counterinsurgency included) and a few good men (and women) led by an intelligent 
junior enlisted warfighter can succeed in counterinsurgency whereby hundreds of well-
armed warfighters under a mediocre senior officer will fail (Kilcullen 2010: 34). This 
attitude is especially prevalent amongst the generation of American warfighters since 
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September 11, 2001.  
2-31. Despite the American military’s transformation from conventional war to 
counterinsurgency, rank still has its privileges. There are privileges for higher ranking 
officers and senior enlisted warfighters. These include parking spots reserved at 
commissaries (military base grocery stores) for generals, admirals, and sergeants major 
(senior enlisted rank). A military organization’s commanding officer and senior enlisted 
warfighter have designated parking spots outside of their headquarters building. During 
working hours at base barber shops, chairs are designated for officers and senior 
enlisted personnel. Of course, warfighters of higher rank make higher pay and 
allowances. That being said, junior in rank military personnel are also afforded 
privileges. In the Army and Marine Corps, the most junior person in the unit eats first, 
while senior officers and senior enlisted personnel in the unit eat last (Harrell 2003: 2). 
Junior enlisted personnel are often given first choice on weapon systems and 
equipment. Rank, responsibility, and authority in the American military are centered on 
the understanding there is equality amongst warfighters at the human level whereby 
one’s status (socio-economic, skin-color, gender) is “neutral” (Hoebel 1966: 310) when 
one enters the military. There is however a sense of recognition and respect for the 
differences in rank, responsibility, and authority between junior and senior military 
personnel. The goal of this recognition is to take care of the warfighters, their families, 
and accomplishment of the mission.   
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Military Art 
2-32. While writing has only been in existence for a few thousand years, the arts are 
much older (Van Creveld 2008: 209) and the relationship between art and war goes 
back almost as far as art does (Van Creveld 2008: 227). [Anthropologists] have insisted 
on a relativistic approach to culture (which includes art) whereby it should be examined 
in relation to the cultural context in which it was shaped and what it means to the people 
(i.e. warfighters) who created it (Taylor 1976: 274). Military art became increasingly 
prevalent during ancient state-level civilizations and depicted the battles as well as the 
people who fought them in various styles, including Egyptian tomb paintings and 
Sumerian steles (Klish 2011: 1). For example, an Egyptian tomb relief illustrates a 
uniformed military archer and an infantryman (Douherty 2008: 28) and the Sumerian 
Stele of the Vultures depicts helmeted warriors from Lagash trampling over the corpses 
of warriors from Umma. The Stele of Vultures also illustrates the King of Lagash fighting 
from his battle wagon as he leads his warriors into the fight (Roaf 1990: 194).   
 
Picture 3: Stele of Vultures Armed soldiers Marching into Battle 
2-33. Visual commemorations of American warfighters by combat artists are a part of 
America’s military heritage and its historical patrimony (Klish 2011: 265). Many civilians 
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are amazed to learn about the longstanding tradition of artists documenting the 
American military and its warfighters (Klish 2011: 1). The American military has a long 
tradition in commemorating its history, mission, and warfighters through artistic 
expression. Today the Global War on Terrorism is commemorated with specific 
American military artistic organizations and programs where all five branches of the 
Armed Forces have combat art programs (Kino 2010: 1). Many contemporary paintings 
on combat art not only include the Global War on Terrorism, but humanitarian efforts by 
the American military as well. Military combat artists have depicted scenes from 
contemporary humanitarian operations in Haiti (Kino 2010: 1) to numerous scenes from 
Iraq (Kino 2010: 1; Klish 2011: 18) and Afghanistan (Kino 2010: 1; Klish 2011: 17). 
Military art is not just about capturing the lives of American military personnel as it also 
includes images of the far-away landscapes and indigenous populations who live there 
(Kino 2010: 1).  
 
Picture 4: “Graffitied” Jersey Barrier Mural in Iraq  
2-34. The combat artist is an American warfighter who combines the tactical eye of a 
warrior with the creative eye of an artist (Klish 2011: 241; Kino 2010: 1, 2). The 
American men and women depicted via military art is only a small representation of the 
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millions of individuals who have served their country. Combat artists have captured 
American warfighters in every facet of their military experience and just like many other 
cultures, American military art features the elements from warfighters’ everyday life 
(Taylor 1976: 274). This everyday life includes training for upcoming deployments, 
performing everyday chores, relaxing, engaging in battle, recuperating from wounds, 
and sometimes holding a fallen comrade during or after a battle.   
 
Picture 5: Marine Combat Artist Captain C.J. Bauman 
Military Music  
2-35. Music is an essential part of the culture of war (Van Creveld 2008: 118) and it has 
played a significant role in military battles, ceremonies and rituals throughout history. 
Music has a variety of uses (especially in military contexts) and because of its 
effectiveness in expressing sentiment and value, it has an impact on those who 
participate and listen to it (Taylor 1976: 269). Many warriors throughout the world enter 
into battle to the sound of musical instruments of every kind (Van Creveld 2008: 116). 
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This is evidenced by a seventh-century B.C. Corinthian vase which displays the image 
of two rival forces approaching one another as a musician plays to pace the advancing 
warriors as they march into battle (Lynn 2008: 56).  
 
Picture 6: Seventh-Century BC Corinthian Vase 
The earliest pictorial, sculptured, and written records of musical instruments were used 
in connection with military activity for signaling during encampments, parades, and 
combat operations (FM 3-21.5 2003: 1-2). Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and American 
Indian chronicles and pictorial histories show trumpets and drums of many varieties (FM 
3-21.5 2003: 1-2). Early and middle twentieth century examples include the British Army 
leaving their trenches to the sounds of bagpipes (Van Creveld 2008: 117) and German 
armored columns blaring Ride of the Valkyries during a charge over the Oder River in 
1945 (Van Creveld 2008:117-118). In contemporary battles in the Global War on 
Terrorism, American warfighters on the battlefield incorporate music into combat 
preparation and actual combat engagements.   
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Picture 7: British Army Bagpipe circa World War I 
2-36. During the “shock and awe” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, heavy 
metal, gangster rap music and American military marching tunes could be heard from a 
myriad of vehicles blitzkrieging across the desert. Heavy metal and gangster rap music 
is not traditionally military in nature, but it (as well as military music) was incorporated 
and used as a stimulant for the already highly anticipated engagement of the enemy as 
“music induces emotion and communicates feelings and information not easily 
expressed in speech or other nonmusical ways” (Taylor 1976: 270). This is similar to the 
manner in how a war dance builds up feelings of aggressiveness before and/or during a 
battle or how solemn tunes can relax and console at a military funeral (Taylor 1976: 
270). Music (both military and non-military) has been used to commemorate battles (i.e. 
Battle of Fallujah) as well as to celebrate the American Armed Forces in general 
(YouTube—Fallujah 2007; YouTube—Taliban 2006).    
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2-37. In ceremonial contexts, military music establishes a sense of alertness, urgency, 
attention to detail, discipline, and confidence (U.S. Army 2009: 129). Examples of this 
include bugle calls and an adjutant’s call—which indicates the adjutant is about to call a 
formation of the guard, battalion, or regiment. The Star-Spangled Banner pays honors 
to the American flag when it is raised, and Retreat is played when the flag is taken down 
(FM 3-21.5 2003: 1-2). Other examples of military music include the U.S. Army’s official 
song: The Army Goes Rolling Along (FM 3-21.5 2003: 1-2) and the Marine Corps’ The 
Marines’ Hymn (Palm 2009: 29).   
 
Picture 8: The President’s Own United States Marine Corps Band 
2-38. Among all military music, “none is so easily recognized or more apt to render 
emotion than Taps” (Villanueva 2012: 1). Taps is played by a single bugler (AR 600–25 
2004: 23) and was composed in 1862 by Union Army Brigadier General Daniel 
Butterfield. In 1874 Taps was officially recognized by the U.S. Army and in 1891 it 
became standard at all American military funerals (Villanueva: 2012: 1). Taps is 
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reserved for deceased military or former military individuals (Estes 1996: 356) and it is 
an eternal tribute to the fallen American warfighter (Oüten 2009: 1). 
 
 
Picture 9: U.S. Army Soldier Playing Taps     Picture 10: U.S. Navy Sailor Playing Taps 
Military Funerary Rites  
2-39. The ceremony of the American military funeral is a tribute of honor to American 
warfighters who have passed away and/or made the ultimate sacrifice in service of the 
nation (FM 7-21.13 2003: C-13). The United States Armed Forces established 
dedicated military cemeteries by an act of Congress in 1862 (Van Creveld 2008:153) 
and like any other culture, American military culture has developed a rich tradition in 
funerary and burial rites. These include but are not limited to the grave itself (this 
includes either cremation, burial in the ground or at sea), body arrangement (fallen 
placed in coffin in accordance with religion), grave goods (fallen’s sword or personal 
items), adornment of the body (medals, rank, insignia), and cemetery organization 
(Pearson 2008: 5-12). There are a myriad of rituals associated with the burial of fallen 
warfighters and these traditions have been around for thousands of years (Oüten 2009: 
1).   
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2-40. The first general mourning proclaimed in America was the death of Benjamin 
Franklin in 1791 and the death of George Washington in 1799 where the purpose was 
to pay a last tribute of respect with simple but grand ceremonies of religion (FM 3-21.5 
2003: 14-1). American military funerals have musical honors during transfer of a fallen 
warfighter (Estes 1996: 356). This includes transfer of the fallen’s remains to and from 
the vehicle (such as a hearse or horse drawn buggy); to and from the fallen’s house of 
worship (church, temple, etc.); and finally, to the grave and resting site (Estes 1996: 
356). Several military funerary traditions used today have been brought forward from 
the past (FM 3-21.5 2003: 14-1). Familiar attributes of American military funerals include 
rituals such as the American flag-draped coffin procession, the gun salute and 
presentation of the American flag to the deceased’s family, as well as memorials to 
deceased and/or fallen warfighters.   
2-41. The custom of the flag-draped coffin began during the Napoleonic Wars when the 
fallen were carried off the battlefield by their comrades on a caisson covered with a flag 
(Arlington National Cemetery 2012: 1). The American flag draped over a casket 
originated during the American Civil War (Oüten 2009: 1). During American military 
funerals the American flag covers the casket and is placed so the union blue field is at 
the head of the casket and over the fallen’s left shoulder.  
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Picture 11: Flag Draped Coffin for deceased American Soldier 
The American flag is not placed in the grave nor is it permitted to touch the ground 
(Arlington National Cemetery 2012: 1). Instead the flag is folded by the pall bearers 
(also military personnel or former military personnel) into a triangle where only the blue 
field and stars of the flag are visible. The flag is then presented to the next of kin (the 
parents or the spouse of the deceased) usually by the military chaplain (Arlington 
National Cemetery 2012: 1; Oüten 2009:1). Pallbearers and others who perform duties 
at a military funeral consider it a privilege to participate as it is a distinct means of 
honoring fellow warfighters who have served before or who have given their lives in 
defense of America (FM 7-21.13 2004: C-13).   
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Picture 12: Montana Army National Guard Honor Guard conducts the Flag Folding Ritual 2019 
2-42. The gun salute reflects the American military custom of firing “three volleys of 
musketry” over the graves of fallen comrades (AR 600–25 2004: 22-23). The practice of 
firing three volleys originated when Roman legionaries would shout the name of their 
deceased comrade(s) three times (Oüten 2009:1). During the American Revolution and 
Civil War, ceasefires would be called so each side could clear their war dead off the 
battlefield (Oüten 2009: 1). Once both sides had cleared its fallen comrades off the 
battlefield, each would fire three volleys to indicate that their dead had been cared for 
and that they were ready to resume the battle (AR 600–25 2004: 22-23).  
 
Picture 13: U.S. Marines conduct Rifle Salute 
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2-43. Memorial ceremonies are patriotic tributes to deceased comrades (FM 7-21.13 
2003: C-11). In recent years, one of the most prominent ways in which warfighters 
honor a fallen comrade is the battle cross. The origins of the battle cross made its first 
appearance during the American Civil War (Greatest Generation 2013: 1). After a battle, 
Confederate and Union military personnel would move through the battlefield and mark 
the bodies in order to recover them. The most convenient manner to do this would have 
been a fallen Soldier’s rifle with its bayonet stuck into the ground and his hat placed on 
top (Greatest Generation 2013: 1). During World War II, Soldiers and Marines would 
often bury their fallen comrades in shallow graves and mark them by placing a rifle with 
bayonet fixed into the ground with a helmet on top to indicate the location of a fallen 
American warfighter—this is now known as the battle cross.  
 
Picture 14: Battle Cross at the University of Montana-Missoula  
The battle cross has now become a visible reminder of the deceased American 
warfighter and it contains the following items: the helmet and identification tags which 
represent the fallen; the inverted rifle with bayonet which indicates a time for prayer as 
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well as an operational pause in order to pay tribute to the fallen; combat boots which 
represent the warfighter’s final march of the last battle; and finally a photograph of the 
fallen warfighter is placed in the center of the cross (FM 7-21.13 2003: C-12). Since the 
Global War on Terrorism began the battle cross has begun to attract popular attention 
with numerous units erecting crosses at memorials to honor the fallen. Since most 
warfighters cannot attend the funerals of their fallen comrades, many military 
organizations have erected battle crosses in order to provide a means for warfighters to 
pay tribute to their fallen comrades (Greatest Generation 2013: 1). The battle cross is 
also depicted on tattoos on the comrades of a fallen warfighter as a living memorial to 
him or her. Monuments across the United States also have statues and memorials 
depicting the battle cross.   
Agency 
2-44. The human will is the chief incalculable in war (Liddell-Hart 2008: 151). Like any 
social or cultural institution, the institutions and individuals in the American military are 
heterogeneous (Harrell 2003: 10). It is important to understand the American warfighter 
and how he or she functions individually and as part of a group before, during, and after 
combat operations (Van Doorn 1984: 35). While American warfighters share common 
values and beliefs, it is a mistake to view them in a monolithic fashion. As is the case in 
any cultural group, there are as many differences among individuals within the group as 
there are differences between cultural groups (Fenell 2008: 1). When an individual joins 
the American Armed Forces he or she voluntarily enters a lifestyle and environment that 
is vastly different from American civilian society (Goldich 2011: 62). The purpose of 
recruit training is to immerse the recruit in military discipline and introduce military 
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history, custom, tradition, and basic technical and tactical skillsets where individualism 
is eliminated as much as possible and uniformity is enforced (Van Creveld 2008: 49; 
Van Creveld 2012: Personal Communication). Individualism should not be confused 
with individuality (Rapport and Overing 2007: 209). Individualism is a conceptualization 
of the person or self (Rapport and Overing 2007: 209). Individuality refers to the 
universal nature of human existence, with individuals maintaining agency in that realm 
of existence (Rapport and Overing 2007: 209). The minimization of individualism 
resides in the paradox that even as the American Armed Forces are the front-line 
guardians of our cherished American Republic and democracy, they do not live in 
and/or practice democracy themselves (Wertsch 2011: 107). This premise can not only 
be observed in the authoritarian structure of the chain-of-command but also in its core 
values of selfless service, namely by putting one’s comrades and mission above one’s 
self. On the other hand, individuality and agency are left relatively untouched as the 
warfighter retains his or her own character and personhood no matter how they may 
express it (individualism) in a socio-cultural context—albeit in a cleaned pressed 
uniform and a closely cropped haircut!   
2-45. To expound on this concept of American military culture and agency, George 
Patton wrote about the warrior soul where he stated it was the “implausible something” 
that could be readily discerned by the acts and thoughts of warfighters (Coker 2007: 
16). “The warrior soul is what makes war an intensely existential experience” (Coker 
2007: 16). The warrior soul is the part of a warfighter’s individuality and is the facilitator 
of the warfighter’s expression of individualism in the form of the warrior ethos and the 
warrior code. The warrior ethos is the foundation for the warfighter’s dedication on and 
51 
 
off the battlefield and enforces four tenets: mission first; never accept defeat; never quit; 
and never leave a fallen comrade behind (U.S. Army 2009: 112-113). The warrior code 
conveys to American warfighters there is no honor in killing an unarmed person, let 
alone a child (Coker 2007: 61).  
2-46. Today’s American warfighters are composed of an all-volunteer force. Perhaps 
the most pertinent example of individual choice and agency by these volunteers are the 
American military oaths of enlistment and office. The first oath under the Constitution 
was approved by an Act of Congress on September 29, 1789 and it applied to all 
commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted members in military 
service of the United States (CMH 2012: 1).  
2-47. The current oath of enlistment for enlisted members of the American Armed 
Forces  
I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of 
the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over 
me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help 
me God (Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first 
adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962) (CMH 2012: 1). 
2-48. The current oath for commissioned officers for members of the American Armed 
Forces 
I, _____ (SSAN), having been appointed an officer in the Armed Forces of the 
United States, as indicated above in the grade of _____ do solemnly swear (or 
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affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the 
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose 
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office 
upon which I am about to enter; So help me God (DA Form 71, 1 August 1959, 
for officers) (CMH 2012: 1). 
 
Picture 15: Captain Tommy Livoti, USMC Taking the Oath of Office, 01 October 2002 
2-49. American warfighters take their oath of office seriously and it is the epitome of 
agency and freedom of choice. The oath is perhaps the ultimate testament to selfless 
service to the Nation and to one’s comrades where the individual’s word is his or her 
bond. The oath is something American warfighters live with daily and it reflects the core 
values and the warrior ethos in how they live and serve each day in war and in peace.   
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Common Ground 
2-50. Anthropologists and American warfighters have much in common which includes 
spending long periods of time in the field and attempting to establish rapport with local 
populations (Simons 2003: 113) and despite today’s sophisticated military technology, 
nothing can replace the element of humanity in achieving success during humanitarian 
and/or combat operations (Gabriel 1987: 7). Therefore, it makes sense for the American 
military to have its personnel trained in anthropology. This is because anthropology is 
the one social science dedicated to the study of humanity in that it attempts to define 
and describe human ways of life as they occur in cultures throughout time and space 
(Swartz and Jordan 1976: 33). Even though archaeology and history (including military 
history) illustrate that cultures change throughout their existence (albeit at different 
rates) (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 56) we also know that the ancient warrior was 
psychologically and physiologically identical to the contemporary warfighter as “he was 
subject to the same fears and sufferings that have always accompanied military life in 
whatever age” (Gabriel 2007: 33). Therefore, it is imperative that anthropologists not 
only conduct ethnographic research on American military culture— but ethnologic 
research within and outside of military institutions and the people they comprise of. This 
will provide a holistic anthropological and historical background from which 
anthropologists will be better able to appreciate the individual and common warfighter 
and how he or she contributes to the American military as a culture.   
The Common Everyday Warfighter 
2-51. Contemporary archaeological research has now stressed the importance of 
examining the fate of the common fighting man in past conflicts (Bletzer 2010: 1) when 
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examining the archaeological and historical records. The emphasis on the common 
American warfighter would benefit anthropologists who choose to study the American 
military and its culture (past and present) and all the contexts (war, peace, 
humanitarian) in which they exist. Today military historians maximize time spent with 
warfighters on the ground in order to permit detailed observation of their day-to-day 
events—this observation increases the military historian’s comprehension of the myriad 
of battlefield events that otherwise would almost certainly remain obscured (Keegan 
1976: 32).   
Military history today has a much wider scope than previous generations of 
scholars granted it. More than simply the story of armed conflict of campaigns 
and battles, it is the story of how societies form their institutions for their 
collective security and how those institutions operate in peace and war. It is the 
story of soldiers and the subculture of which they are a part. It includes the entire 
range of economic, social, legal, political, technological, and cultural issues that 
arise from the state’s need to organize violence to preserve its existence and 
accomplish its national goals (Stewart 2005: 5).  
2-52. Military historians now present the history of warfare from the perspective of the 
common warfighter instead of only the perspectives of generals and admirals, who more 
often than not, rarely experience the hardships and difficulties present in the life of the 
common warfighter (Gabriel 2007: 12). Anthropologists would be right to do the same, 
only approaching the common American warfighter from an anthropological in addition 
to historiographical perspective(s). Just as anthropologists study the history of cultures 
they prepare to engage, anthropologists can gain a better understanding of the ways in 
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which warfare influenced the development of complex states, which will in turn provide 
useful insights to better comprehend the background of contemporary warfare (Sabloff 
2008: 62). They can do so by spending time with American warfighters before during 
and after deployments as well as studying and learning about American military history 
and military history in general. This includes but is not limited to the individual 
warfighter’s family history and how it is connected to the warfighter’s ancestors who 
(may) have served in the military, especially during armed conflicts.  
2-53. War is one of humanity’s great social inventions (Gabriel 2007: 21) and institutions 
(Hoebel 1949: 390) and so long as war exists, the American military will play an 
important role in one way, shape, or form—this includes but is not limited to the 
enforcement of American foreign policy objectives when political and diplomatic 
mechanisms fail. American military culture is a viable, genuine, living and evolving 
culture and since “anthropology studies the ways in which cultures persist and change” 
(Segal 1984: 170) “it is essential that the worldview, the mindset, and the historical 
perspective of life in the military are understood” (Hall 2011: 4).    
2-54. The cruel reality of warfare has grown exponentially more complex and the human 
element of warfare has not changed; nor is it likely to change (Gabriel 1987: 13). If 
contemporary warfighters are successful in making cultural connections with host nation 
populations in the Global War on Terrorism, there is a high probability that these 
populations will view American warfighters “as people, as individuals and not as generic 
cut outs of the U.S. military war machine” (Philyaw 2011: 76). Anthropologists are the 
key to facilitating this goal—and appreciating and recognizing the American military as a 
culture is the first step to this realization. This realization will assist anthropologists in 
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not only appreciating the culture of the American Armed Forces but provide a culturally 
unique insight to the concept of military ethics as well as the history of anthropology and 
the American military.  
Military Anthropology 
2-55. Although the Department of Defense has no official definition of military 
anthropology, the following examples are intended to describe three types of military 
anthropology (Lucas 2009:85). The first is anthropology of the military (MA1) or the 
anthropological study of military culture (Lucas 2009:85). The second is anthropology 
for the military (MA2) or human terrain systems (HTS)21 (Lucas 2009: 85). The third is 
anthropology for the military (MA3) via educational programs (language, culture, 
regional studies) at military service academies (Lucas 2009: 85). These descriptions 
(MA1, MA2, and MA3) provide a basic understanding in the ways military anthropology 
has and/or may be employed in the Global War on Terrorism.   
2-56. MA1 is the anthropological study or research of the military itself, or its distinct 
organizations and/or service subcultures (Lucas 2009: 87). The first known 
anthropological study of an American military organization was the American 
Expeditionary Unit during World War I (Hawkins 2003: ix). MA1 is the ethnographic 
study of the members, organizations, and subcultures of the military (Lucas 2009: 87). 
 
21 HTS as identified in this section as MA2 should not be confused with the past Human Terrain 
Systems program of the U.S. Army. “[The Army’s Human Terrain Systems] HTS is not an 
applied anthropology program.  HTS conducts operationally relevant socio-cultural research and 
analysis, utilizing [sic] multiple social science disciplines and operational skill sets” (Human 
Terrain Systems Website 2011:1). 
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The subject of the military can be tremendously diverse as each military department has 
its own culture, mission, and structure (Harrell 2003: 3). The purpose here is to 
understand military organizations and subcultures as the focus of scientific study in the 
same manner an anthropologist would study any other organization, subculture or 
society (Lucas 2009: 87).  
2-57. MA2 (HTS) is organized into five categories according to Lucas (Lucas 2009: 
142). HTS1 provides cultural advice and regional knowledge (including language skills) 
to military personnel deploying to or while serving in combat zones. HTS2 consists of 
unclassified cultural databases maintained in the United States. HTS3 conducts cultural 
espionage and gathers clandestine cultural data for classified data bases. HTS4 carries 
out forensic anthropology and investigates possible war crimes. HTS5 is charged with 
the preservation of valuable cultural patrimony in war zones (Lucas 2009:142).     
2-58. MA3 has become more robust in the last decade. Since the Global War on 
Terrorism began, the military has made an effort to examine the consequences of not 
understanding the culture of the enemy and civilian non-combatants (Fujimura 
2003:145). This is important during asymmetric warfare as the culture of the enemy and 
civilian non-combatants are often one in the same. Today, there are a few 
anthropologists who teach and conduct their research at military service academies, 
war colleges, and language institutes and advise these institutions how to increase 
cultural literacy, promote and enhance foreign language proficiency, and increase the 
cultural awareness and cultural sensitivities of military men and women serving 
overseas (Lucas 2009: 7). Programs like Project Minerva (a Department of Defense-
wide program) assist in the development of regional study programs for military units 
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deploying in support of the Global War on Terrorism (Lucas 2009: 7). As anthropology 
and anthropologists have evolved over the last century, the concept of military 
anthropology will continue to evolve as well—especially as more anthropologists and 
archaeologists begin to cross the divide and work with military organizations and 
personnel.  
Military Anthropology History 
 
2-59. After America declared war22 in 1917, Mayan archaeologist Sylvanus Morley 
volunteered his services to the Office of Naval Intelligence23 and has been recognized 
as the greatest American spy during World War I (Harris and Sadler 2003: 46). Other 
Mesoamerican archaeologists with experience in Latin America joined Morley and 
volunteered their services to the Office of Naval Intelligence when America declared war 
(Brunhouse 1971: 112). Their task was to collect information on German activity in Latin 
America24 as the Germans wanted to exploit Latin American antipathy toward the United 
States and attempt to secretly construct submarine facilities on the east coast of Central 
America and southern Mexico (Harris and Sadler 2004: 1). The use of archaeology as a 
 
22 On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed Congress asking for a declaration of war 
against the German Empire. Just over two months earlier, on January 31, the German government had 
announced its resumption of “unrestricted submarine warfare” (Stewart 2005: 7). 
23 The Office of Naval Intelligence was the most active branch of secret service at the time (Brunhouse 
1971: 112). 
 
24 “Less than a year before the United States’ entry into the war, German submarines had visited U.S. 
ports three times in not-so-subtle demonstrations to the U.S. Navy in their reach capability of their U-
boats” (Harris and Sadler 2004: 1). “The U-boat was potentially a war-winning weapon and German 
submarines had not only ravaged Allied shipping but conceivably could prevent the transport of U.S. 
troops and supplies to France” (Harris and Sadler 2004: 1).   
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cover in World War I was not unique to Americans working in Latin America. The British 
recruited archaeologists for espionage as well. During World War I archaeologists 
Thomas E. Lawrence and C. Leonard Woolley conducted intelligence operations in 
Syria while their colleague Gertrude L. Bell conducted intelligence operations in Egypt 
and Mesopotamia; all three used their academic research as covers (Price 2003: 32). 
Some scholars took issue with archaeologists serving as spies in World War I and there 
are scholars today who disagree with the concept of military anthropology and its 
application in the Global War on Terrorism (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 9; Browman 2005: 3; 
Harris and Sadler 2003: 46). These anthropologists cite Franz Boas in his opposition to 
anthropologists using their knowledge and skills in World War I as a cover for 
espionage.     
Franz Boas25 and the Boas Principle 
 
2-60. Today Franz Boas is considered a brilliant and talented scholar who shaped 
American anthropology and has influenced all four subfields (Marks 2005: 30; Smedley 
2001: 57)—and rightfully so. However, during Boas’ time in American anthropology 
(especially World War I), there was a significant amount of resistance from the 
anthropological community to Boas’ radical ideology and the application of his ideas into 
American anthropology (Browman 2011:11). Boas considered himself both a scientist 
and a citizen (Lesser 1981:11). As a citizen Boas expressed his personal opinion where 
 
25 The following critique of Franz Boas is not a condemnation of him as a person, or as an anthropologist. 
The analyst believes that Boas greatly contributed to the field of anthropology and did much more good 
than harm for the discipline, and remains an example for all anthropologists to follow, including the 
analyst.  
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he was opposed to war and as a scientist, he was against other scientists using their 
profession as scientists in order to engage in espionage to support warfare (Lucas 
2009:69). On December 20, 1919 Franz Boas wrote a letter in The Nation newspaper. 
His letter was in response to scientists (specifically Morley; generally, Lawrence, Bell) 
using their positions as archaeologists for the purposes of collecting information and 
data for military intelligence organizations.  
A soldier [sic] whose business is murder is a fine art, a diplomat whose calling is 
based on deception and secretiveness, a politician whose very life consists in 
compromises with his conscience, a business man whose aim is personal profit 
within the limits allowed by a lenient law-such may be excused if they set patriotic 
devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They 
merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so 
the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth. We all know 
scientists who in private life do not come up to the standard of truthfulness, but 
who nevertheless would not consciously falsify the results of their researches 
(sic). It is bad enough if we have to put up with these, because they reveal a lack 
of strength of character that is liable to distort the results of their work. A person, 
however who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself 
to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance 
in his alleged researches (sic) in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political 
machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to 
be classed a scientist (Boas 1919). 
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Boas’ letter led to his censure by the American Anthropological Association ten days 
later (Tyrrell 2007: 12).  
2-61. Boas claimed that he had recently learned about such activities in October of 
1919 (Browman 2011:14), but in fact “Boas had known about this spying and had 
written his feelings about it to various anthropologists for more than two years prior to 
this fateful letter. So, it may appear disingenuous of him to write in October 1919 
implying this had just come to his attention – if we ignore the possible political strategy 
involved” (Browman 2011:14). Franz Boas is well-known for influencing twentieth 
century American anthropology but what is less well-known was his commitment to 
radical political causes (Bullert 2009: 208).  
2-62. To understand Boas’ ideological agenda, we must examine his background. Born 
and educated in Germany, Boas received a doctorate in physics before immigrating to 
the United States (Erickson and Murphy 2003: 74). In 1891 Boas became an American 
citizen (Stocking 1974: 308), yet despite his American citizenship, he had always 
considered himself a German and World War I was a time of great emotional strain for 
him (Stocking 1974: 308). In his anthropological research, Boas espoused the idea of 
cultural relativity: the idea that cultures should be understood from their own 
perspectives and not judged by the values and morals of outsiders (Lassiter 2009: 18). 
In World War I America, Franz Boas was the ultimate outsider26 in that he was an anti-
American intellectual with pro-German cultural affection and loyalty to the German 
 
26 Boas considered himself German and he was in America to promote German culture, values, and 
morals in America (Cole 1999: 280).   
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nation-state (Cole 1999:280; Browman 2005: 3). Boas’ letter to The Nation was 
influenced more by his pacifism and loyalty to Germany rather than scientific principle. 
Furthermore, Boas’ scientific judgment was clouded by his anger and outrage with 
Office of Naval Intelligence archaeologist-spies in their efforts to defeat Germany during 
World War I (Lucas 2009: 53). It is here that Boas “sounded a lofty tone of righteous 
indignation, decrying what he considered to have been the prostitution of science” 
(Harris and Sadler 2003:284).   
2-63. To understand the reasoning behind his letter, it is very important to know that 
Boas believed American Soldiers27 were nothing more than cold-blooded murderers 
(Lucas 2009: 90). Therefore, we must not “dignify his elitist, smug, and condescending 
moral judgments of classes of people including Soldiers” (Lucas 2009: 74) as ethical or 
scientific principle but instead recognize Boas’ letter was a reflection of his personal and 
political ideology. Ironically Boas’ condemnation of such a diverse range of activities 
was not only anti-relativistic but a “grave disservice to science” (Lucas 2009: 53) as 
well. Boas grouped all American warfighters (and did so without an anthropological 
study) as cold-blooded murderers in that he assumed there were moral distinctions 
dividing scientists and warfighters, with the former somehow being morally superior to 
the latter (Tyrell 2007: 3). Even more ironic was the fact that, during his later years, 
Boas used his authority to facilitate “radical political-social transformation” in American 
anthropology (Bullert 2009: 208) which still influences American anthropology 
departments today (Erickson and Murphy 2003: 74). Boas combined anthropological 
 
27 Soldier, Marine, Airman, Coast Guardsman, and Sailor are capitalized when referring to those who 
serve in the American Armed Forces.  
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method and theory with a radical political perspective in order to “professionalize” North 
American anthropology; this established the foundation for twenty-first century 
anthropological ethics and this based on Boas’ control of anthropology and his distaste 
for science being used as a cover for espionage (Tyrrell 2007: 2). 
2-64. It is very important to note that in the course of World War I Boas emphasized his 
political agenda via anthropology and committed treasonous acts while trying to expose 
American archaeologists serving as spies28 for the Office of Naval Intelligence to foreign 
governments and officials (Harris and Sadler 2003: 287). Boas no longer considered 
Lawrence, Bell, and others like them as scientists (Harris and Sadler 2003: 284). 
Indeed, using one’s profession as a cover for spying certainly has the potential to cause 
moral dilemmas and compromises—which are true for all professions in any context, 
especially war. The context of war and the obligation to serve one’s country required 
Boas’ colleagues to become Soldiers (Sailors in Morley’s case) as well as scientists. 
This context and the cultural relativism of the environment and realities present during 
war was not, unfortunately, considered by Boas when he publicly denounced those 
colleagues who were attempting to win a war against Boas’ German comrades in 
Europe. Despite Boas’ bias and prejudice, he emerged as the victor in controlling early 
20th century anthropology and “he took advantage of his power base and rewrote the 
history of anthropology, giving no quarter to his institutional competitors” (Darnell 2001: 
11, 33, 35). The rewriting of the intellectual history of our discipline by the victors is 
known as unreflexive presentism (Browman 2011: 1). Because of the rewriting of 
 
28Boas wrote letters to colleagues in Mexico in order to expose archaeologists John Alden Mason and 
William Hubbs Mechling who were conducting operations in Mexico (Harris and Sadler 2003: 285, 287).   
64 
 
anthropological history, modern anthropology has continued to be influenced by Boas’ 
ideology and his version of anthropological ethics. Boas’ contempt for the Soldier and 
his condemnation of the scientist as spy has resulted in American anthropology’s 
aversion for and distrust of the military (Tyrrell 2007:12).29 This aversion and distaste for 
the military has evolved into the Boas Principle (Lucas 2009: 93).   
2-65. The Boas Principle considers the Department of Defense30 and intelligence 
agencies31 moral abominations—thus any anthropologist who works for these 
organizations in any capacity (even with good intentions) is morally and ethically invalid 
and may no longer consider himself or herself a scientist (Lucas 2009: 93). Boas’ 
sentiments are “one-sided, stereotypical, and generally unworthy of so eminent and 
accomplished social scientist”; moreover “his laudatory moral assessment of science 
itself is highly idealized and we now know from numerous sociological and historical 
studies it is deeply flawed” (Lucas 2009: 53).32 Scientists are human beings who are 
driven by their sense of patriotism (or lack thereof) like everyone else.   
 
 
29This aversion and distaste originate from the end of World War I and was reinforced during Vietnam and 
the Cold War (Tyrrell 2003:12). 
 
30 Includes the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, service Academies, War Colleges, 
Reserve Officer Training Corps Units, Defense language institutes (Lucas 2009: 93).   
 
31 Includes Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  
 
32 As a result of Boas’ letter to The Nation, he was censured by the American Anthropological Association 
(Price 2008: 1). “The entire AAA Executive Board at the time realized the 1919 letter was not an 
astonished discovery or sudden concern about intellectual integrity, but part of a series of political 
agendas by Boas” (Browman 2005: 3).  
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2-66. Scholars (e.g. Lucas 2009; Tyrrell 2007; Browman 2005; 2011, Bullert 2009; 
Harris and Sadler 2003) have demonstrated that Boas was politically motivated as 
opposed to being firmly grounded in objective scientific principles. Despite the obvious 
context of Boas’ bias, contemporary anthropologists have used Boas (and his letter) to 
justify the condemnation of applying military anthropology in the Global War on 
Terrorism. This has led to a flawed ethical basis that unjustly repudiates military 
anthropology. A closer reading of Boas’ 1919 letter revealed that he did not come right 
out and say that science must not be used for harm during times of warfare or that using 
anthropological skills or knowledge in the context of war was necessarily wrong (Price 
2008: 16). Boas also never stated that anthropologists should avoid working for military 
and intelligence agencies (Price 2008: 16). Rather he paved the way for future critiques 
(via the Boas Principle), which became ethical impasses related to military anthropology 
(Price 2008: 16). Boas’ political and ideological bias has been used to bring cases 
against military anthropology, (Browman 2005:3). One such “case” is Project Camelot.  
Project Camelot and Unreflexive Presentism  
2-67. Project Camelot was conducted in 1967 in Chile in order to measure Chileans’ 
inclination to communism via questionnaires provided by social scientists. Project 
Camelot outraged some in the anthropological community because some social 
scientists had been providing cultural information for the American war effort in Vietnam 
(Harris and Sadler 2003: 317). The American Anthropological Association’s 
Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence 
Communities (CEAUSSIC) report used Project Camelot as an historical example in 
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order to oppose the application of military anthropology in the Global War on Terrorism. 
This example however is not historically accurate (Lucas 2009: 56). Project Camelot 
was created by the Army’s Chief of Research and Development where research was 
delegated to the American University in Washington D.C. (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 8). 
“Project Camelot was commissioned to determine the feasibility of developing a general 
social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically 
significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world” (Horowitz 
1967: 5). Project Camelot was never classified or secret and it was never designed to 
conceal U.S. Army sponsorship (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 8). “Although Camelot was not a 
classified project and Chile was not one of its primary research sites, the research 
design caused an immediate outcry from American and Latin American social scientists, 
the State Department, and the press” (Wakins 1992: 28). There was no spying or 
clandestine research in Project Camelot (Lucas 2009:60) and there was in fact, only 
one anthropologist33 involved with the project as most of the social scientists involved in 
the research were sociologists and psychologists, not anthropologists (Fluehr-Lobban 
2003: 8). There is no evidence of Camelot conducting malicious acts or its social 
scientists (including the one anthropologist) having engaged in unethical practice as 
defined by codes of conduct during that time or since (Lucas 2009: 62).   
 
33 The anthropologist in question was Assistant Professor Hugo Nuttini (Lucas 2009: 59). Nuttini was 
retained in a limited and decidedly informal capacity as an outside consultant with a modest honorarium 
of $750, charged to explore the feasibility of cooperating with social scientists in Chile on the project, 
(Lucas 2009: 59).   
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2-68. Even though Camelot was never an anthropological endeavor and was not in 
conflict with Boas’ objection to scientists serving as spies, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban states 
that, without the Camelot affair, no statement regarding ethics would have been 
forthcoming from the American Anthropological Association (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 10). 
The American Anthropological Association states that: The international reputation of 
anthropology has been damaged by the activities of individuals…who have pretended to 
be engaged in anthropological research while pursuing other ends. There is good 
reason to believe that some anthropologists have used their professional standing and 
the names of academic institutions as cloaks for the collection of intelligence information 
and for intelligence operations (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 9). 
2-69. Fluehr-Lobban goes on to state that because of Project Camelot, Boas was 
justified and his actions during World War I are vindicated (Fluehr-Lobban 2003: 9; 
AAA-1 2005: 1). Using unreflexive presentism, Fluehr-Lobban attempted to associate 
Project Camelot with actions that never took place with a large group of anthropologists 
who did not exist. Fluehr-Lobban’s above analysis is inaccurate in that she cites Project 
Camelot as vindicating Boas even though, through her own admission, Project Camelot 
did not violate anything Boas had criticized during World War I. Moreover, Project 
Camelot never violated the American Anthropological Association’s 1967 statement on 
ethical behavior in that the project did not ask anyone (anthropologist, sociologist, 
psychologist) to collect information for the purposes of intelligence or participate in 
intelligence operations. There is no evidence that anyone involved with Project Camelot 
was expected or authorized or expected to do so (Lucas 2009: 61). The fear of a 
“Camelot fiasco” refers to the public scrutiny and subsequent cancellation of Camelot, 
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but not to its existence as a research project (Wakins 1992: 60). Camelot was an 
applied social science (not anthropological) endeavor whose goal was to assist the 
United States government in developing stability and security in third world countries 
(Wakins 1992: 60-61). “If Boas’ position on such matters even requires ‘vindication’, it 
would not be forthcoming from the details of this incident” (Lucas 2009: 61).   
2-70. Boas’ goal was to professionalize anthropology as a science (Tyrell 2007: 3) 
within his own ideological agenda. “As such, anthropologists must meet the ‘highest 
ethical standards’ held for scientists including their expulsion for certain ‘heretical’ acts 
of which ‘spying’ is amongst the worst” (Tyrrell 2007: 3). “One point that is crucial to 
note is that certain key words are used in opposition to ‘ethics’ – ‘spying’, ‘deception’, 
and ‘falsification’ stand out in particular” (Tyrrell 2007: 3). Whether you agree or 
disagree, arguments within anthropology about the roles and responsibilities of 
anthropologists conducting applied work are based on the idea that conducting applied 
anthropological (or archaeological) investigation or work must fall under certain 
ideological and methodological positions (Green 2006: 119). The dichotomy between 
academic and applied anthropology has resulted in many academic anthropologists 
regarding applied anthropologists with contempt (Gow 1993:381). This dichotomy is 
even more pronounced in the context of applying military anthropology in the Global 
War on Terrorism. “Accepted critiques within the social sciences, and within 
anthropology have exposed the fallacy of seeking, and trying to represent objective truth 
and the false promise of scientism, while explicit alliance with certain political positions 
equally compromises any claims to, if not truth, an honest presentation of research 
findings” (Green 2006: 119). This has led to the Boas Principle in that for one to practice 
69 
 
anthropology, one must follow an ethical policy based on anti-war ideology and 
historical fiction. While there are many anthropological and archaeological professional 
organizations with ethical codes, some may choose to follow the Boas Principle while 
others may not. Due to the myriad of anthropological and archaeological professional 
organizations and their subsequent ethical codes the ethically conscious anthropologist 
must decide on which code to follow—but which one is best? 
Ethics: Professional Organizations and the Military 
 
2-71. The purpose of establishing of a code of ethics was to codify fundamental ethical 
principles that Western archaeologists should follow in their day-to-day research and 
field work (Hamilakis 2007: 21). When it comes to ethical codes in anthropology and 
archaeology, there are “attempts to establish abstract universal applicability” (Hamilakis 
2007: 22). This however is not possible as there are many professional organizations 
that have many ethical codes, and more often than not, they are not always in sync with 
each other. There are no list of rules or regulations that could ever be detailed enough 
to cover every possible situation and every possible action (Imiola and Cazier 2010: 15). 
This is especially true during times of war.   
2-72. The American Anthropological Association and the Society for American 
Archaeology provide ethical guidelines for anthropologists and archaeologists to follow 
when conducting their research (e.g., how to work with stakeholders and how findings 
should be distributed to the public) (Riggs 2007: 84). Should archaeologists and 
anthropologists choose one set of ethics or follow all anthropological codes of ethics? 
This is the challenge anthropologists and archaeologists face (Riggs 2007: 85). Is 
adhering to one code better than another? Who decides which code is best and for 
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whom? On one subject, one ethical code is specific, while on that same subject, another 
ethical code is less specific. For example, “scientific research is often at odds with 
respect for other cultures” (Riggs 2007: 85). According to the American Anthropological 
Association’s Code of Ethics, anthropologists have ethical obligations first and foremost 
to the people, species, and materials they study and to the “people with whom they 
work, and these obligations can supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge” (Stone 
2005: 208). The American Anthropological Association makes it clear that the people 
being studied take precedence (Riggs 2007: 85-86). However, the Society for American 
Archaeology’s Principles on Ethics does not even address the issue of putting these 
subjects first (Riggs 2007: 85-86). Even if it did, but differed in its intent or perspective, 
which ethical code would take precedence for the practicing archaeologist?   
2-73. While an archaeologist who is anthropologically trained could just as easily turn to 
the American Anthropological Association’s prioritizing of the people and materials 
being studied if another ethical code is too vague, this example draws attention to the 
fact that it is unrealistic to expect a code of ethics based on generalities to provide 
solutions to the vast range of issues that exist in the real-world (Groarke and Warrick 
2006: 164). Instead there should be an ethical platform which provides anthropologists 
and archaeologists an opportunity to employ their skillsets in accordance with the 
situation after it is identified, assessed, and therefore can be properly (and ethically) 
addressed (Groarke and Warrick 2006: 164). “Archaeological ethics are overburdened 
with statements, guidelines, codes and standards: the relationship of these dreary 
documents to archaeological praxis is very often a vague and formal one, and almost 
invariably unreflexive” (Moshenka 2008: 163). “Only after seeking objective knowledge 
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can the anthropologist even begin an informed assessment of the relative threats of the 
courses of action recommended by the competing ethical platforms” (Stone 2005: 208). 
Switching back and forth from one ethical code to another in order to ensure no one 
code is violated is unrealistic. War is a human driven activity that is fluid and 
unpredictable. Therefore, flexible and situational-based ethical paradigms are required 
in order for an anthropologist to operate effectively in a real-world context—especially 
on the battlefield.  
2-74. Thus, anthropological ethical codes composed in theoretical black and white 
ignore the real-world (applied) gray (Stone 2005: 208). Nothing in life is black or white, 
especially during times of war. Too frequently during war the best choice for a military 
member is often still a bad choice (Rhodes 2009: 3). “If the moral authority of 
anthropology depends, as some claim, on its capacity to grasp social and cultural 
reality, it is possible that anthropological inquiries overly obedient to moral constraints 
may, paradoxically, undermine the moral authority of the discipline, since moral 
agendas run the risk of limiting our capacity to study and to understand certain aspects 
of this reality” (Stoczkowski 2008: 350). There has to be a commonsense approach to a 
situation as it arises, and a black or white ethical approach based on a zero-defect 
mentality does not offer a solution, especially in a real-world context such as warfare. 
Applied anthropological issues in the real-world are situational and should be 
approached and considered on a case-by-case basis (Nicholas and Hollowell: 2007: 
73).   
2-75. Since the Global War on Terrorism began, American military leadership has been 
reaching out to the anthropological community for help in order to better understand the 
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[asymmetric] battlefield (Serrato, Laporte, and Dhanju 2009: 24). Yet many American 
anthropologists have not only neglected the American military—they have also 
condemned it (Tyrell 2007: 12). Despite the military’s request, the Boas Principle has 
become the basis for opposition to military anthropology, especially in the Global War 
on Terrorism. The idea (from individuals within the anthropology community) that there 
is either the military or ethics is a false dichotomy and is unfair to military organizations 
and personnel (Toner 2003: 1). This dichotomy falls back to Boas’ 1919 categorization 
of the so-called pure scientist versus the impure non-scientist and thus creates an “us 
versus them” dichotomy (Tyrell 2007: 8). This is an artificial dichotomy (Toner 2003: 1) 
which forces anthropologists into two camps within anthropology.       
In a discipline which has minimal presence outside the ivory towers of    
established universities, the majority of those identified as anthropologists or who 
identify themselves as such, are part of a tiny group of academics employed 
within an elite university sector. Such individuals continue to practice what those 
in the established profession recognize as “anthropology”; occasional, if 
extended, periods of field-based research and the production of articles and 
books oriented towards a community of specialists pursuing questions of 
theoretical interests to anthropologists. However not all anthropologists confine 
themselves to this kind of anthropology. Individuals also do other kinds of social 
research work; they do so for different audiences (Green 2006:119).   
2-76. Different audiences include civil, military, and intelligence organizations currently 
operating overseas. “Unless codes of ethics and practice are in a constant state of 
revision and negotiation, the dangers of solidification, stagnation, and ethical complicity 
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are always present” (Hamilakis 2007: 22). There needs to be plausible alternatives that 
will address pressing ethical issues in the real-world (such as war and armed conflict) 
and avoid the types of codification that result in inaction and stagnation (Hamilakis 
2007: 22). “But what is the alternative? Should we subject anthropological investigations 
only to epistemological constraints? Would it be possible to consider all knowledge 
about human beings equally worthwhile, provided that it meets some epistemological 
criteria, independently of the uses it can be turned to” (Stoczkowski 2008: 350)? Does a 
plausible alternative exist? The answer to these questions requires an ethical 
framework that addresses the legitimate concerns of anthropological organizations yet 
recognizes the realities of the asymmetric battlefield in the Global War on Terrorism. 
One conceivable plausible alternative—at least in wartime contexts—is military ethics. 
Like applied archaeology, military ethics is an applied science (Rhodes 2009: 19).  
Military Ethics and Just War Theory 
 
2-77. Ethical codes are limited because they do not cover every possible ethical 
situation or dilemma (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006: 116). It seems that 
ethical codes are primarily concerned with what not to do instead of focusing on action 
to promote positive outcomes (Scarre and Scarre 2006: 3). That said there is never a 
good reason to ignore ethics especially during times of war (Rhodes 2009:3, 4). Military 
ethics apply to all warfighters in every situation (Rhodes 2009: 4). This is especially true 
in the Global War on Terrorism and the military’s global counterinsurgency34 efforts. The 
 
34 Counterinsurgency is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 383). Insurgency is 
defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 385).  
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ethical challenges posed in a counterinsurgency environment require all warfighters’ 
attention and action (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 251). This statement from the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual exemplifies the efforts of the American military in the 
enforcement of a robust ethical standard in every context on the battlefield. The 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual has implied ethical principles throughout its pages 
(Perez 2010: 59). These applied ethical implications in the Field Manual ensure that the 
warfighter understands how to assess a situation and how to competently carry out his 
or her actions (Rhodes 2009:1). “Wars as awful as they are would be worse in the 
absence of military ethics” (Rhodes 2009: 1).  
2-78. Just war theory35 forms the foundation for American military ethics. Just war 
theory was developed over the centuries in order to clarify when war or military action 
was justified for nation-states (Hartle 2004: 94). That said there are principles of just war 
theory that are generally agreed upon. The principles are jus ad bellum (the initiation of 
war); jus in bello (the conduct of war) (Hartle 2004: 96); and jus post bellum (the 
responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war) (Moseley 2009: 1). Jus 
ad bellum or the right to fight concerns the morality of going to war (Guthrie and Quinlan 
2007:11). Jus in bello or how to fight concerns the morality of what is done within war 
and how it is to be waged (Guthrie and Quinlan 2007: 11). For the purposes of this 
section, jus ad bellum and jus post bellum will not be discussed as this section is 
focused on the ethics of how military anthropologists conduct themselves during 
operations, more specifically, in counterinsurgency situations.  
 
 
35Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought (Moseley 2011: 1). 
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2-79. Jus in bello encompasses two important considerations during the conduct of war. 
The first consideration is proportionality, which applies at the micro level in the conduct 
of military operations. All force applied during an operation must be proportional to the 
goal or objective of the operation (Hartle 2004: 97). Proportionality considers the lives of 
our own military, non-combatant civilians, enemy prisoners of war, and even the lives of 
the enemy (Guthrie and Quinlan 2007: 14). The second consideration is discrimination, 
in that combatants are never to target noncombatants (Hartle 2004: 97) or deliberately 
attack the innocent (Guthrie and Quinlan 2007: 14).  
2-80. Military ethics are by no means infallible and are subject to the same analysis and 
critique as other ethical codes. Military ethics applies to the real-world environment of 
war and has developed courses of actions that help guide warfighters for present and 
future conflicts (Rhodes 2009:2). Within military ethics, deontological ethics, virtue 
ethics, and utilitarian ethics are often identified as one of the three primary moral 
options between which individuals can choose (Surprenant 2010: 165). When it comes 
to military ethics (as well as the analyst’s own ethical dilemmas during actual combat 
operations), the analyst asserts that it is not a choice of one but a combination of all 
three. Within this combination, one ethical construct may be applied more robustly than 
others. It will “depend on the situation” (King 2004:15).   
Virtue Ethics and Military Core Values 
2-81. “Character is merely virtue in action” (Toner 2003: 8). Virtue ethics are based on 
character and trust and do not place codes or rules as the priority (Scarre and Scarre 
2006: 8). That being said, virtue ethics does not discount the idea of deontological or 
utilitarian ethics. For in order to be virtuous in your profession, you have to be a virtuous 
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person first (Scarre and Scarre 2006: 4). Virtue ethics follows along the same concept 
of what the military refers to as core values. Military core values are custom-made 
versions of virtue ethics for members of the military. Ultimately, core values are about 
an individual putting the needs of others above the individual’s own needs. In the Air 
Force its "service before self"; in the Army it’s called "selfless service"; and in the Navy 
and Marine Corps it’s called commitment" (Toner 2003: 2)36. Army core values37 include 
principles, standards, and qualities considered essential for Soldiers and are 
fundamental to Soldiers and Army civilians making the “right decision in any situation” 
(FM 6-22 2006:4-2). Marine Corps core values38 are the values that form the heart of 
 
36 Since most military anthropology will be conducted with ground troops, I will only include Army and 
Marine Corps core values. This is in no way a dismissal or disrespect of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, or 
Coast Guard, who have similar core values and standards.  
 
37Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers. 
Duty: Fulfill your obligations. Respect: Treat people as they should be treated. Selfless Service: Put the 
welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.  Honor: Live up to all the Army 
values. Integrity:  Do what’s right—legally and morally. Personal Courage: Face fear, danger, or adversity 
both physical and moral (FM 6-22 2006: 4-2). 
 
38Honor: the quality that guides Marines to exemplify the ultimate in ethical and moral behavior; never to 
lie, cheat, or steal; to abide by an uncompromising code of integrity; to respect human dignity; to have 
respect and concern for each other. Courage: The mental, moral, and physical strength ingrained in 
Marines to carry them through the challenges of combat and the mastery of fear; to do what is right; to 
adhere to a higher standard of personal conduct; to lead by example, and to make tough decisions under 
stress and pressure. Commitment: The spirit of determination and dedication within members of a force of 
arms that leads to professionalism and mastery of the art of war. It leads to the highest order of discipline 
for unit and self; it is the ingredient that enables 24-hour-a-day dedication to Corps and Country; pride; 
concern for others; and an unrelenting determination to achieve a standard of excellence in every 
endeavor (MCWP 6-11 2002: 101). 
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Marine character and provide guidance to meet any challenge (MCWP 6-11 2002: 101). 
The core values stress the importance of virtue in all aspects of military endeavors and 
promote living an honorable life on and off the battlefield. These core values can be 
utilized by an anthropologist or archaeologist working on the battlefield as well.  
Utilitarian Ethics and Consequentialism 
 
2-82. Utilitarianism (Consequentialism) states that an act is right or wrong based upon 
the consequences of that action or inaction (Olsthoorn 2011: 81). Utilitarian ethics is an 
approach to what is universally good and although it is consistent with virtue theory, it 
adds another important perspective to ethical thinking (Rhodes 2009: 10). This 
approach does not concentrate so much on the sort of person one ought to be but 
rather on how one ought to choose how to act. These options may amount to the same 
thing in some ways, but the emphasis in this approach is in on how to make decisions 
rather than on how to live well (Rhodes 2009: 10). All military leaders are responsible 
for everything they do or fail to do as well as their actions and inactions—and the 
resulting consequences or outcomes. Military Leaders are also responsible for 
everything those in their charge do or fail to do as well as their actions and inactions—
and the resulting consequences or outcomes.  
2-83. The main objective in counterinsurgency is to avoid taking the lives of non-
combatants (and to persuade the insurgent to denounce violence and return to the 
political process) and uses the principle of double effect to mitigate if not eliminate the 
chance of harming innocent life (Olsthoorn 2011: 83). The realities of war, however, 
make it impossible to always avoid the killing and/or injury of non-combatants. While 
this reality is sad, the military recognizes that killing, in and of itself, is an evil act. This 
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principle states that evil acts are permitted if four conditions are met (Olsthoorn 2011: 
83). The first condition is the evil act must be morally permissible (Rhodes 2009: 117). 
The second condition is the positive effect must be proportional to the negative effect 
(Rhodes 2009: 117). The third condition is that the intention must be good (such as 
neutralization of the enemy is intended, and civilian deaths are not) (Olsthoorn 2011: 
83). The fourth condition is the intended positive effects (the neutralization of the 
enemy) outweigh the unintended negative effects (civilian deaths), namely, the chosen 
means should be proportional (Olsthoorn 2011: 83) and that an evil effect must not be 
intended or desired (Rhodes 2009: 117).  
Deontological Ethics and Military Rules, Regulations and Policy 
 
2-84. The deontological school of ethics argues that rightness of action is determined by 
certain rules in place (Chatterjee, Sarker, and Fuller 2009: 143). The military has rules 
based on deontological standards such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice. “The 
Uniform Code of Military Justice constitutes a specific body of rules supported by 
sanctions that apply to the military” (Hartle 2004: 62). Other deontological rules of the 
military include general orders issued by commanders in specific theaters of combat 
and garrison. General orders are given by a commander in how his or her organization 
will implement policy and procedures in accordance with the Uniformed Code of Military 
Justice and other military rules and regulations. The military is also beholden to 
international treaties on war including but not limited to The Hague Convention and the 
Law of Land Warfare. All are deontological in nature and form the rules-based codes 
that all military members must obey.   
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2-85. Military ethics is an applied science rooted in individual conscience and is in 
concert with all three ethical schools (virtue, utilitarian, and deontological) (Rhodes 
2009:19). Therefore, military ethics as an applied science is an ideal and reasonable 
alternative for an applied anthropology on the contemporary battlefield and its 
employment within the Global War on Terrorism.   
Military Ethics and Do No Harm 
 
2-86. “When did do no harm become do nothing” (Serrato, Laporte, and Dhanju 2009: 
24)? Many anthropological ethicists have spent time scrutinizing the consequences of 
actions by colleagues but not on the consequences of inaction by colleagues, especially 
when it comes to human life (Fosher 2010: 267). If an anthropologist does nothing 
about a situation in which he or she can reduce harm or save lives; where does that fall 
in terms of “do no harm” (Fosher 2010: 267)?  
[Do no harm] is, after all, a truism that comes out of medicine, so ‘harm’ is always 
measured against the current and projected physical state of the individual (Tyrell 
2011: Personal Communication).  
Anthropological ethics resulted from anthropology borrowing ethical principles from 
other disciplines in which peer review provides oversight for research methods and 
practice (Meskell and Pels 2005: 3). “Even in medicine, its utility is in question when it 
gets applied into a larger social group; say the debate on assisted suicide-it was never 
meant to be a social code (or, rather, a code applied to a social group)” (Tyrell 2011: 
Personal Communication). The term harm is itself, when it comes to anthropology is a 
very relative term. Anthropology’s holistic perspectives (Stone 2005: 198) can be 
applied in any context, especially asymmetric warfare. Keeping this in mind, there is 
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little justification in remaining on the sidelines for apprehension in causing harm (Stone 
2005: 198). “The principle of beneficence (do no harm) obligates researchers to create 
procedures and research designs that allow them to accurately predict and assess the 
risks and benefits of their research and to be both vigilant and effective in avoiding 
unnecessary harm to their research participants” (Whiteford and Trotter 2008:74). In the 
art and science of applying anthropology in war, the same applies in accordance with 
jus in bello. This means we must not take action where the harm done is disproportional 
to the military benefit. Harm is to be applied in relation to all human life, especially the 
lives and well-being of innocent people (and even the enemy) (Guthrie and Quinlan 
2007:14). In all contexts of combat, warfighters must never use more force than 
necessary (Guthrie and Quinlan 2007: 14). 
2-87. One advantage military ethics has in its application on the battlefield are rules of 
engagement. Rules of engagement are “directives issued by a competent military 
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” 
(Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 387). Actions based on military ethics will “depend” on 
the situation, location, and operational environment39. Rules of engagement tailor how 
 
39The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which 
affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. The three 
major types of operational environments are (1) permissive: the host country military and law enforcement 
agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to 
conduct (2) uncertain: the host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to operations that a unit 
intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended 
operational area (3) hostile: hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose 
or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct (FM 6-02 2004: 1-138).     
81 
 
military ethics and actions will be employed in a specific area of operation and 
recognize that the military ethical code (like other professional and academic ethical 
codes) is not applicable universally. Rules of engagement assist military personnel in 
accomplishing their mission within a context of proper application of force, restraint, and 
civil engagement. Military ethics (unlike professional and academic ethical codes) 
incorporates rules of engagement in order to provide specifics in respect to different 
geographical locations and evolving situations40 when dealing with “gray” issues on the 
battlefield. As mentioned earlier, the principle of double effect is consumed with 
mitigating and/or eliminating harm. The idea of the principle of double effect is still in 
use today, especially when the issue of harm to noncombatants is in play (Rhodes 
2009:29). Contemporary counterinsurgency method and theory stresses in its 
implementation: respect for human rights; uphold security and justice; foster 
transparency and do no harm (JP 3-24: 2009: VI-17).   
Informed Consent, Transparency, and Confidentiality 
 
2-88. “The process of informed consent is one of the most important, powerful, and 
complex actions embedded in the respect for persons section of research/practice 
ethics” (Whiteford and Trotter 2008: 65). The Counterinsurgency Field Manual “values 
freedom of thought, conscience, and activity by espousing the democratic principle of 
consent” (Perez 2010: 64). In war, gray is more common than black or white. Applying 
 
 
40Situational understanding is knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes 
timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly (including non-combatants), enemy, and other 
operations within the battlespace to in order to facilitate decision making and quickly determine the 
context and relevance of events as they unfold (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 387-388).   
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anthropology on the battlefield may at times deviate from academic standards of 
practice due to the reality, circumstances, and uncertainty during military operations. 
Considering Mead’s support (1942: 13-14) for using anthropology to win the war, there 
may be times when consent and transparency are not applicable, especially when 
dealing with the enemy. Toner (2003) provides a poignant example of doing no harm 
amid the gray and grave circumstances of World War II:  
Lying is wrong. But would you lie to a Nazi if you owned a house in Warsaw in 
1939 and he knocked on your door, asking if you had seen two fugitive Jews 
(whom you were hiding in your basement)? Of course, you would lie, for you 
recognize the importance of the situation, circumstances, or realities. The Nazi 
knocking on my door in 1939 is not entitled to the truth, and I will lie to him, 
knowing that a literal-minded devotion to the idea here of the rule ‘do not lie’ will 
result in the reality of a gross miscarriage of justice- the likely murder of those 
two Jewish people. I have two duties- one to save the Jews and the other to tell 
the truth. The rule of truth telling finds exception or exemption in this instantiation 
(Toner 2003:4-5).  
2-89. In situations like the one above, transparency is not always required for any 
member of the military (including anthropologists and archaeologists who choose to 
serve with the military). The example above can also be used via analogy to the realities 
of doing no harm, informed consent, and transparency within the Global War on 
Terrorism. Take for example a rapid ethnographic assessment conducted by an Army 
anthropologist working to improve teenage girls’ and young women’s education and 
health care (literacy, use of birth control, feminine hygiene) in an Afghan village. The 
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village elders as well as the females themselves consented to the assistance from the 
anthropologist, however, there are known Taliban roaming the villages who are tasked 
with stoning any female who receives assistance from the anthropologist. Because of 
the Taliban threat, the Army anthropologist is justified to work in secret and in a non-
transparent manner in order to improve the health and well-being of village girls and 
women. The Army anthropologist is under no obligation to share her applied work with 
anyone who does not have the “need to know.” She is also under no obligation to tell 
the Taliban the truth because the Taliban (like the Nazis) are not entitled to nor do they 
“deserve the truth” (Toner 2003:5). “Secrecy” on the battlefield is called confidentiality in 
peacetime environments. “Ethical confidentiality procedures are designed to protect the 
information collected and observed in the course of the research—or in this case, 
applied anthropological assistance. Ideally, such protection will be supported by law to 
assure that the data will not be used to harm the person socially, financially, or 
emotionally” (Whiteford and Trotter 2008) or physically. Under the Afghan village 
example, the Army anthropologist meets all the criteria for justifying her undisclosed 
applied work: it is to protect the girls and women of the village from being stoned to 
death by Taliban gangs; and it was supported by the Law of War, rules of engagement, 
and mission tasks and requirements, all of which are grounded in military ethics.  
Military Ethics vs. Professional Organizations’ Codes of Ethics 
 
2-90. Cultural relativism warns us about the danger in assuming that all our preferences 
are based on an absolute rational standard-they are not (Rachels 2003: 30). The recent 
surge of ethical codes has all but eliminated classroom discussions as students assume 
these codes are absolute and must be followed without question (Colwell-
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Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006: 116). To examine every ethical code in 
anthropology and archaeology would be a dissertation in and of itself! Instead, the 
analyst has chosen two popular associations and their ethical codes—the American 
Anthropological Association and the Society for American Archaeology. As stated 
earlier, the purpose of this section is not to generate confrontation with the anthropology 
community (or their professional organization’s positions on ethics) but to foster 
common ground and create partnerships in applying anthropology and archaeology to 
solving real world problems in the context of armed conflict.     
American Military Ethics and the American Anthropological Association  
 
2-91. The ethical concerns regarding harm and human dignity are shared by both 
military ethics and the ethics of the American Anthropological Association as is 
recognition of complex and unpredictable environments. The American Anthropological 
Association code of ethics states that it has a responsibility “to avoid harm or wrong, 
understanding that the development of knowledge can lead to change which may be 
positive or negative for the people or animals worked with or studied” (AAA-2 2009). 
Current military doctrine is clear when it restricts (even when engaging legitimate 
military targets) the harm it inflicts, thereby sparing civilians from deliberate attack 
(Rhodes 2009: 103). Counterinsurgency ethics recognizes that in every situation 
American warfighters must remain faithful to their respective military service and the 
corresponding standards of proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life 
(Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 238:2007). This would apply to all military members, 
including anthropologists and archaeologists applying their skillsets during combat or 
humanitarian operations.  
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2-92. The American Anthropological Association code of ethics recognizes that “in a 
field of such complex involvements and obligations, it is inevitable that 
misunderstandings, conflicts, and the need to make choices among apparently 
incompatible values will arise. Anthropologists are responsible for grappling with such 
difficulties and struggling to resolve them in ways compatible with the principles stated 
here” (AAA-2 2009). The American Anthropological Association recognizes the 
complexity of anthropological work, and so does the American military. In terms of 
ethical considerations, counterinsurgency environments are extremely complex. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine dictates that preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is 
the priority when conducting and accomplishing missions and recognizes that this 
imperative exists within a complex ethical environment (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 
2007: 245-246). The anthropologist or archaeologist working with the military will be 
subject to adhering to these military ethical standards when applying anthropology on 
the battlefield.   
2-93. Given the American Anthropological Association and American Military ethical 
standards appear to share a respect for the sanctity of life and avoiding harm, along 
with the awareness of unpredictable and complex environments, it seems clear the 
common ground is at least worth discussing and even cooperation between the 
American Anthropological Association and the American military, with one caveat—that 
the American Anthropological Association approach and examine military ethics from its 
“own terms”, and not based on the academic experiences of their members.  
 
 
 
 
86 
 
American Military Ethics and the Society for American Archaeology 
 
2-94. The American military and the Society for American Archaeology recognize the 
complex responsibilities regarding archaeological resources, and both take on the same 
mission in stewardship and preservation. The Society for American Archaeology’s 
Principle of Stewardship states “it is the responsibility of all archaeologists to work for 
the long-term conservation and protection of the archaeological record by practicing and 
promoting stewardship of the archaeological record” (SAA 1996). The military ethical 
principle of discrimination refers specifically to “sparing religious and cultural sites 
protected under the laws of war” (Hartle 2004: 97). There are also numerous 
Department of Defense directives and general orders mandating that warfighters 
(including anthropologists and archaeologists) preserve and protect archaeological 
resources on the battlefield. For example, the Multinational Forces in Iraq during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom enforced General Order Number One which stated the 
following was prohibited: removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying 
archaeological artifacts or national treasure (Multinational Force Iraq 2010). 
Archaeological stewardship and preservation principles of the American military are 
aligned with the stewardship and preservation principles of the Society for American 
Archaeology. These similarities can form the basis of partnerships between civilian and 
military archaeologists in the protection of cultural property in the Global War on Terror.  
An Anthropological Military for the Twenty-First Century  
 
2-95. Some cultural heritage professionals may refuse to coordinate with the military on 
ethical grounds; however, this approach merely provides an excuse for military planners 
to downplay cultural property concerns and may potentially impede the ability to provide 
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emergency cultural property conservation assistance (Wegener 2008: 165) to 
anthropologists and archaeologists serving in the Global War on Terrorism. The 
American military needs anthropologists and archaeologists to help it understand 
diversity within and outside of the military institution, and the implications this 
understanding will have for successful military ventures, especially those that promote 
peace and understanding across national boundaries (Frese 2003: 149). The resistance 
to this need has been the accusation by many in the anthropological community that 
U.S. Armed Forces (and by extension U.S. Intelligence Community) are attempting to 
militarize anthropology (Forte 2008: 1; Gonzales 2007: 14, 19). However, by reaching 
out to the anthropological community to better understand cultures in the context of 
counterinsurgency, military leadership is attempting to “anthropologize” the military 
(Steir 2007: 1).   
2-96. “Anthropoligization” of the military will not only have an impact on military 
operations but it will also have an impact in civilian society as well. When warfighters 
leave the Armed Forces, they will apply their anthropological experiences in business, 
civil service, government, and academia. This will create an educated and more 
informed group of combat veterans/citizens who understand cultures and the 
importance of recognizing diversity in an applied real-world environment and will 
continue to reach across national boundaries beyond a military context in promoting 
peace and international cooperation. Decision making on the battlefield is often 
constrained by circumstances that may leave American warfighters (including 
operational archaeologists) with genuinely no good choices—here the difficult decisions 
often encountered during war may often be better or worse choices instead of right or 
88 
 
wrong  (Rhodes 2009: 20). Considering these realities, who better to guide, assist, and 
advise military leadership than an anthropologist or archaeologist? 
Moving Forward 
2-97. The analyst has examined the history and the contemporary state of 
anthropological ethics not to criticize but to celebrate the choice anthropologists and 
archaeologists have when applying ethics to their day-to-day work—whether it be in a 
classroom, a boardroom, a construction site, or a battlefield. In the examination of that 
history, the analyst wishes to convey:  
(1) As human beings, archaeologists possess agency to freely associate and 
work with whomever they choose. This includes the American Armed Forces in 
support of humanitarian operations and combat operations. If an archaeologist 
chooses not to associate with an anthropological or archaeological professional 
organization—that is also his or her choice. No anthropological or archaeological 
professional organization, department or professor has legal or canonical 
authority to dictate how a non-member or student chooses to apply his or her 
skillsets.  
(2) Even if the Project Camelot narrative were true, and numerous 
anthropologists were on the payroll and secretly conducting operations—that was 
still the choice of those individuals—and whether or not it “harms” the discipline 
of anthropology is subject to debate and depends on one’s ideological stance 
and particular worldview. Furthermore, the analyst maintains that diversity of 
thought and opinion in anthropology and archaeology is their strength and 
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anthropologists and archaeologists should not be required to champion only one 
worldview or ideology (i.e. Boas Principle).  
(3) Finally, the analyst self-identifies as a United States Marine who happens to 
be an archaeologist, not an archaeologist who happens to be a Marine. The 
analyst chooses to apply his archaeological skillsets in support of the American 
Military in both combatant and humanitarian contexts with the express intent of 
protecting the welfare and safety of non-combatants (and even the enemy); the 
safeguarding and preservation of cultural property; and to stand in unity with and 
in support of American warfighters serving in the American Armed Forces.  
2-98. “Warfare and anthropology have long intersected in fundamental ways when 
anthropologists contribute their professional knowledge and skills to further military and 
intelligence endeavors of their nation at war” (Price 2008: xi). If an archaeologist 
chooses to serve alongside the American Military, then the corresponding ethical 
standards he or she follows could very well be American military ethics—just as an 
anthropologist who chooses to work for a corporation, a university, or non-government 
organization will more than likely follow the prescribed ethical codes as dictated by the 
aforementioned entities. Does this mean the archaeologist working for or with the 
military dismisses out-of-hand the ethical concerns of professional organizations? 
Absolutely not. Applied archaeology goes hand-in-hand with applied ethics. 
Consideration of other ethical perspectives outside of the military promotes intellectual 
growth and awareness—and prevents the previously mentioned stagnation. More 
importantly it can lead to collaborative undertakings with diverse groups and 
organizations—especially when they share common ethical attributes.  
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2-99. Archaeology obviously will not stop wars, but it does provide a useful historical 
context for discussions about the inevitability of war and its role in modern civilization 
(Sabloff 2008: 60). All ethical concerns regarding applied anthropology during armed 
conflict should be considered in order to ensure the right actions are taken, on and off 
the battlefield. Military ethics as described in this essay can be an effective “plausible 
alternative” for applying archaeology during military operations. Despite any 
disagreements on ethics and the application of anthropology during war, it is essential 
for individuals and organizations to recognize similarities and find common ground, no 
matter how minute, and safely navigate through and beyond the current Global War on 
Terrorism as well as future military conflicts. Cooperation begins with small steps. Small 
steps amongst colleagues in and out of uniform who will debate the differences, 
embrace the similarities, and all work to make anthropology and archaeology relevant in 
every context— especially armed conflict.  
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Section 3 
Applied Archaeology during Counterinsurgency Operations 
 
Counterinsurgency operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. 
The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and 
momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement (Petraeus et. al 2007: 
153).   
3-1. Wars are often controversial, and the Global War on Terrorism is no different— 
especially when cultural property and cultural heritage41 are involved. The looting of 
archaeological sites is one of the most alarming and destructive types of cultural property 
destruction (Bowman 2008: 1). During periods of armed conflict, the looting of cultural 
property is not only causing irreparable damage to museums and the archaeological record 
(Zottin 2008: 236), but it is also generating support in the form of cash and/or weapons to 
insurgent and terrorist organizations around the world (Charney et al. 2012:1), especially in 
the Middle East and Mediterranean (North Africa) regions42. These regions are significant 
for archaeologists because the Mediterranean and the Middle East have played formative 
roles in the birth of the discipline and practice of archaeology (Meskell 2001: 17).   
3-2. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, looting of Iraq's archaeological sites 
proceeded at a rate of destruction estimated at 10% per year (Rothfield 2008: 21). During 
Operation Enduring Freedom (the war in Afghanistan), archaeological sites were being 
systematically looted by teams of organized looters and smugglers (this is still happening) 
 
41 Cultural heritage and cultural property include the full range of nonrenewable remains of products of 
human activity or occupation (GTA 2009: 2). For the purposes of this section, cultural property and 
cultural heritage will be used interchangeably. 
   
42 These regions have a robust American diplomatic and military presence.   
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(Wendle 2013: 1). In both cases, looted antiquities and other types of cultural property are 
funding terrorist and insurgent organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban (Russell 
2008: 42; Journeyman Pictures 2009: 1).  
3-3. As the United States continues to conduct and/or support military operations in 
regions of its geo-political interests, archaeologists and colleagues dedicated to the 
preservation of cultural property in areas of armed conflict will be faced with 
questionable military objectives, complex Department of Defense bureaucracy, and 
seeming disregard for cultural property protection by military regional commanders and 
indigenous populations alike (White and Livoti 2013: 199).  
3-4. Decades of legislation including current international laws alone are unable to 
protect cultural property during and after military conflicts (Atwood 2004: 267-268; 
Ghaidan 2008: 94). Despite this fact, the majority of the international archaeology 
community has become overly reliant on international laws in the hope that these laws' 
mere existence will deter looting and destruction of cultural property on the battlefield. 
This hope has fallen short as archaeological sites and cultural property in American 
military areas of operation (as well as other areas of armed conflict) continue to be 
looted, defaced, and/or destroyed (White and Livoti 2013: 200). This is because the 
American government and military does not have a clear and inclusive wartime strategy 
for the preservation of cultural property during armed conflict (White and Livoti 2013: 
199).   
3-5. This section is written specifically for the archaeologist who wishes to work for the 
American military during military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
This section is not a debate about the validity of war or certain types of war. This section 
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does however recognize the reality of war and recommends courses of action to 
mitigate its adverse effects in order to save human life and preserve cultural property. 
To accomplish this, the section will explore the practice of an applied archaeology in the 
context of the Global War on Terrorism—more specifically current counterinsurgency 
efforts in American military areas of operations. This section will examine the following: 
(1) The contemporary battlefield environments in which the exploitation of cultural 
property takes place; (2) An examination in how looted cultural property funds and 
supports terrorist and insurgent organizations; (3) The Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and why and how it needs 
to be enforced; (4) Three American led military organizational proofs-of-concept and 
how applied archaeological approaches during periods of armed conflict can save lives 
and preserve cultural property.   
The Operational Environment43: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
3-6. Today’s conflicts combine new actors with new technology and transfigured ways 
of war. The old threats however also remain and have to be dealt with in the same time 
and space, stressing resources and overloading the systems of American and Western 
militaries (Kilcullen 2009: 5-6). Archaeologists should always be aware and have 
knowledge of the environment in which they plan to conduct archaeological 
investigations. This is important in peacetime environments as well as wartime 
 
43 The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect 
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0 2011: GL-14).   
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environments; more specifically asymmetric44 environments with active terrorist and/or 
insurgent activity.  
3-7. Today’s conflicts are not as clear-cut as they have been in the past. Twenty-first 
century armed conflict has become increasingly blurred and global stability is no longer 
determined solely by conventional45, nation(s)-versus-nation(s) (i.e. World War I, World 
War II) conflict (Mansoor 2012: 12). Since the end of World War II (WWII), insurgency 
and terrorism have become the dominant forms of armed conflict and will continue to be 
in the future whereby conventional forms of warfare decrease and the number of 
terrorist and guerilla organizations continue to grow (Boot 2013: 13). Today the vast 
majority of conflicts occur inside states rather than between them (Nagl 2005: 222). 
Irregular warfare46 has therefore replaced conventional warfare as the typical form of 
war in global armed conflict. This includes insurgency and counterinsurgency (Petraeus 
et al 2007: 2)—which will be the focus of this section.   
 
 
44Asymmetry is dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, and values between armed forces 
(formally organized or not) and U.S. forces. Engagements are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and 
weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement 
are the norm (FM 1-02 2004: 1-15). Insurgents are, by nature, an asymmetric threat and use terrorist and 
guerilla tactics because they are the best means available to achieve the insurgency’s goals (Petraeus et 
al. 2007: 109). 
 
45Conventional wars are armed conflicts openly waged by one nation-state against another by means of 
their regular armies (Van Creveld 2004: 1).  
 
46 Irregular warfare is violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over 
the relevant population(s) (JP 1 2013: I-6).   
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3-8. In contemporary terms, an insurgency is an “organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict” (FM 1-02 2004: 1-101; Kilcullen 2010: 1). “Stated another way, an insurgency is 
an organized, protracted, politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and 
legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority 
while increasing insurgent control” (Kilcullen 2010: 1; Petraeus et al. 2007: 2). 
Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, consists of military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions used to defeat an insurgency (FM 1-02 2004: 
1-47). Unlike conventional warfare, counterinsurgency has no front lines or uniformed 
belligerents47. Instead, the insurgent blends in with the local population (White and Livoti 
2013: 196). Counterinsurgency is in competition with an insurgency for the ability to win 
the hearts, minds, and acceptance of the local population (Kilcullen 2010: 29). The two 
major differences between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency are:   
(1) Conventional warfare is an enemy-centric approach with a focus to defeat the 
enemy (Kilcullen 2010: 9).  
(2) Counterinsurgency employs a population-centric approach with a focus to win 
over the benign and vulnerable segments of the population (Boot 2013: 21); 
Moyar 2009: 2) whose intent is to identify and eliminate the facilitators of violence 
(White and Livoti 2013: 196-197).                              
3-9. Counterinsurgency’s lack of front lines and population-centric focus permits cultural 
property preservation to play a major role in security, stabilization, and reconstruction 
 
47 Members of al Qaeda and affiliated organizations do not wear uniforms, have military rank, conduct drill 
or render salutes (Cassidy 2008: 152).   
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efforts during counterinsurgency operations (White and Livoti 2013: 196-197). It will do 
so by denying the insurgent and/or terrorist a mechanism of funding that has gone 
relatively unnoticed since the events of September 11, 2001.   
Looted Cultural Property: Funding Source for Terrorist Organizations 
3-10. The best way to understand the struggle between rising third-world insurgencies48  
and Western interests is to examine the course of relations in regard to questions of 
cultural property (Goode 2007: 2). Looting of archaeological sites and the loss of 
provenance and knowledge is a well-known fact (Brodie et al 2006: xiii)—especially 
during armed conflict. A less well-known fact is how the illicit trade in cultural property is 
third in the world after drugs and arms trading and has been connected to terrorism 
(Bowman 2008: 1). “Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and 
vulnerabilities” (Petraeus et al 2007: 19). International law enforcement efforts have 
frozen the financial assets of terrorist organizations. These efforts have also neutralized 
the charities that once served as fronts for Islamic supremacist groups thereby cutting 
off the traditional means of financing for terrorist and or insurgent activities. These 
actions have forced the insurgent and/or terrorist to adapt and find new mechanisms to 
support their activities (Bogdanos 2005c:1). As a result, terrorist and insurgent groups 
rely on looted cultural property as a major funding source for their operations and 
activities (Charney et al 2012: 1). Unfortunately, the exploitation of cultural property for 
the purposes of funding warfare is not without precedent.   
 
48 Goode uses “nationalist movements” instead of insurgencies. While some insurgencies do have 
nationalistic origins, many are transnational (i.e. religious) and are having a direct impact on cultural 
property.    
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3-11. Before and during WWII, the Nazis stored and/or sold looted cultural property and 
treasure in order to finance the Axis war effort and other Nazi activities49 (Nicholas 
1995: 34-35; Edsel 2009: 405-406; Eizenstat 1998: 1; Sabian 2011: 1). Many Nazi 
officials began contemplating the possibilities for plunder in the occupied territories 
(Pringle 2006: 205) as soon Nazi forces launched their attacks in both eastern and 
western Europe.    
 
Picture 16: Goring and Hitler examine a looted work of art. 
It used to be called plundering, but today things have become more humane. In 
spite of that, I intend to plunder, and to do it thoroughly. Reichsmarshall Hermann 
Goring, Speaking to a conference of Reich Commissioners for the Occupied 
Territories and the Military Commanders, Berlin, August 6, 1942 (Edsel 2009: 
VII). 
3-12. The Nazis had been preparing years before WWII to loot cultural property whereby 
German “scholars” began visiting nations all over Europe and secretly preparing cultural 
 
49 The Nazis also did this for personal gain as well (Nicholas 1994: 34-35; Edsel 2009: 405-406; Eizenstat 
1998: 1; Sabian 2011: 1). 
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property inventories so when the German military conquered each country, Hitler’s 
agents would know the name and location of every important object of artistic and cultural 
value (Edsel 2009: 13). As early as 1939 the Nazis were auctioning off looted cultural 
property under the guise of raising money for German museums. Many of the buyers 
however, believed proceeds from the sales would actually finance the Nazi party. In the 
end the museums never saw a penny and the proceeds from the auction were deposited 
into Nazi accounts in London (Nicholas 1995: 13). Cultural property soon became a 
major factor in the Nazi economy as everyone with cash—from black marketeers to Hitler 
himself, sought safe assets (Nicholas 1995: 117).    
3-13. In the occupied countries, the Nazis raided museums, confiscated cultural objects 
and commissioned Nazi archaeologists to loot archaeological treasures (Pringle 2006: 
18, 205, 326). Nazi organizations such as the Ahnenerbe SS50 (Pringle 2006: 10; 
Nicholas 1995: 20) and the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (Nicholas 1995: 111; 
Eizenstat 2003: 187) were created specifically to plunder archaeological sites, museums, 
artwork, and other cultural objects.   
3-14. The Nazis also destroyed cultural property for the purposes of psychological 
warfare in order to demoralize, terrorize, and subdue the populations of the occupied 
territories. They fortified numerous cultural and religious sites and burned infrastructure, 
sometimes for tactical reasons but often did so simply because they could (Edsel 2009:  
91). There was an official policy to loot Jewish sites and destroy Jewish monuments, 
 
 
50 By the late 1930s the Ahnenerbe SS was in complete control of all archaeological research in Germany 
(Nicholas 1995: 85).  
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including graves and cemeteries (Edsel 2009: 74, 168). Synagogues were burnt or 
otherwise destroyed, holy books and scrolls thrown onto bonfires, and the headstones of 
Jewish cemeteries51 were used as paving stones. Christian shrines were desecrated, and 
churches were looted and subsequently converted into dance halls, storage rooms, 
garages, and hay barns (Nicholas 1994: 76). In Axis occupied France, Nazi forces tore 
down statues of French war heroes (Nicholas 1995: 197) and destroyed national cultural 
monuments in Poland (Edsel 2009:  74; Nicholas 1995: 74). Some of these cultural 
monuments were melted down in order to produce bullets and artillery pieces for the Nazi 
war effort (Edsel 2009: 117; Nicholas 1995: 157).   
3-15. As with the Nazis who preceded them, international terrorist organizations such as 
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, [and most recently DAESH52(Islamic State)] are profiting from the 
illicit trade in antiquities in order to fund terrorist attacks and other activities (White and 
Livoti 2013: 207). In Iraq53 the illicit trade in cultural property falls just below kidnappings 
for ransom and mob-style "protection" money extorted from businesses and local citizens 
(Bogdanos 2008: 124). Insurgents in Iraq are able to do so because there is a virtual 
limitless supply of cultural property (especially antiquities from museums and 
archaeological sites) available to them throughout the countryside (Bogdanos 2008: 124). 
 
51 In France the graves of American Jewish Soldiers who fought and died in World War I were destroyed 
by the Nazis as well (Edsel 2009: 168).   
 
52 Daesh is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym formed of the same words that make up ISIS in 
English: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or al-Dowla al-islaamiyya fii-il-i'raaq wa-ash-shaam. Daesh is 
word that most Arab states and many European governments use to refer to the Islamic State or ISIS 
since the words Islamic and State denote legitimacy to the terrorists who formed the so-called caliphate 
(Garrity 2015: 1). 
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Antiquities smuggled out of Iraq every day may be putting tens of millions of dollars into 
Iraq’s underground economy and providing weapons and funding to terrorists and 
insurgents (Thurlow 2005: 180-181; Johnston 2005: 1). In 2005, Donny George, then 
director of Iraq's National Museum, stated that the sale of looted cultural property was 
helping insurgent groups purchase "weapons and ammunition to use against Iraqi police 
and American forces” (Becatoros 2008: 1). For example; Iraqi Security Forces and 
American Marines conducting operations in Al-Anbar Province arrested five terrorists and 
found them in possession of automatic weapons, ammunition, ski masks, night vision 
goggles, and more than 30 artifacts looted from the Iraq National Museum (Bogdanos 
2007: 730). In the Syrian Civil War, looted artifacts were being traded directly for 
weapons (Baker and Anjar 2012: 1). The Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
acknowledged “there is a link between the removal and transport of cultural objects and 
the funding of terrorism” (Thurlow 2005: 180; Johnston 2005: 1) and INTERPOL54 has 
also linked the illicit sales of antiquities to terrorist organizations (McNamee 2010: 1). In 
2005, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that September 11 al-Qaeda terrorist 
Mohammad Atta had approached an archaeology professor (Ruiz 2010: 1) at the 
University of Gottingen in an attempt to sell looted antiquities in order to raise money to 
buy an airplane (De La Torre 2006: 10). Most recently DAESH has been benefiting from 
the illicit trade in cultural property and integrated cultural property trafficking into its 
diverse financial portfolio (Howard 2016: 1). The U.S. House of Representatives Finance 
Services Committee’s Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing indicated that 
 
54 INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization whose role is to enable police around 
the world to coordinate efforts to make the world a safer place (INTERPOL 2013: 1). 
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DAESH encourages and profits from the looting of cultural property in the territory it 
controls (U.S. House of Representatives 2016: 5). Within its territory, DAESH permitted 
the looting of pre-Islamic sites on an industrial scale and taxed the illicit excavations to 
raise money for the caliphate it declared in 2014 (Myers and Kulish 2016: 1). It is 
therefore important to recognize that protecting cultural heritage may not only be an 
important diplomatic strategy but may also facilitate the fight against global insurgency 
and terrorism by denying terrorist organizations the ability to profit from the illicit sale of 
looted cultural heritage (Thurlow 2005: 181).  
3-16. Al Qaeda, the Taliban and DAESH (like the Nazis) also conduct psychological 
operations to demoralize populations they control by exploiting cultural property that does 
not fit into their narrative of Islamic Supremacy and Sharia law. In 2012 Iraqi intelligence 
officials discovered a plot by al Qaeda to destroy all pre-Islamic archaeological sites, 
monuments, and artifacts because they are considered idolatrous and not compatible 
with al Qaeda’s version of Islam (al-Qaisi 2012: 1). In Afghanistan, the Taliban did this by 
destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001 (Atwood 2004: 268; Hegarty 2012: 1) and 
Ansar Dine (an al Qaeda linked terrorist group) destroyed and or defaced sacred shrines 
and tombs in the African nation of Mali (Karimi 2012: 1). In 2015 Islamic State militants 
released a video on showing them destroying priceless antiquities in northern Iraq 
(Williams 2015: 1). According to DAESH, the Taliban and Al Qaeda these renowned and 
priceless cultural heritage sites are an affront to their perverted version of Islam.   
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Hague Convention: Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict55 
3-17. Professional looters in many Third World countries make a living in the distribution 
and sale of looted antiquities (Schiffer 1996: 115). Even in the United States the looting of 
cultural property (mainly archaeological sites) is common because laws and enforcement 
policies do not provide adequate mechanisms for protection (Schiffer 1996: 114). In 
areas of armed conflict this activity is intensified as cultural property is at its most 
vulnerable state of being looted, damaged, and/or destroyed due to the chaos that takes 
place during warfare (Bernhardsson 2005: 73; White and Livoti 2013: 197). As a result, 
the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (the Convention) was established to identify and protect cultural property during 
times of war (Bernhardsson 2005: 73-74).   
3-18. The Convention has roots in the Union Army’s Lieber Code written in 1863 during 
the American Civil War. The Lieber Code recognized that “cultural, scientific, artistic 
works and repositories were to be protected during warfare and should not serve as war 
booty” (Gerstenblith 2008a: 183). The Convention was completed in the wake of large-
scale intentional looting and destruction of cultural property perpetuated by Nazi 
Germany during WWII (Gerstenblith 2008a: 183). Modeled on instructions given by 
Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to aid in the preservation of 
Europe’s cultural legacy, the Convention is the oldest international treaty to address 
cultural property and heritage preservation exclusively (USCBS 2013: 1). On September 
 
55 Many individuals within the cultural property community support the ratification of the Convention as a 
tool for protecting and preserving cultural property during armed conflict. The analyst decided to illustrate 
how the Convention could be employed in contemporary counterinsurgency operations as well as other 
asymmetric conflicts. The analyst wishes to thank Task Force-South West Judge Advocate Captain Sean 
Price for providing the idea of including this footnote to the dissertation (Price 2019).  
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25, 2008, the U.S. Senate voted to ratify the Convention (USCBS 2013: 1) and was 
signed into law by President (POTUS56) George W. Bush in early 2009. The United 
States now joins 121 nations in becoming a party to this historic treaty as a signatory 
(USCBS 2013: 1). These events place the Department of Defense in a decisive position 
to determine the American military’s future plans-of-action for the preservation of cultural 
property during periods of armed conflict (White and Livoti 2013: 198). 
3-19. Because the Convention was ratified by the Senate and signed by POTUS, it has 
become codified law (similar to a Constitutional Amendment) and therefore obligates the 
American government and military to meet the Convention’s intent. The Convention’s 
intent is “to take all possible steps to protect cultural property” (UNESCO 2013: 1) during 
armed conflict by way of the articles contained therein. However, ratification has had very 
little impact to ensure the American military creates and enforces an all-encompassing 
cultural property protection directive in current (and future) military operations. This is for 
the following reasons: (1) The Convention is a vague document leaving many of its 
articles subject to broad interpretation on how to enforce it and (2) there has been no 
attempt to apply the Convention from the perspective of a counterinsurgent as the 
Convention resulted from a mid-20th century conventional conflict, not a 21st century 
asymmetrical global insurgency (White and Livoti 2013: 198).   
Military Necessity 
3-20. While the Convention was designed and planned by an international coalition of 
statesmen and concerned stakeholders, its implementation rests upon military personnel 
(whose nations are signatories to the Convention) who are either planning for and/or are 
 
56 POTUS: President of the United States. 
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currently engaged in global combat and/or humanitarian operations. Since the 
Convention was created for military forces it makes sense for the Convention to be 
applied in a military context. For the American military and the Global War on Terrorism, 
the context is irregular warfare, more specifically, counterinsurgency operations. 
Therefore, the Convention’s intent can be met if it is applied from an asymmetrical 
perspective (White and Livoti 2013: 199).  
Article 4, Military Necessity, and Cultural Property Protection 
3-21. Article 4 of the Convention states “The obligations of the convention may be waived 
only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver” (UNESCO 
2013: 1). There is no universal agreement on what is meant by military necessity and the 
Convention is unclear as to what military necessity means (Gerstenblith 2010: 9). 
Fortunately, the Department of Defense defines military necessity as the principle 
whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures which are required to bring 
about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by the 
laws of war (JP 1-02 2010: 235). It has been argued that military necessity significantly 
undermines the value of the Convention (Gerstenblith 2010: 9). This concern has merit 
as there have been times in the past where combatant commanders did not make the 
distinction between military necessity and military convenience57. Simply defined, military 
convenience is the conscious effort of military personnel to take advantage of a situation 
for the sole purpose of ease and expediency that is not necessary for mission 
 
57 See Edsel 2009: One contemporary example of military convenience in the Global War on Terror was 
the Marine Corps occupation of Babylon during Operation Iraqi Freedom- an occupation of which the 
analyst was present.    
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accomplishment and or saving human life. Keeping this in mind, it is also important to 
note that: 
The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by “military necessity” 
which has been defined as that principle which justifies those measures not 
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete 
submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military necessity has been 
generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and 
conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and 
framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity (FM 27-10 1956: 
Appendix A-1). 
3-22. Therefore, in order to ensure the military necessity concept is not taken advantage 
of by combatant commanders and/or warfighters, the Department of Defense, during 
times of war issues general orders58 and rules of engagement59 to further clarify how 
military necessity applies in different combatant and other military contexts. This can 
also apply when it comes to cultural property protection during armed conflict.   
Solution: Cultural Property Protection as Military Necessity 
3-23. Many of the concerns addressed in the Convention regarding cultural property 
and military necessity are mainly oriented toward justification in the destruction and/or 
 
58 General orders are given by a commander in how his or her organization will implement policy and 
procedures in accordance with the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and other military rules and 
regulations. 
 
59 Rules of Engagement are “directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and or continue combat 
engagement with other forces encountered” (Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl 2007: 387). 
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damage of cultural property during military operations. This is because the Convention 
offers its member states metered guidelines which aim to avoid reckless disregard and 
destruction of irreplaceable objects that represent national identity and cultural 
diversity—actions that can be interpreted as antagonistic and increase in occurrences of 
armed conflict (White and Livoti 2013:198-199). However, Article 4 also states that 
parties to the Convention “undertake to prohibit, prevent and if necessary, put a stop to 
any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed 
against cultural property” (UNESCO 2013: 1).    
When read literally, it seems to impose an obligation on nations to prevent any 
form of theft or pillage, even if it is being carried out by the local population. 
However, this provision probably refers only to an obligation to prevent acts of 
theft, pillage and misappropriation by members of the nation’s own military 
(Gerstenblith 2010: 9; See Gerstenblith 2006: 308-311). 
3-24. While the above statement is one of the “broad interpretations” of the Convention, it 
is not the only one to consider. Article 4 contains two significant statements. To review: 
The first statement is for the American military “undertake to prohibit, prevent and if 
necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of 
vandalism directed against cultural property” (UNESCO 2013: 1). The second statement 
is that the American military recognize “the obligations of the convention may be waived 
only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver” (UNESCO 
2013: 1). For the Global War on Terror and subsequent counterinsurgency operations, 
Article 4 provides a way in which the Convention may be applied in an asymmetric 
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manner. It will do so by providing the American military the ability and flexibility to protect 
cultural property in two different but integrally related contexts.  
Context 1: Protect cultural property for the purpose of preserving it for host-nation 
populations, concerned stakeholders, and for all humanity.   
Context 2: Protect cultural property for the purposes of military necessity. This 
will deny the terrorist and/or insurgent the ability to profit from the looting of 
cultural property which is used to fund its operations against civilian populations 
via intimidation and violence.  
3-25. Article 4 is an adaptive article in that it can be applied to a myriad of situations and 
realities which are present on the asymmetric battlefield. Article 4 also provides the 
American military an applicable counterinsurgency mechanism for saving cultural 
property and most importantly saving human life. It appears the Convention’s 
vagueness is in actuality its greatness.     
3-26. The preceding information illustrates two points:  
(1) Current international laws alone are unable to protect cultural property during 
and after military conflicts (Ghaidan 2008: 94) and  
(2) Laws and treaties are meaningless without actual protection and enforcement 
by personnel who are trained in archaeological skillsets as well as knowledge of 
military tactics, techniques, and procedures and how to apply them within the 
military decision-making process.  
The American military, however, cannot accomplish this without assistance. For the 
most part, archaeologists and cultural property professionals are at best on the 
periphery in both the planning and execution of cultural property protection on the 
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battlefield—especially those who champion the intent of the Convention. Cooperation 
between the American military and archaeologists during times of war however is not a 
new concept. This cooperation can be accomplished by way of study of past 
partnerships during periods of armed conflict and applying the lessons learned from 
military historical examples to twenty-first century warfare.   
3-27. The section will now examine three vignettes on American military organizations 
of the past (one modern, two contemporary) that have applied archaeological and/or 
cultural preservation skillsets during armed conflict. These examples will serve as 
frames of reference for future cultural property protection organizations in the American 
military during counterinsurgency operations. 
Proofs of Concept  
Vignette 1: Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section 
3-28. During WWII the Allies under the direction of General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
attempted to protect and locate looted cultural property and heritage. At this same time, 
Nazi leadership had established laws and regulations to legalize and legitimize the 
plunder which took place during their occupation of the conquered territories. This 
included compelling conquered nations to provide specific cultural property as a term of 
their surrender (Edsel 2009: 117). To counter the Nazi war crimes against cultural 
property, the American and British60 military forces formed the Monuments, Fine Arts 
and Archives Section (MFAA), also known informally today as the Monuments Men 
 
60 British participation in the Monuments Officers was organized by archaeologist and British Army 
Colonel Sir Leonard Woolley (Spirydowicz 2010: 16).   
 
109 
 
(Edsel 2009: 1; Gerstenblith 2010: 8; Spirydowicz 2010: 16; White and Livoti 2013: 
202). This organization, under the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary 
Force’s European theater command, was composed of cultural property experts such 
as art historians, classicists, and archaeologists (Edsel 2009: 2; Gerstenblith 2010: 8; 
Spirydowicz 2010: 16) and included both enlisted personnel and officers in its ranks 
(Edsel 2009: xvii-xviii).   
                             
Picture 17: Monuments Men Rescue Marble Statue            Picture 18: Monuments Men Secure Looted Artwork 
3-29. The creation of the Monuments Men was a remarkable experiment because it marked 
the first time the U.S. Army fought a war while comprehensively attempting to mitigate 
cultural property damage (Edsel 2009: 2). The Monuments Men had one objective: “to save 
as much of the culture of Europe as they could during combat” (Edsel 2009: 2). The 
Monuments Men also conducted cultural and archaeological damage assessments before, 
during and after battles; advised Allied commanders in protecting cultural property and 
heritage on the battlefield (military necessity); retrieved stolen cultural property and returned 
it to its original owners; and hunted down the Nazi war criminals and their collaborators 
(which included classified missions) responsible for the looting and theft of cultural property 
from the conquered territories (Alford 2000: 105; Edsel 2009: 34-5, 400, 404; Eizenstat 
2003: 188-189). To properly employ their scholarly talents, the Monuments Men used both 
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military methods (including data and information collection for military intelligence and 
analysis61) and law enforcement methods, such as reconnaissance and investigation to 
accomplish its tasks (Alford 2000: 57-59, 200, Edsel 2009: 148, 233-234). The extraordinary 
service of the Monuments Men was instrumental in preserving Europe’s cultural heritage 
during the final days of WWII (Eizenstat 2003: 188). This approach was repeated on another 
battlefield sixty years later during Operation Iraqi Freedom (White and Livoti 2013: 202).  
Vignette 2:  Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group 
3-30. In February of 2003, the National Museum of Baghdad (the Museum) was forced 
to close down due to the build-up of American led military forces in Kuwait. On April 10, 
2003, after the American military entered Baghdad, looting and pillaging of the Museum 
took place. Some of the looting was committed by random mobs out for revenge against 
the regime of Saddam Hussein. Other incidents included the coordinated and 
systematic looting of the museum by museum personnel and organized crime 
syndicates which had detailed knowledge of what cultural property to take while 
worthless copies were left behind (Deblauwe 2003: 1,3). In the end the looters pilfered 
7,000 years of history while helpless museum security officials stood by and watched in 
horror (Ghaidan and Paolini 2005: 23). Original estimates by the media (and 
archaeological community) were exaggerated62 and based on misinformation 
 
61 Like today’s Global War on Terror, children were usually the best sources of information during WWII 
(Edsel 2009:  263). 
 
62 The intensity to which some people held on to these exaggerations of the museum’s losses increased 
in direct proportion to the individual’s opposition to the Iraq War (Bogdanos 2005b: 494). This included 
misinformation from the press and academia (Bogdanos 2005a: 208-209). 
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(Bogdanos 2005: 21).  
                           
Picture 19: USMC Colonel Mathew Bogdanos Antiquities Recovery Iraq Museum, 2003 
3-31. In response to these events, the American military’s Central Command 
established the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group consisting of Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. 
Customs and American military personnel to track down looters and document returned 
artifacts (Bogdanos 2005a: 17; Deblauwe 2003: 3). The Joint Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group was commanded by Marine counter-terrorist expert Colonel Mathew Bogdanos—
also trained in the classics—who attempted to locate and document the initial 
assessments of the museum’s losses (Deblauwe 2003: 3).  The Colonel used the 
following approaches to complete the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group’s mission: 
(1) Identify what was missing;  
(2) Send photographs of the missing items to the international law-enforcement and 
art communities to assist in intercepting stolen objects in transit;  
(3) Reach out to religious and community leaders to promote an amnesty program for 
anyone returning antiquities; and  
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(4) Conduct raids based on information developed about stolen artifacts (Bogdanos 
2005b: 488). 
3-32. In the spirit of the Monuments Men, Colonel Bogdanos and his team were 
successful in locating and returning thousands of looted artifacts (Bogdanos 2008: 120).  
The Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group did so because of a well-coordinated and 
multi-disciplinary boots-on-the-ground local approach (Bogdanos 2006: 1; White and 
Livoti 2013: 203). Soon after the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group completed its 
mission, another American archaeological military organization operating in Iraq was 
preparing for another important undertaking.   
Vignette 3:  Iraq Mass Graves Investigation Team 
3-33. In June 2004, the Department of Justice requested forensic and archaeological 
assistance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the excavation and analysis of 
evidence from mass graves associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq (Trimble 2005). In response to this request, the St. Louis, Missouri district of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assembled a team of archaeological and forensic experts 
(Trimble 2005). In August 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Mass Graves 
Investigation Team was attached to the Department of Justice under the Regime 
Crimes Liaison Office to conduct the arduous task of excavating and accumulating facts 
surrounding the war crimes of the former Iraqi regime (Trimble 2005).         
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Picture 20: Battlefield Archaeological Survey, Iraq 2006              Picture 21: Battlefield Archaeological Excavation, Iraq 2006 
3-34. While the focus of the mission was forensic research, the principles and 
employment of archaeological skillsets in a military setting were in step with 
archaeological methods applied to counterinsurgency operations (White and Livoti 
2013: 203). During the course of the archaeology and forensic mission in Iraq, military 
leadership from several of the Armed Services and law enforcement agencies sought 
archaeological/cultural property guidance and assistance from the Mass Graves 
Investigation Team (Trimble 2005). These requests involved:  
 (1) Direct forensic assistance in law enforcement endeavors,  
(2) Assistance and advice to various military units’ inadvertent archaeological 
“discoveries” by American ground and support troops, and  
(3) Troop educational outreach and awareness classes on cultural property, such 
as artifacts, sites, and monuments (Trimble 2005).  
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Picture 22: Security Patrol, in vicinity of mass grave site, Iraq 2006 
The Mass Graves Investigation Team was not always able—or permitted—to answer all 
these requests due to the nature of their mission while in Iraq. However, the Mass 
Graves Investigation Team was designed within a military hierarchy where the analyst 
served as a forensic archaeologist and security liaison (Trimble 2009) whose duties 
involved: walking the defensive perimeter; communications checks with higher military 
headquarters; coordination of air support assets; forensic archaeological survey and 
excavation; troop advising, education, and outreach; and laboratory assistance (Trimble 
2009; White and Livoti 2013: 204). The Mass Graves Investigation Team combined 
sound archaeological and forensic investigation while maintaining:  
 (1) Vigilant situational combat awareness; 
 (2) Public education and outreach; and  
(3) Continuous liaison with the media, indigenous population, and authorities in a 
counterinsurgency environment—all the attributes necessary for success in 
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conducting archaeological operations in a counterinsurgency (White and Livoti 
2013: 204).  
 
Picture 23: Mass Graves Investigation Team Archaeologist teaching American 
warfighters and contractors about cultural property awareness in Iraq, Summer 2006 
The Mass Graves Investigation Team leadership embraced counterinsurgency 
principles, including the civil-military cooperation concept, by seeking key personnel 
from both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and from outside the Department of 
Defense, as well as medical institutions, law enforcement organizations, and academia 
(USACE 2006: 8). Due to Mass Graves Investigation Team’s efforts, Saddam Hussein 
and his regime were brought to justice, tried, and sentenced (White and Livoti 2013: 
204).   
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Picture 24: Mass Graves Investigation Team Archaeological Expeditionary Camp, Iraq 2006 
3-35. While the above vignettes represent successful proofs of concepts, they were 
designed to be temporary in nature and only for specific missions. So far, this section 
has demonstrated how the destruction of cultural property and illicit sales thereof are 
having devastating effects on multiple levels (archaeological record, destruction of 
museums, funding of terrorist and insurgent organizations) which ultimately provides the 
terrorist and/or insurgent the means to destroy cultural property and human life. In 
response to this, many cultural organizations and academics are content to issue call 
for papers rather than a call for action (Bogdanos 2008: 121)—it’s time for the American 
archaeological community and military to take action.   
Call to Action 
3-36. Similar to warfare, archaeology is both an art and a science, and the line between 
art and science is often blurred. During war, campaigns and battles are never the same, 
just as archaeological surveys and excavations can differ dramatically, based on 
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research goals, environmental factors, and recovered artifacts (White and Livoti 2013: 
199). Another important similarity is that war (Clausewitz 2010: 39) and archaeology 
(Goode 2007: 164) are both political and are deeply connected with the realities of 
political discourse (Meskell 2001: 18, 19). “No longer is archaeology regarded as a 
neutral or a purely scientific discipline, but as a process influenced by the aims of its 
practitioners, who are, in turn, deeply affected by contemporary intellectual, social and 
political agendas” (Gillot 2010: 1). Therefore, the tools and personnel employed for 
success in both archaeology and war will often “depend on the situation” (King 2004: 
15). At any time during war, rogue military personnel, criminals, and terrorists may take 
advantage of the chaos in order to destroy and/or loot cultural property, permit such 
actions, or remain indifferent. During this time, open-minded, ethically conscious 
American military combatant commanders truly need archaeologists the most (White 
and Livoti 2013: 200).   
3-37. Despite this reality, some archaeologists refuse to coordinate with the military on 
ethical grounds (Wegener 2008: 165). As stated earlier, refusal to work with the military 
merely provides an excuse for military leaders and planners to downplay cultural 
property concerns (Wegener 2008: 165). It also makes it difficult for archaeologists to 
deal with military officers who may be totally oblivious and/or not care about the 
importance of cultural property preservation before, during and after battle (Nicholas 
1995: 281). In addition, refusal to work with the military is a disservice because it 
neglects the role of stakeholders—both military and private—and the preservation and 
protection of cultural property (White and Livoti 2013: 201). Furthermore, most critics of 
the military’s efforts on cultural property protection in time of conflict wish only to 
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arbitrate a no-strike-list or deploy to a military area of operation and protect cultural 
property only if it is safe and/or when the fighting is over (White and Livoti 2013: 201). 
This approach is flawed for the following three reasons:  
(1) A no-strike-list has its place throughout military operations, but it fails to 
consider and incorporate other types of cultural property (archaeological sites, 
traditional cultural properties) as the fight on the battlefield will inevitably evolve 
(White and Livoti 2013: 201). 
(2) Going to battlefields to preserve and mitigate the effects of warfare on cultural 
property after the fight is often pointless, as the damage and/or destruction has 
already taken place (White and Livoti 2013: 201).  
(3) In time of conflict, host nation governments and American military 
organizations must tend to the social by-products of war (combatting terrorists 
and or insurgents, restoring infrastructure), and they have few resources and 
trained personnel to track and properly identify looted cultural property 
(Bogdanos 2008: 121).   
3-38. Action requires organization and organization requires a new concept for 
proactive and robust cultural property protection on the battlefield. This concept is 
operational archaeology and the operational archaeologist.  
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Section 4 
Applied Archaeology in Action: Operational Archaeology 
We should be very clear on one thing, there is no doubt that antiquities trafficking 
is funding terrorism and has since 2005…In terms of what percentage, you 
should not confuse what is publicly released with what exists. Like it or not, 
because of the connection to terrorist activities, the vast majority of this 
information is classified (Bogdanos 2015: 1). 
4-1. “Operational archaeology employs the art and science of archaeology to support 
military operations, including, but is not limited to combat and humanitarian operations” 
(White and Livoti 2013: 204). The goal of operational archaeology is simple: to save 
lives (including those of the enemy) and to save cultural property from destruction—in 
that order. In the case of looted cultural property and the funding of terrorist and 
insurgent activities—saving cultural property itself will translate into saving lives as well.  
4-2. The concept of operational archaeology asserts however that tracking down looted 
cultural property and tending to the social by-products of war are one in the same—as 
both have the same end state63—saving lives.  
4-3. Operational archaeology works within the parameters of a third-party determinant in 
the same manner as public archaeology, applied anthropology, and cultural resource 
management (White and Livoti 2013: 204-205). During military operations, an 
 
63 End State is a set of required conditions which defines the achievement of the combatant commander’s 
objective(s) (JP 3-0 2011: GL-9).   
 
120 
 
operational archaeologist64 will liaison on behalf of the military commander with military 
and civil authorities via a unity of effort65. The operational archaeologist must fully 
integrate all efforts into the combatant commander’s plan of action. This includes 
providing support to the combatant commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver66, as 
well as mutually supporting higher and adjacent military organizations working within the 
context of achieving stability and security (White and Livoti 2013: 200, 202).  
4-4. Operational archaeologists must take an applied approach and execute a “boots-
and-trowel-on-the-ground” plan of action in concert with and in support of the combatant 
commanders’ efforts. This includes working at the local level as well as working in close 
concert with military intelligence personnel. Archaeologists can no longer be bystanders 
to what transpires in the Global War on Terrorism nor can the American military 
disregard the importance in preserving cultural property in their areas of operation. 
There needs to be a unified effort by the American military and archaeological 
community to incorporate, train, and employ operational archaeologists in a proactive 
manner which will become a permanent fixture in the American military. This will not 
 
64 The operational archaeologist should not be confused with the Cultural Heritage and Preservation 
Officer specialty- which is based in the Civil Affairs military occupational specialty. The operational 
archaeologist is based in the field of military intelligence. 
 
65 Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized 
objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command structure (FM 1-02 2004: 1-
194). 
 
66 Scheme of Maneuver is the description of how a military unit will accomplish the commander’s intent 
(JP 1-02 2011: 321). 
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only preserve cultural property, but more importantly, save human life in the Global War 
on Terrorism and future military conflicts.   
4-5. The operational archaeologist will demonstrate to combatant commanders that 
implementing the simplest methods of cultural resource management and awareness 
into the military decision-making process can protect cultural property and do so without 
compromising mission success, intelligence, and most importantly, protecting and 
saving human life and cultural property on the battlefield. The challenges an operational 
archaeologist will face in preserving cultural property in a counterinsurgency 
environment is the same challenge a military engineer will encounter in restoring 
essential service infrastructure (electricity, schools, roads etc.). Both must operate 
within the insurgency as a counterinsurgent, and like military engineers, operational 
archaeologists working for the military in a time of armed conflict will not succeed by 
working in a vacuum (White and Livoti 2013: 201-202). Here the operational 
archaeologist will be part of a coordinated effort of military professionals working toward 
the same goal of saving lives on the asymmetric battlefield.    
4-6. If operational archaeologists are to effectively manage and protect cultural property 
on the battlefield, they must not only be technically proficient in archaeological skillsets 
and site management planning, but also proficient in military culture, language, tactics, 
techniques, procedures, and planning (Edsel 2009: 60; White and Livoti 2013: 205). 
This is because once the operational archaeologist is assigned to a combatant 
command he or she becomes a warfighter and a counterinsurgent and needs to ensure 
the combatant commander has both tactical courses of action regarding cultural 
property protection (White and Livoti 2013: 200). At its most basic, the operational 
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archaeologist’s preparation for preserving cultural property during counterinsurgency 
operations requires three things:  physical fitness, study of the host nation’s history and 
archaeology, and endless training to build muscle memory and install confidence while 
conducting cultural property preservation on the battlefield (Bogdanos 2005a: 116).   
The following is a billet description in how an operational archaeologist could function as 
a member of a combatant command. The following section is based on the five-
paragraph operations order format67 currently in use by the American military.   
Operational Archaeologist68 Billet Description and Responsibilities 
4-7. I. Situation   
Since the events of September 11, 2001 there has been insufficient cooperation 
between archaeologists and the American military regarding the identification, 
protection, and preservation of cultural property in American military areas of 
operation in the Global War on Terror.      
4-8. II. Mission 
Assign operational archaeologists to combatant commands in order to advise the 
commander, train warfighters, investigate and survey cultural landscapes, sites, 
and monuments; and conduct liaison with civil and military authorities on cultural 
property preservation, management, and methods before, during, and after 
 
67 Operational orders are used for combat operations, humanitarian operations, military social and 
sporting events, and billet descriptions and responsibilities.  
 
68 The operational archaeologist should not be confused with the Cultural Heritage and Preservation 
Officer specialty- which is based in the Civil Affairs military occupational specialty. The operational 
archaeologist is based in the field of military intelligence.  
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combat and/or humanitarian operations. 
4-9. III. Execution: 
4-10. a. Concept of Operation: 
4-11. 1. Selection to serve as an operational archaeologist will be open to U.S. citizens 
who possess a bachelor’s degree or higher in anthropology, archaeology or 
related field and the ability to receive a TOP SECRET security clearance.   
4-12. 2. Once selected the operational archaeologist will attend a Uniformed  
Service’s (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard) military 
intelligence school (in accordance with rank69) in order understand the 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield process and the military decision-
making process. Upon graduation from said course, the operational 
archaeologist can serve in as a military intelligence70 officer or warfighter while 
assigned to the combatant command.  
4-13. 3.  Operational archaeologists will conduct all manner of training relating to  
combat preparedness which will permit them to operate in a myriad of 
environments (such as counterinsurgency).  
 
 
69 During counterinsurgency, “Rank is nothing: talent is everything (Kilcullen 208: 31). The operational 
archaeologist can be officer or enlisted.  
 
70 Historically archaeologists and anthropologists have served in military intelligence when volunteering to 
serve in their nation’s armed forces (See: Allen 2013; Bamberger 1970; Bernhardsson 2005; Coon 1980; 
Harris and Sadler 2003; McIntyre 1989; Morell 1995; Pringle 2006).  
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4-14. b. Tasks71 
4-15. 1.  Assist and advise the combatant commander in all manner of planning  
for and execution of missions regarding military necessity and cultural property 
awareness.  
4-16.  2. Conduct reconnaissance, survey, and assessment of cultural property  
before, during, and after combat and or humanitarian operations.  
3. Identify hazards and assess risks associated with natural, accidental, or 
intentional events as they pertain to cultural property, and provide guidance to 
civil and military institutions on mitigation steps before, during, and after military 
operations.    
4-17. 4. Promote mitigation and preparedness training with warfighters and the  
host nation cultural property community via liaison and joint training. 
4-18. 5.  Assist higher, adjacent, and subordinate military organizations  
responsible for the care and preservation of culturally and historically  
significant resources and properties. 
4-19. 6. Educate warfighters of potential risks for specific missions and how they  
will affect cultural property before, during and after operations. 
4-20. 7. Provide guidance to the combatant commander in the prioritization of  
available resources (i.e. funds, equipment, personnel) for specific cultural/historic 
sites that may need assistance. 
 
71 Majority of tasks modified from the Scope (Section II) in the Cultural Property Appendix 1 
Appendix to the Emergency Support Function 11 Annex of the Utah Emergency Operations Plan (Utah 
2012: 4).   
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4-21. 8. Provide guidance, coordination, and assistance in long-term cultural  
property resource management strategies for both follow-on military forces and 
host nation cultural property officials.  
4-22. 9. Conduct site exploitation of looted archaeological sites to assist  
warfighters in supporting military intelligence organizations and/or counter-threat 
finance organizations via the collection of information and data in order to 
produce actionable military intelligence for the purpose of saving lives and saving 
cultural property.  
4-23. IV. Administrative/Logistical Requirements: 
4-24. a. Logistical Requirements: 
4-25. 1. The operational archaeologist will have a standard issue military kit72  
including M9 pistol and M4 carbine rifle. Any archaeological/field equipment 
needed for conducting archaeological operations can be made via a request from 
the operational archaeologist’s supply and/or logistics officer.   
4-26. b. Administrative Requirements: 
The operational archaeologist will be subject to all laws and regulations involving 
deployment during domestic/overseas operations and training exercises.    
4-27. V.  Command and Signal 
4-28. a.  Command: 
4-29. The chain of command for the operational archaeologist is the unit intelligence 
officer (or designated officer), followed by the combatant commander (or designated 
 
72 Basic standard military issue includes but is not limited to a uniform, boots, rucksack, day pack, body 
armor, kevlar helmet, and other gear required for specific missions.  
 
126 
 
officer). For evaluation purposes73, the unit intelligence officer (or designated officer) will 
serve as the operational archaeologist’s reporting supervisor followed by the combatant 
commander (or designated officer), who will serve as the reviewing supervisor on the 
evaluation.    
4-30. During day-to-day operations, the operational archaeologist will work out of  
the unit intelligence section (or designated section) and reports daily to the 
intelligence officer (or designated officer) in order to provide updates and 
progress. During military training exercises and operations, the operational 
archaeologist will also coordinate with the unit operations officer and/or other 
personnel as directed.    
4-31. b. Signal: 
4-32. The operational archaeologist will use standard radio communication  
equipment and will initiate communication checks and situation reports as per 
order and/or standard operating procedure by direction of the combatant 
commander and/or communications officer. 
4-33. The operational archaeologist’s duties will straddle many different facets of a 
military organization. It is therefore imperative that the operational archaeologist not 
only understand military organizational dynamics, but more importantly, the complex 
nature of the environment he or she will operate.  
 
73 Each military service has different terminology for the chain of command when it comes for evaluation 
of its personnel.   
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Cultural Heritage Assessment and Advisory Detachment (CHAAD)74 
4-34. As stated earlier in reference to the Convention, the Cultural Heritage and 
Preservation officer specialty exists but there is not dedicated military unit established to 
organize and deploy 38G’s (or operational archaeologists) overseas in American 
military areas of responsibility.  
4-35. In response to this, the analyst created the Cultural Heritage Assessment and 
Advisory Detachment (CHAAD). As of this writing, the CHAAD is in the initial stages of 
development. The analyst has been working closely with an active duty officer who 
holds a doctorate in Fine Art/Classical Reception and is along with the analyst one of 
the first officers to be designated with the cultural heritage and preservation specialty. 
The capabilities75 of the CHAAD are the following:  
4-36. 1. Assist and advise the combatant commander in all manner of planning  
 for and execution of missions regarding military necessity.  
4-37. 2. Conduct reconnaissance, survey, and assessment of cultural property  
 before, during, and after combat and or humanitarian operations. 
4-38. 3. Identify hazards and assess risks associated with natural, accidental, or  
intentional events as they pertain to cultural property and provide guidance to 
civil and military institutions on mitigation steps before, during, and after military 
 
74 The CHAAD concept should not be confused with the Army’s new Monuments Men unit. The CHAAD, 
like the operational archaeologist, is designed to function under military intelligence, not Civil Affairs.  
75 The capabilities development is based upon the State of Utah: Cultural Property Appendix to the 
Emergency Support Function 11 Annex of the Utah Emergency Operations Plan from the time the analyst 
served as the Cultural Property Liaison officer for the Utah National Guard (State of Utah 2012: 1).  
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operations.    
4-39. 4. Promote mitigation and preparedness training with warfighters and the  
 host nation cultural property community via liaison and joint training.  
4-40. 5.  Assist higher, adjacent, and subordinate military organizations  
responsible for the care and preservation of culturally and historically significant 
resources and properties. 
4-41. 6. Educate warfighters of potential risks for specific missions and how they  
 will affect cultural property before, during and after operations. 
4-42. 7. Provide guidance to the combatant commander in the prioritization of  
available resources (i.e. funds, equipment, personnel) for specific cultural/historic 
sites that may need assistance. 
4-43. 8. Provide guidance, coordination, and assistance in long-term cultural  
property resource management strategies for both follow-on military forces and 
host nation cultural property officials. 
4-44. 9. Conduct site exploitation of looted archaeological sites to assist  
 warfighters in supporting military intelligence organizations and or counter-    
 threat finance organizations. 
4-45.  The CHAAD, and the operational archaeology concept is the latest effort of the 
analyst to promote a proactive and intelligence based military cultural heritage 
protection organization in the Armed Forces of the United States. More progress to 
come.  
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Section 5 
Applied Theories 
  We all use theory whether we like it or not (Johnson 2011: 26).  
The Complexity of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
5-1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are forms of warfare that are both challenging and 
complex in nature (Petraeus et al. 2007: 1; MCDP-1 1997: 12; Rouzer 2009: 179). The 
complexity of an insurgency stems from its ability to operate on different levels of time 
and space and across international boundaries. Insurgencies also operate with post-
modern capabilities as well as pre-modern structures and ideologies (Kilcullen 2009:  6; 
Miller and Page 2007: 234). This combined with differences in populations, unfamiliar 
terrain, and the counterinsurgents and insurgents themselves (Moyar 2009: 5) makes for 
an extremely complex environment. The purpose of today’s military operations during the 
Global War on Terror is to counter a global insurgency led by terrorist organizations 
(Kilcullen 2010: 166). To better understand the challenges of global insurgency, many 
counterinsurgents employ complexity theory (Kilcullen 2004: 22).   
Complexity Theory 
5-2. Complexity theory is a multi-discipline field of study (Beech 2004: 3) of self-
reinforcing interdependent interactions and how such interactions create evolution, 
fitness, and surprise (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003: 56). Operational archeologists should 
be interested in complexity theory because it is used specifically for the study of 
complex systems of interacting agents—which is what all human societies are past and 
present (Bentley and Maschner 2003: 5). Complex systems are self-organizing and 
adaptive in that they actively attempt to turn any circumstance they are presented into 
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an advantage (Waldrop 1992: 11). This is the same for insurgencies and their 
subsequent actions and organizational efforts (i.e. looting) on the battlefield.  
5-3. Many counterinsurgents recognize insurgencies as not only complex, but organic 
systems as well—in that organic systems adapt, evolve and change their behavior 
frequently —often in response to the actions of counterinsurgents (Kilcullen 2010: 29; 
Moyar 2009: 5). It is therefore imperative for the counterinsurgent to achieve maximum 
awareness of the complex environment and gain the advantage before the insurgent 
does by applying a holistic world-view in which the complex environment is recognized 
as an integrated whole of interdependent organic systems and organisms (Capra 1996: 
6). This awareness offers innovative mechanisms for improving the local population’s 
quality of life; including health care, education, business, and other day-to-day activities 
(Capra 1996: 3). 
5-4. Interdependence of organisms within the complex environment of American military 
areas of responsibility provides the driving force that maintains an insurgency via 
feedback loops (Kilcullen 2004: 23, 24). “A feedback loop is an arrangement of circular 
causality within a system, such that a self-reinforcing ‘vicious circle’ develops: A causes 
B, which exacerbates A, which in turn intensifies B, and so on” (Kilcullen 2004:  
Appendix C, 3). These principles can be used specifically to understand and recognize 
the looting of cultural property as a phenomenon on the asymmetric battlefield (White 
and Livoti 2013: 208), its interdependence within the insurgency, and its existence as a 
microorganism operating within the organism of insurgency itself. Just as complexity 
theory can be used to examine an insurgency, it can also be used to examine and 
understand the looting phenomenon taking place on contemporary asymmetric 
131 
 
battlefields.   
Complexity Theory and Archaeology 
5-5 As stated earlier, looted cultural property is a substantial economic commodity in the 
funding of insurgents’ training, indoctrination, propaganda, weapons, and explosives 
(White and Livoti 2013: 208). Insurgent violence (including terrorism) causes a lack of 
legitimate commerce (White and Livoti 2013: 208). The lack of commerce causes 
poverty and compels some of the population to loot cultural property in order to make a 
living (White and Livoti 2013: 208, 210). The looting is facilitated by smugglers in league 
with the insurgency (White and Livoti 2013: 210). Via the sale of illicit antiquities, the 
looters provide funding to the insurgency (White and Livoti 2013: 210). The insurgency 
then conducts more violence and intimidation of the population (White and Livoti 2013: 
210). This violence suppresses legitimate commerce, which, in turn, causes widespread 
poverty and compels some of the population to loot cultural property (White and Livoti 
2013: 210), hence, a repeatable feedback loop (Figure 1) that provides the power to fuel 
the insurgency (Kilcullen 2004: Appendix C, 6).  
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Figure 1 Looting Organism: Socio-Economic Dislocation Model76 
5-6. Deny the commodity of looted cultural property within the cycle of the looting 
feedback loop, and the insurgency loses power and significantly loses influence within 
the insurgency organism (complex system) (Kilcullen 2004: 23) which in turn will 
degrade the life force of the insurgency. It is therefore imperative to employ cultural 
property protection to deny insurgents and terrorists a funding mechanism that not only 
destroys cultural property but facilitates the violent loss of human life (White and Livoti 
2013: 210).   
5-7. In keeping with the counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, all efforts to preserve 
cultural property will be at the local level via rapid ethnographic and archaeological 
 
76 Based on Kilcullen’s Socio-Economic Dislocation Model (Kilcullen 2004: Appendix C, 6; See White and 
Livoti 2013: 210). 
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assessments with local stakeholders (White and Livoti 2013: 210). As with any other 
effective counterinsurgency endeavor, a bottom-up (Kilcullen 2010: 155-159) solution is 
necessary to mitigate if not eliminate looting (White and Livoti 2013: 210). A bottom-up 
approach is analogous to the same methods U.S. forces employ in eliminating roadside 
bomb factories— aggressive reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and direct 
engagement with tribal and local leaders—not via bureaucrats at the national level 
(White and Livoti 2013: 210). Counterinsurgency begins at the local level and so does 
cultural property protection (White and Livoti 2013: 210).   
Combined Arms Concept 
5-8. The art and science of combined arms has existed for centuries (House 1984:1) 
and was practiced by ancient armies such as the Greeks and the Egyptians (Gabriel 
and Boose Jr. 1994: 50, 152). Combined arms is a military term for the coordinated 
application of several arms such as infantry, armor, field artillery, combat engineers, air 
defense, and aviation in order to achieve an effect on the battlefield that is greater than 
if each arm were used in sequence or separately (FM 1-02: 2004: 1-37; FM 3-0 2008: 4-
7). Here different arms and weapons systems can be used in concert to maximize the 
survival and combat effectiveness of each other (House 1984: 2). This will maximize 
combat power by using all available resources to achieve the best advantage on the 
battlefield (MCDP-1 1997: 94). 
5-9. Combined arms is a military term for the coordinated application of several arms—
such as infantry, armor, field artillery, combat engineers, air defense, and aviation in 
order to achieve an effect on the battlefield that is greater than if each arm were used in 
sequence or separately (FM 1-02 2004: 1-37; FM 3-0 2008: 4-7). The military combined 
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arms concept can be applied to the employment of archaeological theory—especially in 
areas of armed conflict and counterinsurgency. As mentioned earlier archaeologists 
wishing to work for the American military must understand that looting on the battlefield 
does not exist in a vacuum (White and Livoti 2013: 208) but in a complex environment, 
including “complex physical terrain, complex human terrain, and complex informational 
terrain” (Indiana National Guard 2007: 4). This environment exists because 
insurgencies are complex forms of engagements that straddle the boundaries between 
armed conflict, government, social stability, and moral acceptability (Kilcullen 2004: 21).  
As a complex system, [insurgencies] also possess multiple interactions, nonlinearity, 
contingency, and dynamics (Agar 2004: 413). Therefore, archaeological theory and 
complexity theory have much to offer to one another “from epistemology down to 
methodological detail” (Agar 2004: 413)—but which archaeological theoretical 
paradigm(s) is the most appropriate for applying in a counterinsurgency environment?  
The answer is simple: it depends (King 2004: 15). [Operational archaeologists] can find 
common ground in complexity theory (Bentley 2003: 9)— especially in 
counterinsurgency environments. This is because it allows for the envelopment of 
archaeological theory which can be applied in different manners as well as different 
times and places (Bentley 2003: 9). This also includes combining different theoretical 
paradigms to meet the complex challenges present in myriad of circumstances that 
exist in a counterinsurgency. This is also true for military action when using the various 
types of arms and weapon systems in the American military’s arsenal.   
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Combined Archaeological Theoretical Approach 
5-10. In war as in archaeology, there is no “one size fits all” theoretical paradigm during 
armed conflict—especially when it comes to cultural property protection and 
preservation operations. “Semper Gumby” is Marine Corps slang to always be flexible 
when approaching any challenge on or off the battlefield. Flexibility reminds the 
archaeologist that there is no rote way to do archaeology (King 2005: 52) and the same 
goes for archaeological theory.  
5-11. The combined archaeological theoretical approach—based on the military 
combined arms concept recognizes that multiple theoretical approaches (within the 
foundational framework of complexity theory) can be applied in concert to maximize the 
effectiveness to safeguard cultural property and save human life when engaging the 
complex situations (three block war example) which arise during counterinsurgency 
operations. For example, the operational archaeologist may choose to apply processual 
theory when investigating a looted site but may draw from post-processual theory while 
engaging the local population in order to determine why the site was looted. The 
possibilities of the combined theoretical approach are endless and again will depend on 
the situation (King 2004: 15).  
5-12. The combined archaeological theoretical approach, based on the military concept 
of combined arms, recognizes that more than one theoretical research design may be 
appropriate when engaging the complex issues that arise on an asymmetric battlefield 
in both spatial and temporal contexts. For example, the operational archaeologist may 
choose to use a processual approach when investigating a looted site but may take a 
more post-processual approach when engaging the local population in order to 
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determine why an archaeological site was looted. The possibilities of the combined 
theoretical approach are endless and again will depend on the situation. Such situations 
may include the following:  
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing 
displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they 
will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations –
and finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the 
same day ... all within three city blocks.  It will be what we call the ‘three block 
war’.77 
5-13. The narrative above has been played out many times since September 11, 2001 
and is the reason why complexity theory assists as a framework for employing the 
various archaeological theories that will be needed in the myriad of situations that may 
arise. This means all counterinsurgents must be prepared to employ both soft power 
tactics78 and hard power tactics79 (White and Livoti 2013: 197) at all times. All 
warfighters must be prepared for any contingency, and this includes the operational 
archaeologist. Like laws and regulations however, “theory alone is never enough” 
(Kohler and van der Leew 2007: 6).   
 
77 Former Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak in an address to the National Press Club, 
Washington D.C.10 October 1997.   
78 Soft power is the method of co-opting people rather than coercing them. Rests on the ability to shape 
the preferences of others on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values (Nye 2004: 18, 19). 
79 Hard power rests on coercion based on inducements (carrots) and or threats (sticks) (Nye 2004: 18, 
19).  
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Section 6 
Applied Archaeological Methodologies 
The work of applied anthropologists is often undertaken in new contexts. It 
involves researching new topics, asking different questions and requires 
innovative methodologies80 (Pink 2006: 910). 
6-1. Applied anthropology is the employment of anthropological knowledge and 
methods to solve real-world problems, often for a specific client (Haviland et al 2005: 
737). This definition of applied anthropology is in keeping with UMDA program’s 
commitment to apply anthropological theory and research and engage contemporary, 
real-world and relevant issues (UMDA 2016: 1). In the context of this dissertation 
defense, the specific client is the American Armed Forces. Keeping this in mind, its also 
important to recognize that when practicing applied archaeology, a hypothesis gives 
structure and efficiency to a piece of archaeological research. Its also important to 
approach archaeology as not a science or discipline in its own right but as a box of tools 
that we use to investigate hypotheses derived from other disciplines or simply from 
life—the box of tools notion is very useful because it illustrates archaeology’s alliance 
with other disciplines (King 2005: 50). This is especially useful during counterinsurgency 
operations where cultural property protection and preservation is only one piece of the 
puzzle in counterinsurgents’ goal to save human life. 
 
 
80 Methodology is the techniques and methods used to collect and interpret archaeological data (Johnson 
2011: 264).  
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6-2. Therefore, it is important to remember the operational archaeologist is a 
counterinsurgent working for a combatant commander via a unity of effort. It is also 
important to understand there are no universal answers on how to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations (Kilcullen 2006: 1). The same goes for conducting cultural 
property protection during counterinsurgency operations. As a complex phenomenon, 
an insurgency will continuously evolve and the counterinsurgent must evolve as well.  
If a tactic works this week, it might not work again next week; if it works in this 
province, it might not work in the next (Petraeaus et al 2007: 50). 
6-3. The evolving developments during counterinsurgency operations demand the 
operational archaeologist maintain continuous analysis of battlefield conditions and 
maintain situational awareness at all times. As mentioned in the preface, this 
dissertation is a product of analysis. As the operational archaeologist works in the field, 
he or she will need to conduct analysis in the same manner an intelligence officer 
conducts analysis whereby collected information is evaluated and integrated with 
existing information to produce intelligence products that describe the battlefield 
situation (FM 1-02 2004: 1-10).  
6-4. How the operational archaeologist applies his or her archaeological skillsets and 
methodology (or methodologies) will once again “depend” (King 2004:15) on the 
situation. This will include but is not limited to the mission, enemy, terrain, weather, 
personnel available to assist, time on site, consideration for local civilians/stakeholders 
and the situational awareness of local conditions. In the military, warfighters are 
instructed in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Methods on how to apply 
these TTPs are developed at the small unit (local) level and are based on military 
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training, education, and most importantly, experience.   
6-5. Based on this information the operational archaeologist, like other 
counterinsurgents, must remain flexible and adaptive (Kilcullen 2006: 10). Therefore, 
the analyst will not constrain or limit the operational archaeologist to a prescribed 
method (or methods) when tasked with cultural property protection and preservation 
during a counterinsurgency operation. Instead, the analyst wishes to enable the 
operational archaeologist into applying known archaeological methodologies 
(techniques and methods) and develop them into sound and effective cultural property 
protection and preservation mechanisms in synchronization with and in support of the 
combatant commander’s mission and tasks. 
Military Intelligence and Counterinsurgency 
6-6. Counterinsurgency is an intelligence driven undertaking whose focus is on the 
understanding of the operational environment with particular emphasis on the 
population, the host nation, and finally, the insurgents themselves (Petraeus et al 2007: 
79).  Military intelligence81 has been a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations 
 
81 Military Intelligence can be defined as the following: (1) The product resulting from the 
collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas 
of actual or potential operations (JP 1-02 2011: 179) (2) Information and knowledge about an 
adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding (JP 1-02 
2011: 179; MCWP 2-1 2003: A-4) (3) Knowledge of the enemy and the surrounding 
environment that is needed to support decision-making. (MCDP 2 1997: 28).  
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since the days of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar (Boot 2013: 13). Due to the 
complex characteristics of a counterinsurgency environment, it is important to recognize 
that military operations and military intelligence complement one another (Petraeus et al 
2007: 58; Kilcullen 2010: 31). During these complex undertakings, military operations 
will be driven by military intelligence—therefore military commands must “organize for 
their own intelligence” (bottom-up intelligence) and not depend solely on military 
intelligence products prepared and disseminated by higher headquarters (Kilcullen: 
2010: 31; MCWP 2-1 2003: 1-6).    
6-7.  In counterinsurgency operations, combatant commands must “organize for their 
own intelligence82”, as operations will be intelligence driven and not as a product 
prepared and disseminated by higher headquarters (Kilcullen: 2010: 31) (i.e. bottom-up 
intelligence). All military intelligence is anthropological intelligence, no matter what 
forms it may take (Lewis 2011: 67) and this includes operational archaeology. This is 
why the operational archaeologist can serve in the role of an intelligence officer within a 
combatant command. One manner in which the operational archaeologist can drive 
intelligence to facilitate military operations and contribute to saving lives and cultural 
property is conducting site exploitation operations of looted archaeological sites.   
6-8. All archaeological sites have valuable information, and this includes looted 
archaeological sites. Here valuable information can be exploited and can have a direct 
 
82 Military intelligence is a product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, 
evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. It is also 
information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or 
understanding (JP 1-02: 114).   
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impact on stopping the looting of cultural property and the subsequent funding of 
insurgent and terrorist organizations. For a looted archaeological site, site exploitation 
can “recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or 
materiel found during the conduct of operations in order to protect the force and 
produce an advantage within the operational variables to support tactical, operational, 
and strategic objectives” (JP 3-31 2010: IV-24). Site exploitation will also serve as an 
enforcement mechanism of the Convention. This unique archaeological application of 
site exploitation can assist warfighters in protecting human life as well as produce an 
advantage for defeating violence and achieving stability and security (JP 3-31 2010: IV-
24).   
Applied Approaches: Site Exploitation of Looted Archaeological Sites 
6-9. Site exploitation is the systematic search for and collection of information, material, 
and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information 
requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution (FM 3-
90.15 2010: 1-1). In military doctrine, a site is defined as a location that potentially 
contains valuable information (FM 3-90.15 2010: 1-1). This includes looted 
archaeological sites. Artifacts exist in two forms; the historical record83 and 
archaeological record84 (Schiffer 1996: 3). Very often at looted archaeological sites, 
looters will leave behind a collection of sherds near the looted site and instead take 
unbroken artifacts and vessels (Schiffer 1996: 116). The sherds and artifacts left behind 
are still a part of the archaeological context (Schiffer 1996: 4) and hence have a 
 
83 Artifacts that exist within living societies in museums and antique shops (Schiffer 1996: 3). 
84 Artifacts that exist as culturally deposited objects that are no part of society (Schiffer 1996: 3). 
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multitude of information that can be examined to assist the operational archaeologist in 
discovering who is looting the sites and why.   
6-10. Historically, site exploitation operations have been associated with eliminating 
weapons of mass destruction. However, site exploitation operations can contribute to 
defeating a wide range of current and evolving threats on today’s asymmetric battlefield 
(FM 3-90.15 2010:  1-2) including protecting archaeological sites. Site exploitation of 
looted archaeological sites as a data collection mechanism can also examine the 
asymmetric battlefield from both an intelligence driven and archaeological driven 
perspective whereby it provides the warfighter valuable collection of forensics85, 
biometrics86, and evidentiary material to assist in mitigating and/or neutralizing the 
enemy’s ability to fund insurgent and terrorist activities including the identification of key 
individuals who facilitate insurgent and terrorist funding operations. These individuals 
are usually connected to insurgent/terrorist organizations and/or organized crime 
smuggling syndicates. Smugglers only care about making money—whether the cargo is 
drugs, weapons, human beings or cultural property. When pursuing terrorists, American 
forces are now finding them in possession of antiquities (Bogdanos 2005c: 1). This is 
critical as some exploitable sites may contain evidence of war crimes (FM 3-90.15 2010: 
1-1) such as mass graves and malevolent destruction of cultural property.   
 
85 Forensics refers to using “multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. Multidisciplinary 
scientific processes include, but are not limited to, the following disciplines”: Latent prints, DNA and trace 
material, and forensic anthropology (FM 3-90.15 2010: A7).  
86 Biometrics refers to the “measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize 
the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual” (JP 2-0 2007: GL-5).  
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6-11. Looters who come into contact with material culture at archaeological sites will 
leave behind unintentional traces on the looted site and/or the objects they discard.  
These traces87 will more than likely come in the form of fingerprints88 and/or DNA89 
(Moran 2007: 16). Fingerprints (BFF 2012: 75; See Moran 2007) and/or DNA (EP 2012: 
6)—usually in the form of blood and or saliva90 can provide valuable data to the 
operational archaeologist by contributing to the knowledge and understanding of the 
material culture (Moran 2007: 16) left behind at looted sites. Identifying, assessing and 
collecting of fingerprints and DNA will assist in the identification of looters and or 
smugglers (EP 2012: 6).   
6-12. By recognizing all intelligence as anthropological, the operational archaeology 
concept goes a step further in the employment of a holistic approach by examining the 
cultural, material, geographical, historical, biometric, and forensic properties of a looted 
site. In doing so, the actions and skillsets of the operational archaeologist becomes a 
force multiplying91 asset for the combatant commander on multiple levels on the 
asymmetric battlefield. These actions combined with a proactive archaeological 
 
87 Other trace material includes but is not limited to hair, skin cells, nail clippings, fibers (EP 2012: 6).  
88 There are two types of fingerprints left behind on material culture. Latent fingerprints are invisible, left 
behind in sweat. Plastic prints that are left behind in another medium (i.e. clay, wax, grease, or paint) 
(Moran 2007: 16, 17).  
89 Deoxyribonucleic Acid. 
90 Can also be present in feces, urine, and semen left at the site.  
91 A force multiplier is a capability which significantly increases a military organization’s effectiveness 
during combat/humanitarian operations and thus enhances the probability of successful mission 
accomplishment (Kila 2011: 323). 
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awareness will not only preserve and protect cultural property but more importantly save 
human life.     
Conclusion 
6-13. The looting of cultural property on the battlefield does more than destroy the 
archaeological record, cultural monuments, and museums— it finances terrorist and 
insurgent organizations via the capital generated from its illicit sale on the international 
black market. Consequentially this endangers the lives of people everywhere.  
6-14. As the American military continues to conduct military operations in countries with 
significant cultural property resources, warfighters will continue to be confronted with 
battlefield cultural property issues and have little expertise to draw upon (Wegener 
2008: 171). While there are a solid group of dedicated archaeologists who provide 
outstanding training and education to warfighters before they deploy overseas, this 
alone is not sufficient as their subject matter expertise in cultural property protection are 
needed during and after military operations as well.  
6-15. The American military and archaeological community need to take this a step 
further in creating a cadre of military trained archaeologists. This effort needs to be in 
the same manner military engineers, military lawyers, and military physicians have been 
incorporated into the military for their subject matter areas of expertise while they 
provide an integral piece to saving lives and winning battles.   
6-16. As this section has demonstrated, laws and treaties alone will not suffice in protecting 
cultural property in the event of armed conflict. While the Convention is well intentioned; its 
ratification by the American Senate has not stopped the rampant looting of cultural property 
in American military areas of operation in the Global War on Terrorism. This is because of a 
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failure of policy within the archaeological community as well as the American military and 
government (Rothfield 2008: 5). As a result, there is no enforcement, no specific directives 
and most importantly no presence of American military archaeological personnel on the 
battlefield working for the specific purpose of protecting cultural property. Proponents of the 
Convention (including the analyst) believe that Convention can accomplish the following 
goals:  
6-17. 1. Clarify the obligations of the U.S. Military.  
6-18. 2. Encourage the marking92 of cultural sites. 
6-19. 3.  Give added impetus to the training of U.S. Military personnel in their  
obligations to protect cultural heritage. 
6-20. 4.  Require the U.S. Military to ensure an adequate number of properly trained  
 cultural heritage professionals are part of the military. 
6-21. 5. Encourage better preparation during war planning and gathering of  
information as to the locations of cultural sites in a potential war zone.  
6-22. 6.  Bring greater awareness of the provisions of the convention to war planners. 
6-23. 7. Allow for concerns to be incorporated at an earlier stage of war planning. 
6-24. 8. Prevent resorting to last-minute efforts to obtain the necessary information  
and minimize the risk that cultural sites might accidentally be targeted (Gerstenblith 
2008b: 84).   
6-25. This section has demonstrated the above goals would be much better served with 
operational archaeologists proactively applying Article 4 of the Convention and doing so 
 
92 Marking includes but is not limited to: adding site coordinates via a GPS or on a map. Could also be 
marked with engineer stakes at a site in a secure area.  
146 
 
by serving as permanent members of the American military. This new cadre of subject 
matter experts would not only champion the accomplishment of these goals, but more 
importantly, serve as a continuous reminder to combatant commanders and warfighters 
alike on the importance of protecting and preserving cultural property before, during, 
and after military operations. 
6-26. Archaeologists must take an applied approach and execute a boots-on-the-ground 
plan of action in cooperation with the American military. Archaeologists can no longer 
be bystanders to what transpires in the Global War on Terror. Nor can the American 
military disregard the importance in preserving cultural property in their areas of 
operation. There needs to be a unified effort by the American military and 
archaeological community to incorporate, train, and employ operational archaeologists 
and pick up where the Monuments Officers, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group 
and the Mass Graves Investigation Team left off, and build upon it in a proactive, unified 
effort rooted in military intelligence that will become a permanent fixture in the American 
Military: The Operational Archaeologist. 
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1626595&selectedIndex=4&ajaxhist=0  
 
Battlefield Archaeological Excavation Iraq Picture 21 
Courtesy of David Hempenstein 
 
Battlefield Archaeological Survey Iraq Picture 20 
Courtesy of David Hempenstein 
 
USMC Cake Cutting Ceremony Picture 2 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=POUNum%2Bj&id=B9B0505
AAEFBB11AE15D42746D8541E3EDB3D206&thid=OIP.POUNum-
jC0muXWvqTXylyAHaE8&mediaurl=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.dvidshub.net%2Fmedia%2
Fthumbs%2Fphotos%2F1411%2F1647662%2F1000w_q95.jpg&exph=667&expw=1000
&q=cake+cutting+ritual+marine+corps&simid=608025295130460956&selectedindex=0
&ajaxhist=0&vt=0&sim=11  
 
CJ Bauman Combat Artist Picture 5 
Courtesy of Captain CJ Bauman, USMC. Personal Communication  
 
Corinthian Vase Picture 6 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=xdMiop7Q&id=F4338A055D
05FEF6DE2D1C6353DDCEE41EFA09CF&thid=OIP.xdMiop7QtvVwkC0YaZC45QHaF3
&mediaurl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.gettyimages.com%2Fphotos%2Fgreek-civilization-
7th-century-bc-chigi-vase-showing-details-of-a-picture-
id122318207&exph=811&expw=1024&q=seventh-
century+B.C.+Corinthian+vase&simid=607986906735380812&selectedindex=3&ajaxhis
t=0&vt=0&sim=11  
 
U.S. Army Flag Draped Coffin Picture 11 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=0LHhy%2bap&id=2BEE7463
7C678531C8EEE4B921E2AD51BA73D68A&thid=OIP.0LHhy-
apGEK2JomZMItnmwAAAA&mediaurl=http%3a%2f%2fwvutoday-
archive.wvu.edu%2fresources%2f1%2f1251677894.jpg&exph=281&expw=432&q=flag+
draped+coffin&simid=608047809366524776&selectedIndex=9&ajaxhist=0  
 
Goering and Hitler View Looted Artwork Picture 16 
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/archives/photos  
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Jersey Barrier Mural Picture 4 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&id=788A9F363F46D885F36E39C
F433FE2CD544140EB&thid=OIP.bLNfaGwwbnjd27jNRqlqIAHaE8&mediaurl=https%3A
%2F%2Fwww.wired.com%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2Fimages_blogs%2Fdangerroom%2F2011%2F06%2Firaq1377.jp
g&exph=440&expw=660&q=jersey+barriers+in+iraq+graffitti&selectedindex=5&ajaxhist
=0&vt=0&eim=0,1,2,3,4,6,8,10  
 
Mass Graves Archaeologist Teaching American Warfighters, Iraq Picture 23 
Courtesy of Tommy Livoti 
 
Mass Graves Archaeological Expeditionary Camp, Iraq Picture 24 
Courtesy of David Hempenstein 
 
Security Patrol Mass Graves Site, Iraq Picture 22 
Courtesy of David Hempenstein 
 
University of Montana Battle Cross Picture 14 
Courtesy of Tommy Livoti 
 
U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Matt Bogdanos Iraq Museum Picture 116 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&id=FBD8A69CC88FC912FD0064
69C375F85939D1ACC5&thid=OIP.5fuFejjxRRoR4ln9zy58NgHaFD&mediaurl=http%3A
%2F%2Fadst.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F09%2FSoldier-at-Iraq-
Museum.jpg&exph=262&expw=384&q=bogdanos+iraq+&selectedindex=2&ajaxhist=0&
vt=0&eim=0,1,2,3,4,6,8,10  
 
Montana Army National Guard Flag Folding Ceremony Picture 12 
Courtesy of Gabrielle Livoti 
 
Monuments Men Marble Statue Rescue Picture 17 
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/archives/photos  
 
 
Monuments Men Secure Looted Artwork Picture 18 
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/archives/photos  
 
Presidents Own Marine Corps Band Picture 8 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&id=19D453B4D5445562BF136C8
DB5448B16B8CAEB2B&thid=OIP.yc-pEXw-
jjuch7XyV5PC3QHaE7&mediaurl=http%3A%2F%2Fmedia.defense.gov%2F2014%2FJ
un%2F23%2F2000802793%2F-1%2F-1%2F0%2F140623-M-SC493-
001.JPG&exph=1198&expw=1800&q=usmc+president%27s+own+band+picture&select
edindex=0&ajaxhist=0&vt=0&eim=0,1,2,3,4,6,8,10 
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USMC Oath of Office Picture 15 
Courtesy of Tommy Livoti 
 
U.S. Marine Corps Salute Picture 1 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=h7PE8MUM&id=187B17F57
417FB0385E0A742B5F03FFA40FF0434&thid=OIP.h7PE8MUM5sVUc5KKDKpNsgHaE
8&mediaurl=https%3a%2f%2fi0.wp.com%2fblog.usaflagco.com%2fwp-
content%2fuploads%2f2017%2f12%2fmarines-salute-change-of-
command.jpg%3fresize%3d1500%252C1000%26ssl%3d1&exph=1000&expw=1500&q
=marine+corps+salute+&simid=608003708619393403&selectedIndex=16&ajaxhist=0 
 
Stele of Vultures Picture 3 
http://www.ancientpages.com/2016/09/01/sumerian-stele-of-the-vultures-oldest-known-
historical-records-carved-on-limestone/  
 
U.S. Army Soldier Playing Taps Picture 9 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=IB0E6LUq&id=D0BBD786C2
F1E0AE8D03F2FB72DBEB84EA2D5301&thid=OIP.IB0E6LUqgv_LWgdT7XjhuwHaFj&
mediaurl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.tapsforveterans.org%2fwp-
content%2fuploads%2f2017%2f12%2fMilitary-Funeral-Honors-Team-3-
1068x801.jpg&exph=801&expw=1068&q=taps+funeral&simid=608031535719319788&
selectedIndex=54&ajaxhist=0  
 
U.S. Navy Sailor Playing Taps Picture 10 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=MKi17C6V&id=9E06C60286
C6533D60C62AB1037E88E38A521831&thid=OIP.MKi17C6VtFyVK3AFBEpXYAHaFF&
mediaurl=http%3a%2f%2farhiva.dalje.com%2fslike%2fslike_3%2fr1%2fg2011%2fm05
%2fox281267412236223760.jpg&exph=703&expw=1024&q=taps+funeral&simid=6080
42805727726475&selectedIndex=63&ajaxhist=0  
 
U.S. Marine Corps Rifle Salute Picture 13 
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=lj%2fJkRQy&id=D8A01D3C1
5FA9FD4657E6DCA66C9C8CCC558D6E5&thid=OIP.lj_JkRQybmDfySc8KO8rTAAAA
A&mediaurl=http%3a%2f%2fstatic.tvtropes.org%2fpmwiki%2fpub%2fimages%2frsz_ma
rines.png&exph=224&expw=350&q=military+funeral+gun+salute&simid=608043754901
736978&selectedIndex=8&ajaxhist=0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
